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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Three Essays on Corporate Finance 
 
Yuan Zhuang 
 
 
My dissertation aims to better understand managers and financial analysts’ behavior, 
incentives, and constraints, as well as their impacts on firm decisions and financial 
markets. In Chapter 1, I show that peer firms play an important role in determining U.S. 
corporate cash saving decisions. Using an instrument variable identification strategy, I 
find that one standard deviation change in peer firms average cash savings leads to a 
2.63% same-direction change in firm’s own cash savings, which exceeds the marginal 
effects of many previously identified determinants. The economic implications of such 
peer effects are large, which can significantly alter cash savings in a representative 
industry by 7.2%. In cross-sectional tests, I find that peer effects are stronger when the 
product market is highly competitive and when the economy is in recession. In addition, 
less powerful, smaller, and financially constrained firms respond more actively to their 
peers’ cash saving decisions. Finally, I provide evidence that such peer effects are 
asymmetric — cash-rich firms, who already hold enough cash, are less likely to mimic 
peers’ cash policies compared to cash-starved firms. 
A recent strand of literature on stock market feedback examines how agents extract 
information from stock prices when making decisions. In Chapter 2, we investigate 
how analysts learn about the quality of their research from the stock-price reaction to 
 their reports. I find evidence of analyst learning from the stock market when there is a 
strong price reaction to their recommendation changes. Recently impactful analysts are 
more likely to issue recommendation changes and increase their total recommendation 
activity in the next period. These feedback effects are short-lived and also exist at the 
broker level, in which brokers with more influential recommendation changes in a 
month become more active in revising recommendations next month. Our results imply 
that short-term information in recently successful analyst reports gets incorporated with 
a lag to the rest of the coverage universe. A calendar-time strategy that seeks to benefit 
from such predictable spillover can earn abnormal returns of up to 0.6% per month.   
Companies are run by a team of top managers. However, the literature normally 
focuses on CEO when studying managerial influence on firm decision-makings. In 
Chapter 3, I aim to examine the role of other senior managers. Specifically, the effect 
of non-CEO managers’ over-optimism is studied, and it is found that other top 
managers are at least as important as CEOs in corporate decisions. The study shows 
that only the firms with both overoptimistic CEOs and overoptimistic non-CEO 
manager teams would make more investment, use more debt financing, and are less 
likely to pay dividends. Furthermore, overoptimistic CEOs need help of other 
overoptimistic senior managers in translating the growth opportunities into firm value, 
only overoptimistic CEOs alone cannot achieve such success. This result is consistent 
with the recent literature which documents the bright side of managerial over-optimism.
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CHAPTER 1 
DO PEER FIRMS AFFECT CORPORATE CASH SAVING 
DECISIONS? 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Firms do not operate in isolation, studies have uncovered many roles for peer groups 
in affecting various corporate policies (i.e., Shue (2013), Leary and Roberts (2014), 
Popadak (2017)). A recent strand of literature emphasizing the “strategic” role of cash 
implies that peer effects may matter for corporate cash policies.1 Cash can help firms 
to finance competitive strategies, signal the possibility of aggressive behaviors, and 
protect firms from predation risk induced by the rivals. Therefore, paying attention to 
peers’ cash saving decisions would enable firms to better understand the potential 
opportunities and risks, and then adjust their own cash accordingly. In this paper, I 
examine whether firm’s cash changing behavior is influenced by peer effects. I also 
study the economic forces that might explain the existence of such peer effects.  
Fresard (2010) shows that large cash reserves will lead to future market share gains 
at the expense of industry rivals. Therefore, a firm will face greater predation risk in 
the product market when its peer firms increase their cash holdings. Such threat can 
also spur the firm to hold more cash, since Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) find 
evidence that the extent to which a firm is exposed to product market risk is positively 
                                                          
1 See Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007), Fresard (2010), Lyandres and Palazzo (2012), Hoberg, 
Phillips, and Prabhala (2014), and Lyandres and Palazzo (2015). 
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associated with the amount of its cash holdings. On the other hand, when peer firms 
decrease their cash holdings, the firm may also find it optimal to hold less cash, because 
high level of extra cash is always related to the high opportunity cost and potential 
agency problems, it is inefficient for the firm to hold much more cash than that of peers.  
The identification of peer effect is empirically challenging (see the “reflection 
problem” in Manski (1993)). Contextual and correlated effects are two economic forces 
that also induce firms to behave like their peers. Contextual effects are the propensity 
of an individual firm to change cash holdings in some way that varies with the 
exogenous characteristics of the industry peer group. For example, cash saving tends 
to vary with the average investment expenditures or growth opportunities of other firms 
in the same peer groups. Correlated effects wherein individual firms in the same 
reference group tend to behave similarly when they have similar/correlated firm-
specific characteristics or face common institutional environments. For example, 
correlated effect occurs when firms change their cash ratio together because of financial 
crisis. These alternative industry effects, endogenous selection, or spurious correlation 
cannot be interpreted as causal interactions.  
 To address identification problem, I use the lagged relative idiosyncratic stock 
volatility (firm’s own idiosyncratic stock volatility minus industry median 
idiosyncratic stock volatility) of peer firms as an instrument for peer firms’ average 
cash savings. A valid instrument should be associated with the cash savings of peer 
firms, and it should not be driven by common factors. Existing studies document the 
relevance of lagged idiosyncratic stock volatility and firm cash savings (e.g., Riddick 
and Whited (2009), and Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)). These studies find that an 
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increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in corporate cash savings, which is 
consistent with precautionary motivation of holding cash. Similarly, when the average 
of the peer firms’ idiosyncratic stock volatility increases, the average cash savings 
across peer firms should also increase. On the other hand, each firm’s relative 
idiosyncratic stock volatility is unpredictable, distinct from industry stock volatility, 
and only captures firm-specific shocks. Consequently, other firms’ relative 
idiosyncratic stock volatility cannot be directly linked to a firm’s own cash saving 
decisions. This indirect relationship makes peers’ lagged relative idiosyncratic stock 
volatility an ideal candidate for an instrumental variable because it likely satisfies the 
exclusion restriction. Taken together, my primary identification assumption is that, 
one-period-lagged relative idiosyncratic stock volatility across peer firms is correlated 
with their average cash savings, but it is orthogonal to common industry-wide and 
market-wide shocks, which cannot directly influence the firm’s own cash savings.  
Two-stage least square estimation (2SLS) shows that peer effects are statistically 
significant and economically meaningful in influencing corporate cash savings. The 
estimated marginal effect of peer influence is larger than many previously identified 
determinants, such as real size, market-to-book ratio, net equity issuance, net debt 
issuance, and the last period idiosyncratic stock volatility. Specifically, one standard 
deviation increase in the average cash savings of peer firms would lead to the 2.63% 
increase in a firm’s own cash savings. The reverse is also true, that one standard 
deviation decrease in the peers’ average cash savings would lead to the 2.63% decrease 
in a firm’s own cash saving. In addition, the results continue to hold when I further 
control for cash mean-reverting dynamics, when I use an alternative definition of peer 
4 
groups, and when I restrict the sample to the US domestic firms or the periods where 
cash trend disappears.   
Having documented the existence, magnitude, and direction of the peer effect on 
cash savings decisions, I investigate the underlying mechanisms to better understand 
why peer effect matters for cash saving decisions. There are two theories related to the 
peer effects: rivalry-based theory and information-based theory. The rivalry-based 
theory regards imitation as a response designed to mitigate competitive rivalry or risk 
(see Lieberman and Asaba (2006)). A firm that imitates peers’ cash policies could 
alleviate competitive risk from the aggressive actions of rivals, and hence maintain its 
relative position in the product market. On the other hand, imitating peers cash policies 
can not only make firms keeping their competitiveness, but at the same time make them 
avoid holding so much cash that is always related with high opportunity cost and 
potential agency problem. Therefore, if rivalry-based theory works for cash-saving peer 
effects, the learning behavior would be more pronounced in the competitive industries. 
The information-based theory explains peer effects from the aspects of social learning 
and reputation concern, where mimicking the cash policies of peer firms is an efficient 
approach when managers are unsure of the optimal amount of cash maintained within 
firms, or if direct analysis is difficult, costly, and time-consuming, or if a manager 
wants to avoid his/her bad reputation. Therefore, some less powerful firms might be 
more likely to imitate peers’ cash policies, or it is more likely to observe the peer effect 
in bad time, say, financial crisis periods.  
I extend the instrumental variable analyses to test both theories by interacting the 
peer firms’ average cash savings with dummy variables indicating economic status, 
5 
product market competitiveness, and some firm-specific characteristics, such as firm 
market power and financial conditions. The interaction term is also endogenous and 
instrumented for the peer firms’ lagged average relative idiosyncratic stock volatility 
interacted with the indicators. The cross-sectional tests suggest that rivalry-based and 
information-based mechanisms are both economically important. Firms facing a more 
competitive environment, with less market power, as well as smaller and financially 
constrained firms are more sensitive to the cash policies of peer firms. I also find that 
the peer effect is more pronounced during economic recessions, which further supports 
the information-based channel. As the increased uncertainty in bad times make it harder 
for managers to determine firms’ cash policies, learning from peers might be an 
efficient way for them to do so. Furthermore, I find that peer effects in cash savings are 
not symmetric where cash-rich firms, who had already held enough cash, are less likely 
to mimic peers’ cash policies compared to cash-insufficient firms.  
Finally, I examine the economic implications of peer effects in cash savings. Peer 
effect is the economic externality whereby changes to one firm affect the outcomes of 
other firms. If only one manager in an industry mimic its competitors’ cash saving 
decisions, then it is very likely that other forces will pull it back and force a correction. 
However, if peer learning is common in an industry, this may lead to significant 
changes in the industry overall cash savings. By using an excess-variance test pioneered 
by Graham (2008), I find that peer effects can explain some of the variations in cash 
savings observed across industries.2 To understand the economic magnitude, consider 
an industry with an expected cash change by 2% under the assumption of no peer 
                                                          
2 I thank Professor Bryan S. Graham for making his sample code with regard to identifying social 
interactions through excess variance contrasts available online.   
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influence, the observed cash changes in that industry will be between 1.74% and 2.26% 
when peer effect exists.  
The primary contribution of this paper is to provide new insights on corporate cash 
saving decisions. A large volume of the current literature is dedicated to understanding 
a firm’s cash savings from growth and precautionary aspects. Prominent examples of 
those types of studies include Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Acharya, 
Almeida, and Campello (2007), Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011), Riddick and Whited 
(2009), Palazzo (2012), and Fresard (2012). These studies support the evidence that a 
firm’s saving decisions are driven by the managers’ expectations of future investment 
opportunities and future cash flow risk. In this paper, I argue that a firm’s cash saving 
decisions are not independently determined; rather, the cash policies of peer firms also 
play an important role.  
My study also highlights the strategic role of corporate cash holdings by 
demonstrating that firms facing greater product market competition pressures respond 
more actively to the cash policies of peer firms. Keeping close look at the peers’ cash 
holding decisions could neutralize the aggressive actions of its competitors and 
maintain its relative position. Fresard (2010) shows that cash reserves could lead to 
systematic future market share gains and affect industry rivals’ entry or expansion. 
Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) and Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) both 
indicate that a firm’s cash holdings are significantly affected by predatory threats from 
rivals. Lyandres and Palazzo (2016) further stresse the importance of strategic 
considerations in shaping cash policies in innovative firms. Although this study 
provides some evidence regarding how two closest innovation firms’ cash holding 
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choices are interacted with each other, peer effect was not the purpose of their study. 
Considering the manifold uses of cash, I provide empirical evidence of general peer 
effect and find different results.  
Last but not the least, this paper complements a growing body of literature that 
examines the peer effects in a number of corporate policies, such as capital structure 
decisions (Leary and Roberts (2014)), executive compensation and managerial 
decisions (Shue (2013) and Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008)), dividends and share 
repurchases (Popadak (2017) and Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen (2007)), firm 
investment decisions (Fracassi (2016) and Bustamante and Frésard (2017)), stock split 
decisions (Kaustia and Rantala (2015)), corporate disclosure (Seo (2016)), corporate 
governance (John and Kadyrzhanova (2008)), risk aversion and trust (Ahern, Duchin, 
and Shumway (2014)), the adoption of corporate social responsibility (Cao, Liang, and 
Zhan (2015)), and changes in tax paying and reporting behaviors (Bird, Edwards, and 
Ruchti (2016)). I contribute to this line of studies by providing empirical evidence of 
peer effects in corporate cash savings.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample and descriptive 
statistics; Section 3 details the instrumental variable identification strategy and shows 
the main results as well as robustness checks. Section 4 explores the underlying 
mechanisms of peer effects; Section 5 examines the economic implication of cash-
saving peer effect by studying the total incidence of peer effects at the industry level, 
and Section 6 concludes.  
1.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
This paper analyzes the cash saving decisions of U.S. firms publicly traded on the 
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New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the 
NASDAQ. Firms’ accounting data come from the Compustat database from the year 
1980 through 2014. Stock return data for our sample of firms are obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily stock price database. The data on 
lines of credit are from Capital IQ. Text-based network industry classification (TNIC), 
product market fluidity, and TNIC HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) are provided by 
Hoberg and Phillips in their website.3 I exclude firms in financial industries (SIC code 
6000-6999), utilities industries (SIC code 4900-4999), and government entities (SIC 
code greater than or equal to 9000). To ensure consistency throughout primary analysis, 
I require each firm-year observation to have non-missing data for the explanatory 
variables in each empirical model. To reduce the effect of outliers, all ratios are 
winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentile. 
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables in the final sample of 
94,085 firm-year observations (9419 distinct firms) for the empirical analyses. The 
number of observations varies in different tests depending on the availability of data. I 
define peer groups for the primary analyses based on three-digit SIC industry groups.4 
There are 202 industry groups in our sample. I also require each firm has at least five 
other peer firms in each year.5 Below, I also employ, for robustness, text-based network 
industry classification (TNIC) peer group definition that relying on the similarity of 
product characteristics (Hoberg and Phillips (2010), and obtain qualitatively similar 
                                                          
3 I thank Professor Gordon Phillips and Professor Gerard Hoberg for making their text-based network 
industry classification (TNIC) data, and product market data based on their industry classification 
available online. 
4 The choice of three-digit SIC industry group is a balance between minimizing the possibility of 
grouping firms in unrelated business, and ensuring a meaningful number of peers. 
5 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if the number of peer firms are not restricted.  
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results. In Table 1.1, I report the summary statistics for both firm-specific and peer 
firms’ average characteristics. The peer firms’ average characteristics are constructed 
as the equally weighted average of characteristics across all peer firms in the three-digit 
SIC group excluding ith observation. Comparison between summary statistics for firm-
specific and peer firms’ average characteristics indicates that the two groups have 
similar mean values for most variables. At the bottom of the table, I report the number 
of industries and the distribution of the number of peer firms per industry-year 
combination. Over the entire sample, the average and median number of firms in each 
industry-year (peer group) are approximately 23 and 14, respectively.  
1.3 Identification of causal peer effect 
To test whether peer effects exist in cash saving decisions, I analyze the response 
of executives to peer influence based on the linear-in-means model (Manski (1993)) 
and use the instrumental variable strategy to estimate the causal peer effect.  
1.3.1 Linear-in-means model 
In this section, I first describe how linear-in-means model is applicable to test cash 
saving peer effects and proceed to discuss the identification strategy. Manski (1993) 
provides an empirical framework in estimating marginal peer effects based on a “linear-
in-means” model. The model specification is as follows, 
                               𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸(𝑌|𝑍) + 𝛾′𝐸(𝑋|𝑍) + 𝜂′𝑋 + 𝛿′𝑍 +  𝜀                       (1) 
where Y is an outcome variable of interest, Z are attributes characterizing a reference 
group, X and  𝜀 are observed and unobserved firm-specific characteristics that directly 
affect y. Both 𝛽 and 𝛾 represent social interactions: 𝛽 represents the (endogenous) peer 
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effects wherein the propensity of a firm to behave in some way varies with the behavior 
of the peer group, and 𝛾  represents contextual (exogenous) effects wherein the 
propensity of a firm to behave in some way varies with the exogenous characteristics 
of the peer group, respectively (Manski (1993)). The reason why it is called the linear-
in-means model is that the mean regression of y on X and Z has the linear form: 
                         𝐸(𝑌|𝑋, 𝑍) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸(𝑌|𝑍) + 𝛾′𝐸(𝑋|𝑍) + 𝜂′𝑋 + 𝛿′𝑍 .                    (2) 
I rewrite the equation (4) to apply it to peer effects (𝛽) in corporate cash saving 
decisions, that is, 
                     ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡             (3) 
where ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents cash changings for firm i in industry j in year t. The 
(endogenous) peer effect is captured by the effect of  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖𝑗𝑡, which is defined as 
the peer firms’ average cash savings excluding firm i in industry j in year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 
?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝑡 are vectors of firm-specific and peer firms’ average characteristics (i.e., common 
and contextual effects) that influence the changes in cash holdings. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the firm-year 
specific error component. Firm fixed effects 𝜇𝑖 is included to control for omitted firm-
specific factors that potentially influence cash saving decisions, which also allows me 
to identify within-firm variation in cash saving decisions and mitigates the concern on 
the “sticky” cash. I also include year fixed effect, 𝜃𝑡, to control for unmeasured macro 
shocks. 6  In the model, the peer firms average cash saving variable is measured 
contemporaneously, which makes the identification of causal peer effect more difficult 
because it limits the amount of time for firms to respond to one another. Also, the 
                                                          
6  If I include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, the results are quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar.  
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measurement mitigates the scope for possible confounding effects resulting from other 
changes related to the firm’s cash saving decisions (Leary and Roberts (2014)).  
1.3.2 Identification strategy: IV-Peer firm relative idiosyncratic volatility 
As mentioned in the introduction part, the main identification problem arises when 
I try to infer whether the average behavior in reference group influences the behavior 
of individual members that comprise the group. It is called the “reflection problem” in 
Manski (1993), as he explains that “the reflection problem is similar to that of 
interpreting the almost simultaneous movements of a person and his reflection in a 
mirror”. Thus, an OLS regression could not provide the evidence of (endogenous) peer 
effects (Manski (1993), Angrist (2014)). 
To address the identification problem, I use the lagged relative idiosyncratic stock 
volatility across peer firms as a source of exogenous variation in peer firms average 
cash savings. According to the cash saving literature, idiosyncratic stock volatility is a 
determinant of changes in cash holdings. For example, Riddick and Whited (2009) 
show that firms facing more uncertainty have a higher marginal propensity to save from 
their operating income. In addition, by regressing changes in cash on the last period 
idiosyncratic stock volatility, Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) also find that an 
increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in corporate cash savings, which is 
consistent with precautionary motivation of holding cash. Similarly, when the average 
of the peer firms’ idiosyncratic stock volatility increases, the average cash savings 
across peer firms should also increase.  
Although the average value of idiosyncratic stock volatility across peer firms 
satisfies the correlation condition, i.e., correlates with the peer firms’ average cash 
12 
savings, a firm’s own idiosyncratic stock volatility and peers average idiosyncratic 
stock volatility is likely to move together and contain some common industry 
information, this would go against the exclusion restriction. For example, the 
competition within an industry would lead to the increasing idiosyncratic stock 
volatility for the competitors in this industry (see Irvine and Pontiff (2009) and 
Philippon (2003)). Irvine and Pontiff (2009) envision a type of competition in which 
consumers shift their demand from firm A to firm B within an industry and induce more 
idiosyncratic stock volatility for these two firms. Therefore, the firm A’s idiosyncratic 
stock volatility and firm A’s peers (including firm B) average idiosyncratic stock 
volatility contain common factors—demand variation, which will drive the firm A’s 
cash saving and the average cash savings across firm A’s peer firms varying 
simultaneously, thus the identification of causal peer effects by using peers average 
idiosyncratic stock volatility as instrument would fail. To mitigate such concern, I 
construct a measure of relative idiosyncratic stock volatility based on the innovation in 
stock specific volatility. I follow a simple two-step procedure. First, for each firm i in 
industry j, I construct its relative idiosyncratic volatility, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 in year t as its 
actual idiosyncratic stock volatility 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 minus the industry median idiosyncratic 
stock volatility 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡. That is, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 measures for each firm in 
innovation in its own idiosyncratic stock volatility conditional on the industry and year. 
Next, I construct peer firms’ average relative idiosyncratic volatility, denoted as 
𝑃_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙−𝑖𝑗𝑡, as the equally weighted average of 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 across all peers 
in the three-digit SIC group that the firm belongs. In other words, it measures for each 
firm the average innovation in idiosyncratic stock volatility among its peer firms. I lag 
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this shock innovation one year 𝑃_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙−𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  and use it as the source of 
exogenous variation (instrument) for peer firms average cash savings 𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡.  
To measure idiosyncratic stock volatility of an individual stock 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡, I firstly 
estimate equation (6) for each firm on a rolling month basis using daily returns in the 
past 12 months,  
          𝑟𝑖𝑗𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀 (𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏) + 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷(?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝜏            (4) 
where 𝜏 is the subscript for the day and t is the subscript for the month, 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝜏 is the total 
return for firm i in industry j for the day 𝜏, 𝜏 ∈ 𝑡. (𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏) is the daily excess return 
of market portfolio, and (?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏 ) is the daily excess return of equal-weighted 
industry portfolio excluding firm i’s return.7,8 Then, the idiosyncratic return for each 
individual stock is computed as follows: 9  
         𝜀𝑖𝑗?̂? = 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝜏 −  𝑟𝑖𝑗?̂? = 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝜏 − (𝛼𝑖𝑗?̂? + ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀 (𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏) + ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷(?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓𝜏)).      (5) 
Next, the monthly idiosyncratic stock volatility is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the daily idiosyncratic stock return in that month and multiply the square root of the 
number of trading days in the month.10 Moreover, to maintain consistency with the 
periodicity of the accounting data, I average the monthly idiosyncratic stock volatility 
                                                          
7 As explained in Leary and Roberts (2014), “the last industry factor is to remove any variation in 
returns that is common across firms in the industry peer group, but not a priced risk factor”. 
8 Consistent with the definition of peer groups in this paper, industries are defined by three-digit SIC 
code. 
9 For example, to construct daily idiosyncratic returns in February 1985, I estimate the equation (6) 
using daily returns from February 1984 to January 1985. Then using the estimated coefficients and the 
daily factor returns in February 1985 to compute the daily estimated residual (idiosyncratic stock return) 
in February 1985. To obtain daily idiosyncratic returns in March 1985, I repeat the process by updating 
the estimation sample from March 1984 to February 1985 and using daily factor returns during March 
1985. I require at least 150 trading days in each regression. The trading days per year in my sample 
ranges from 150 to 255 days. 
10 I require a minimum of 15 trading days in a month. A similar procedure is used by French, Schwert, 
and Stambaugh (1987) and Fu (2009). 
14 
in each fiscal year to get the annualized idiosyncratic stock volatility 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
1.3.3 Instrumental variable validity 
Although the exclusion restriction of instrument variable cannot be verifiable from 
the data, several arguments support the plausibility of satisfying the restriction. First, 
the instrument’s construction ensures it to be orthogonal to market risk and industry 
risk, and unique to the specific peer firms. To further bolster this argument, I control 
for the industry competition and industry cash flow volatility in the following 
estimations, as well as the firm’s own idiosyncratic stock volatility that is suggested by 
Leary and Roberts (2014) to absorb the remaining correlation. Second, the inclusion of 
a firm’s own and peers average characteristics, as well as firm fixed effects and year 
fixed effect in the empirical regression would further mitigate the concern that peers 
relative idiosyncratic stock return affects corporate cash savings through its correlation 
with some omitted yet common factors rather than through its relevance for peer firms 
cash saving decisions.  
Table 1.2 examines the partial correlations between peer firms’ average relative 
idiosyncratic stock volatility and firm characteristics, to determine whether instrument 
contains some information about firm fundamental characteristics. The reason why it 
is necessary because “economically large correlation between the instrument and 
observable firm characteristics would raise concerns about the extent to which 
instrument may be correlated with unobservable factors” (Leary and Roberts (2014)). 
The results in Table 1.2 indicate that the economic magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients are all tiny. For the only statistically significant coefficient, cash flow, a 
one standard deviation increase in this factor will lead to 1.63 base point increase in 
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lagged average of peer firms’ relative idiosyncratic stock volatility. Such change in 
instrument is about 0.009 standard deviations. Thus, to some extent, the lagged peer 
firms average relative idiosyncratic stock volatility contains no economically 
significant information related to firm’s next period cash saving determinants. In 
addition, the correlation between firm’s relative idiosyncratic stock volatility and peers 
average relative idiosyncratic stock volatility is -0.03, while the correlation between 
firm’s idiosyncratic stock volatility and peers average idiosyncratic stock volatility is 
0.4. The decline suggests that the method purges most of the intra-industry correlation 
in idiosyncratic stock volatility.  
1.4 Empirical results: IV estimation of peer effects in cash saving decisions 
1.4.1 Main results 
In this section, I document the estimation results from the two-stage least square 
(2SLS) regression where the endogenous variable is the peer firms’ average cash 
savings, and the associated instrument variable is the equal-weighted average of 
relative idiosyncratic stock return across peer firms in the last year 
𝑃_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙−𝑖𝑗𝑡−1. The 2SLS regression includes firm-specific, industry-specific, 
and peer firms’ average covariates as well as firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The firm-specific covariates include firm size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, as well 
as the sources and usage of funds from financing and investing activities in year t, i.e. 
the net equity issuance, the net debt issuance, and the net investment (Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Palazzo (2012)). These help to control for other 
factors that drive changes in cash holdings. The industry-specific covariates that 
associate with firm cash savings include industry competitiveness and industry cash 
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flow volatility, which help to control for other industry dynamics that may cause 
changes in cash holdings. The results are presented in the Table 1.3 and reveal that peer 
effects in cash saving decision exist.  
From the coefficients of the first-stage instrumental variable regressions reported 
at the bottom of Table 1.3, we can see that the instrument is strongly and positively 
associated with the peers average cash savings, this is consistent with the theoretical 
arguments on the precautionary motivation for holding cash. Statistically speaking, 
Kleibergen-Paap rk wald F statistics from the first-stage regression exceed the 
requisite 10 to reject the weak instrument null hypothesis (Stock and Yogo (2002)).  
In terms of the second-stage results, the significantly positive coefficient of the 
instrumented peer firms’ average cash savings in each specification supports the 
existence of peer effects in corporate saving decisions. To ease interpretation of 
magnitudes, all the independent variables included in the 2SLS regressions are 
standardized. Thus, the coefficient of 𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡  in column (1) is interpreted as 
follows: one standard deviation increase (decrease) in instrumented peer firms’ average 
cash savings leads to 2.63% increase (decrease) in firm’s cash savings on average. 
Interestingly, the peer effect for cash savings is economically meaningful and larger 
than many previously identified cash saving determinants. For example, a standard 
deviation increase in firm size only leads to cash saving increasing by 0.66%, compared 
to the 2.63% induced by such an increase in peer influence. This indicates that peer 
influence is at least as important an economic determinant of cash savings as other 
standard firm-specific covariates.11   
                                                          
11 The results are quite similar if I control for industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. 
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Although the instrument variable—peers relative idiosyncratic stock volatility has 
already removed the common trend of idiosyncratic volatility, I further control for the 
industry-specific covariates that may still influence the instrument variable and the 
dependent variable simultaneously, such as industry competition and industry risk. 
Industry competition is proxied by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and industry 
risk is measured by the industry average cash flow volatility.12 From the results in 
column (2) to column (4), I find that the results are quite robust, where the estimated 
coefficients of peer firms’ average cash savings are little affected by the inclusion of 
HHI and industry risk.  
Opler et al. (1999) show that firms have target cash levels and cash holdings revert 
to the mean. If a firm held less cash than its target cash levels in the last year, and 
meanwhile its peer firms increase cash savings on average this year, it is possible that 
the peer effect inducing the firm to save more cash would be confounded by the firm’s 
mean-reverting adjustment of their cash holdings to its own target cash ratio. Therefore, 
I further control for the firm prior-year cash savings in column (5), as well as the peer 
firms prior-year cash savings in column (6). The significantly negative coefficients of 
lagged cash savings support the mean reverting dynamics of cash holdings, and 
interestingly, the effect from peer firms average cash savings is still robust and become 
even stronger.  
In contrast to the peer influence, other peer firm characteristics are less important 
for firm cash saving decisions and are sometimes statistically indistinguishable from 
                                                          
12 The industry average cash flow volatility is calculated by following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). 
It is defined as the average of the firm cash flow standard deviations in each year across each three-digit 
SIC code. 
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zero. This suggests that cash saving peer effects are not simply the repackaging of peer 
effects associated with some other corporate policies, such as, leverage, financing, and 
investment. I also control for the fraction of peer firms who pay dividends in the year 
t, to exclude the possibility that the result of cash saving peer effect is the consequence 
of learning peers in dividend policy (see Popadak (2017)). The unreported results show 
that peer effect of cash savings is quite robust and is not influenced by the dividend 
peer effects. 
Overall, the estimation results in Table 1.3 reveal the importance of peer effects in 
corporate cash saving decisions, these effects are economically large, significantly 
larger than many other cash-saving determinants. 
1.4.2 Robustness tests 
In this section, I check the robustness of the main results to some changes under the 
instrument test specification, including an alternative construction of peer groups based 
on the product market, two subsample tests to exclude the confounding effects of 
foreign cash and the trend of cash ratios, as well as a placebo test involving randomly 
selected peers. The results of these tests are included in Table 1.4, and it reveals that 
cash saving peer effects remain economically meaningful except for the pseudo peers 
in placebo test.  
1.4.2.1 Text-based network industry classification (TNIC) peer group definition 
I consider an alternative definition of the peer group by using the Text-based 
Network Industry Classification (TNIC) developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010), 
which is based on firms’ products description (from 10K filings). Specifically, they 
calculate firm-by-firm similarity measures based on the number of words that two firms’ 
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product description have in common. Using this similarity measure, they define each 
firm i’s industry to include all firm js with pairwise similarities relative to firm i above 
a pre-specified minimum similarity threshold. These firm js are TNIC peers of firm i 
in year t. Such peer groups change over time and are firm-specific. The TNIC peers are 
available from 1996 through 2013 because TNIC industries are based on the 
availability of 10-K annual filings in electronically readable format.  
To perform the sensitivity tests, the peer firms average cash savings, the average 
relative idiosyncratic stock volatility, as well as the peer firms’ covariate averages and 
industry characteristics are all recalculated based on the TNIC peer groups. Then, I re-
estimate the 2SLS estimation for the effect of TNIC peers, and find that the peer effects 
in cash saving decisions are not sensitive to the definition of peer group. From the 
estimation results reported in the column (1) of Table 1.4, we can see that TNIC peer 
influence is larger than the three-SIC peer influence—one standard deviation increase 
in TNIC peers average cash savings leads to the 3.15% increase in firm’s cash savings. 
The results remain statistically significant and economically meaningful.  
1.4.2.2 Domestic and multinational firms 
Foley et al. (2007) document that US multinational firms hold vast volume of cash 
overseas to defer the taxation of foreign cash. To alleviate the concern that the 
mimicking behavior of cash savings might be due to the wave of multinationalism in 
an industry and stockpiling foreign cash overseas simultaneously, I re-estimate the 
linear-in-means model of cash savings only for U.S. domestic firms. As suggested by 
Foley et al. (2007), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2012), and Harford, Wang, and 
Zhang (2015), the identification of domestic or multinational firms is based on whether 
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foreign tax income (TXFO) or foreign pretax income is zero or not. Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009) claim that "Visual inspection of several 10-K filings reveals that many 
of the missing values for tax-related and pretax-related variables in Compustat should 
be coded as zero”. Therefore, I firstly replace some missing values as suggested in 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), and then identify domestic firm-years as the periods before 
the existence of the first nonzero value of TXFO or PIFO, or the firms who never report 
TXFO or PIFO in the whole sample period. Imposing these requirements on the data 
translate into a sample of 47081 firm-year observations. The estimated coefficients are 
illustrated in the column (2) of Table 1.4, suggesting that peer effects still exist for 
domestic firms.  
1.4.2.3 The trend in cash holdings 
Considerable attention has been payed to the growing cash holdings in U.S. firms. 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) shows that time t has a significantly positive coefficient 
on average cash-to-assets ratio from 1980 to 2006. The peer effects may be mixed with 
the cash holding trend since it is difficult to explicitly isolate the trend from peer effects 
tests. To address this problem, I firstly draw the line of average cash ratios for U.S. 
firms from 1980 through 2014 in Figure 1. I find that the trend of cash holdings in U.S. 
firms disappears since the year of 2004. Then, I re-estimate the peer effects in the period 
spanning from 2004 through 2014. The estimate coefficients in column (3) of Table 1.4 
are similar with those in main results, which indicate that the existence of peer effect 
in cash saving decisions is not driven by the cash holding trend in U.S. firms.  
1.4.2.4 Placebo test: Pseudo peers 
If the peer effect really matters for corporate cash savings, I should expect that 
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firm’s cash saving decision is not sensitive to the cash policies of unrelated firms. To 
this end, I artificially generate the “pseudo” peers. Specifically, each year, for each firm 
in the sample, I randomly select firms from outside of the firm’s industry and let the 
number of “pseudo” peers matches the number of the true peers.13 I recalculate the 
peers cash savings, instrument variable and peers average covariates based on the 
pseudo peers. The estimation results are illustrated in the column (4) of Table 1.4. 
Given that a peer group composed of randomly selected firms has no economic links, 
the estimated coefficient of instrumented peer firms average cash savings cannot 
influence firm cash savings. In addition, pseudo peer firms’ other characteristics have 
no impact on firm’s cash saving decisions either.  
1.5 Economic mechanisms of peer effects in cash saving decisions 
Having established that peer effects in cash saving decisions exist, I next explore 
the economic reasons to understand the origins and dynamics of peer effects. There are 
two broad theories of business imitation: (1) rivalry-based theories, where firms imitate 
others to maintain competitive parity or to neutralize the aggressive actions of rivals, 
and (2) information-based theories, where firms follow others that are perceived as 
having superior information (see Lieberman and Asaba (2006)). These reasons 
represent the potential mechanisms underlying the peer effects in cash savings.  
1.5.1 Economic mechanisms 
Cash holding is regarded as a preemptive device to gain market share and affect 
                                                          
13 I require that the pseudo peers industry should be different from the firm’s industry at the one-digit 
SIC level.  
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industry rivals’ entry (Fresard (2010) and Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007)), 
managers not only independently determine their optimal level of cash holdings, it is 
important for them to pay attention to that of peers, since lower cash holdings compared 
to peers high cash levels may impair firms competitiveness in product market (Fresard 
(2010)), such as losing out the investment opportunities to competitors. This is 
especially so in a competitive industry, where firms are exposed to higher risks from 
rivals and prices and profits are easily eroded. Since pursuing a differentiation strategy 
is often costly, difficult and risky, firms cannot be certain whether the new position will 
be superior. Given this, firms therefore often choose to pursue homogeneous strategies, 
where they match the behavior of rivals to ease the intensity of competition. Although 
holding enough cash can protect firm from predation risk, it does not mean that holding 
much more cash than peers is an insurance and it is not an efficient way to do so, as 
high level of extra cash holdings is always related to the high opportunity cost and 
potential agency problems. Therefore, it would be beneficial for firms to learn from 
their peers’ cash policies and avoid holding too little or too much. I predict that peer 
effect in cash savings is more pronounced if firms face greater competition pressures. 
Information-based theories explain mimicking behavior from “social learning” and 
“reputation concerns” aspects. It occurs when a manager is unsure about the optimal 
amount of cash maintained within firms, or the direct analysis is difficult, costly and 
time-consuming. Then, imitating cash holding policies of the industry peers without 
regard to his own information would become optimal. Sometimes, managers want to 
avoid their negative reputations and signal their “qualities” through mimicking peers 
financial policies, because they are afraid of proving to be wrong and suffering a loss 
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or reputation. These situations are more likely to happen in relatively weak firms. 
Therefore, I expect that firms with less market power, smaller firms, growing firms, 
and financially constrained firms would be more sensitive to the peer firms’ cash 
holding decisions.  
In addition, it is acknowledged that in recessions and crisis (periods I call “bad 
times”, Loh and Stulz (2017)), firms will experience greater uncertainty and volatility, 
which leads to the larger pressures, difficulties and cost for managers to make plans. 
Therefore, based on the information-based theory, I predict that the peer effects would 
be more pronounced in bad times than in other times.  
1.5.2 Evidence on the economic mechanisms 
To examine the economic channels, I extend the instrumental variable 
identification strategy wherein the endogenous variables are the peer firm average cash 
savings interacted with indicator variables, and the instruments are the lagged peer 
firms average relative idiosyncratic stock volatility interacted with the same indicator 
variables.  
1.5.2.1 Rivalry-based mechanism 
Table 1.5 assesses rivalry-based mechanism for peer effects. To examine this 
channel, I begin with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure industry 
competitiveness, which is constructed for each three digit-SIC industry classification 
and for each fiscal year using all available firms in the Compustat database. Then I turn 
to the text-based network industry classification (TNIC) HHI developed by Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010). Compared to the Compustat HHI, TNIC HHI might be more accurate 
to measure product market competition as it is based on firms’ products description. In 
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terms of HHI measures, the lower the value of HHI, the higher competition within the 
industry. The third proxy for product market competition is excess price-cost margin 
(EPCM). Following Gaspar and Massa (2006), I subtract the industry average price-
cost margin to control for heterogeneities across industries unrelated to the degree of 
competition. A larger excess price-cost margin indicates weaker competition since the 
closer to perfect competition, the greater extent that price will approximate the marginal 
cost.  I also use cash flow volatility to proxy for the competition intensity, as prior 
studies show that “intense product market interactions increase fundamental cash flow 
volatilities because of the increasing sensitivity of firm performance to rival’s 
behaviors” (Seo (2016) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009)). Last but not the least, I use 
“product market fluidity” to proxy the product market threats. This measure is 
constructed by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) capturing how rivals are changing 
the product words that overlap with individual firm’s vocabulary. The larger of this 
measure, the greater product market threat that firm would face. If rivalry-based peer 
effects channel exists, firms who face higher product market threat will be more 
sensitive to the peers’ cash holding decisions.  
In the tests, firms are sorted into terciles based on the values of these competition 
proxies in each year, the indicator variable 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤 is equal to one if firms are ranked into 
the bottom tercile and zero if the firms are at the top tercile. Just the reverse, 𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ is 
equal to one if firms are ranked into the top tercile and zero for bottom tercile.  The 
results in Table 1.5 are consistent with my prediction, where the coefficients of the 
interaction term with high competition indicators are larger than that of the interaction 
variable with low competition indicator. In column (1), column (2) and column (4), the 
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peer effects are only significant for firms who face high competition environment, but 
insignificant for those firms facing relative low-level competition.   
1.5.2.2 Information-based mechanism 
Table 1.6 assesses the information-based mechanism for peer effects on cash 
savings. In Panel A, for each industry-year combination, I rank firms into terciles based 
on the firm-specific measures of market share, gross margin, market cap, book size, 
market-to-book ratio, and firm age. Similarly, the 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤 equals to one for firms at the 
bottom tercile and zero for firms at the top tercile. To the contrary, 𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ equals to one 
for top tercile firms and zero for bottom tercile firms. The results in the Panel A of 
Table 1.6 show that firms with lower product market power (market share), smaller 
firms (market cap and book size), growing and young firms (market-to-book ratio and 
firm age) are more sensitive to their peers’ cash policies than their counterparts.  
In Panel B, I identify financially constrained firms by firstly using indirect proxies, 
such as whether firms have bond rating, pay dividend, or have lines of credit. Sufi (2007) 
provides evidence that lack of access to lines of credit is a more statistically powerful 
measure of financial constraints than other traditional measures used in the literature. 
Secondly, I use direct proxies constructed as linear combinations of observable firm 
characteristics, such as Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Whited and Wu (2006) indices. 
Following convention, firms are ranked into terciles based on their index values in the 
preceding year. Firms in the top tercile are regarded as constrained firms (𝐷1) and those 
in the bottom tercile are unconstrained firms (𝐷2). The results in Panel B of Table 1.6 
exhibit that more financially constrained firms respond more to the peer effects than 
less financially constrained firms. It is well-known that financially constrained firms 
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rely more on internal financial resources, such as cash holdings and cash flows. If they 
hold less cash than that of peers, it is more likely for them to lose when a new 
investment opportunity arrives. Therefore, imitating peer firms cash policies can help 
them keep a “safe” position in the competition. Overall, the results in Table 1.6 are 
consistent with my prediction, they suggest that mimicking behavior is more 
pronounced among those firms with the greater learning motivation and perhaps the 
greater need to build reputation.  
Table 1.7 assesses whether peer effects is stronger in bad times. The first definition 
of “bad times” uses NBER-defined recessions, which are the periods January-July 1980, 
July 1981-November 1982, July1990-March 1991, March-November 2001, and 
December 2007-June 2009. Second, considering that the last period recession is 
especially sharp, I separate this period as “Subprime Mortgage Crisis”. The third 
definition uses Crisis defined in Loh and Stulz (2017) which are the periods September-
November 1987 (1987 crisis), August-December 1998 (LTCM crisis), and July 2007-
March 2009 (Credit crisis). I identify a fiscal year as a “bad year”, if at least a half 
period of bad times is included in one fiscal year, except for 1987 crisis and LTCM 
crisis as these two crisis periods are quite short. Thus, I require that these two crises 
should completely fall into one fiscal year, then that year could be identified as “bad 
year”. The results in Table 1.7 are consistent with the prediction, that firms are more 
sensitive to peer firms’ behavior during bad times, which provide another evidence on 
the information-based channel. 
1.5.3 Is peer effect on cash saving decisions symmetric? 
After showing the economic channels underlying the cash saving peer effects, I find 
27 
that such peer effect is not symmetric. Table 1.8 shows the evidence that cash-rich firms 
respond less to peer firms’ cash policies than other firms. At the beginning of the tests, 
it is necessary to clarify the definition of “cash-rich”. (1) I sort firms based on their last 
period cash holding levels within each year, and identify the upper and lower third as 
“cash-rich” firms and “cash-insufficient” firms, respectively; (2) Referring to Harford 
(1999), “cash-rich firm-years are years in which a firm’s cash holdings are more than 
1.5 standard deviations above the predicted cash holdings, where the standard deviation 
used is the time series standard deviation of the firm’s cash holdings.” According to 
the definition, there are 10095 cash-rich firm years, compared them to the rest of 65616 
firm-year observations.14 (3) To make sure the results are robust, I put a more stringent 
constraint on cash-rich definition, that firms whose cash holdings are more than 2 
standard deviations above the predicated cash holdings can be regarded as cash-rich 
firms. Column (1) of Table 1.8 presents the cross-sectional estimation results when 
using the first definition of “cash-rich”. Although the results are not very significant, 
the smaller and insignificant coefficient of the peer firms average cash savings 
interacted with the cash-rich indicator variables (𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ) informs that cash-rich firms are 
insensitive to the peer firms’ cash saving behaviors. In column (2) and column (3), 
when using Harford (1999) “cash-rich” definition, it becomes clearer that cash-rich 
firms respond less to the peer firms cash saving behaviors than other firms.  
1.6 Economic implications of peer effects in cash savings 
An important implication of peer effects is the economic externality whereby 
                                                          
14 In Harford (1999), he identifies 1821 cash-rich firm-year observations and compares it to the other 
21675 firm-years in the periods spanning from 1972 to 1994.  
28 
changes to one firm affect the outcomes of other firms. If only one manager in an 
industry mimics its competitors’ cash saving decisions, then it is very likely that other 
forces will pull it back and force a correction. However, if peer learning is common in 
an industry, this may lead to significant changes in the industry overall cash savings. 
In this section, I evaluate whether peer influence is important enough to impact 
aggregate cash savings at the industry level.  
1.6.1 Excess-variance identification strategy 
To identify the total economic impact stemming from peer-influenced cash saving 
decisions at the industry level, I use an excess variance identification strategy pioneered 
by Graham (2008), which proposes an approach for identifying the existence and 
magnitude of social interactions based on the conditional variance restrictions. If firms 
within the same industry learn from one another on cash saving decisions, then 
individual firm cash savings will covary positively within an industry and display 
excess variation across industries. Thus, the ratio of between-industry variance over 
within-industry should be larger than one when peer effect exists. However, there is 
another explanation for excess variance—industry-level heterogeneity (i.e., the 
distribution of observed and unobserved industry and firm characteristics might vary 
across industries). Therefore, the unconditional between-group variance of cash 
savings is the sum of three terms: (1) the variance of any industry-level heterogeneity, 
(2) the between-industry variance of any firm-level heterogeneity, and (3) the strength 
of any social interactions. When identifying the peer effect component of excess 
variance, Graham (2008) compares the within- and between-group variances across 
large and small groups. The distribution of group-level heterogeneity is the same across 
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large groups or across small groups, while the distribution of peer effect differs. The 
key identifying assumption for the excess variance method is that after controlling for 
observables, being in a small or large industry only affects the between-group variance 
in outcome variable via peer effects. To apply it in cash saving peer influence, the 
identification logic is as follows.  
In large industries, clusters of firms with high cash savings are typically offset by 
corresponding clusters of firms with low cash savings, resulting in little variation in 
average cash savings across large industries, that is, the mean levels of cash savings are 
similar across large industries. In small industries, however, through learning from each 
other, the composition of firms with mostly above or below average cash savings are 
more frequently observed than that in large industries, because there are not enough 
firms in small industry to derive offsetting effect. That is to say, the variance of cash 
savings is greater across small industries than that across large industries in the 
presence of peer effects. The strengths of peer effects are different across small and 
large industries, while the variance of industry heterogeneity across large industries and 
that across small industries should be similar. 15  Thus, a ratio of the difference in 
between-group variance across small and large industries to the difference in within-
group variance across small and large industries provides a measure of the existence 
and strength of peer effects.16 This is described as “ratio-in-differences” in Popadak 
(2017).  
                                                          
15 “Even if there is some variable that is unaccounted for that is correlated with industry size and 
outcome variable as long as it does not systematically inflate the observed variance in small industries 
across all observations over sample period, then the identification holds.” See Popadak (2017). 
16 Some industries may have no peer effects, so their cash savings would exhibit no clustering 
regardless of whether they are small or large industries. However, by evaluating all the three-digit SIC 
industries over more than 30 years, it is possible to statistically detect the difference in the excess 
variance when conditional on small and large industries, and that is the evidence of peer effects. 
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Following Graham (2008) and Popadak (2017), the econometric specification of 
excess-variance test of cash saving decisions is given by:  
                                             ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + (𝛾 − 1)𝜀?̅? + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                (6) 
where 𝛼𝑗  represents industry-level heterogeneity, 𝜀𝑖𝑗  represents firm-level 
heterogeneity, and 𝜀?̅?  is the industry mean of 𝜀𝑖𝑗 . 𝛾   represents the peer influence 
parameter and is dependent on 𝜀?̅?. In the absence of peer effect, the 𝛾 will be one. If 
peer effect exists, 𝛾 is greater than one, then cash saving decisions are influenced by 
the 𝜀?̅? which involves the decisions of peer firms and moreover the characteristics of 
the peers. The greater the strength of peer effect, the greater 𝛾 will be. However, the 𝛾 
cannot be directly identified because the presence of 𝜀?̅? leads to a matrix that is not of 
full rank. Graham (2008) provides a way of estimating the square of peer influence, 𝛾2, 
which results from a ratio of actual (observed) difference in between-group variances 
across small and large industries to the corresponding difference in within-group 
variance.17 
                                         γ2 =
𝐸(𝑐𝑗
𝑏
|𝑆𝑗 = 1)−𝐸(𝑐𝑗
𝑏
|𝑆𝑗 = 0)
𝐸(𝑐𝑗
𝑤
|𝑆𝑗 = 1)−𝐸(𝑐𝑗
𝑤
|𝑆𝑗 = 0)
                                                    (7) 
where 𝑐𝑗
𝑏 = (∆𝐶̅̅̅̅ 𝑗. − ∆𝐶̿̿̿̿ 𝑠)
2 is between-industry sum of squares for the vector of cash 
savings ∆𝐶, with ∆𝐶̅̅̅̅ 𝑗. the mean cash savings in industry j and ∆𝐶̿̿̿̿ 𝑠 the grand mean cash 
savings in small or large industries. 𝑐𝑗
𝑤 =
1
𝑁𝑗
1
𝑁𝑗−1
∑ [∆𝐶𝑖𝑗 − ∆𝐶̅̅̅̅ 𝑗.]
2𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1  is within-industry 
sum of squares with ∆𝐶𝑖𝑗 the cash savings for firm i in industry j and 𝑁𝑗 is the number 
of firms in industry j. 𝑆𝑗 is an indicator for industry type, which equals to one for small 
                                                          
17 The mathematical derivations are detailed in Graham (2008) and Popadak (2017).  
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industry and zero for large industry.  
In order to reduce the amount of firm level and industry level heterogeneity, I 
orthogonalize the cash savings with respect to many explanatory variables such as firm 
size, cash flow, Tobin’s Q, net equity issuance, net debt issuance, net investment, as 
well as industry-specific factors including industry competitiveness and industry cash 
flow volatility, and use the residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑗  to compute 𝑐𝑗
𝑏  = ?̅̂?𝑗.
2
, and 
𝑐𝑗
𝑤=
1
𝑁𝑗
1
𝑁𝑗−1
∑ [ ?̂?𝑖𝑗 − ?̅̂?𝑗.]
2𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1 .  
1.6.2 Results of excess-variance tests 
To determine whether excess variance is coming from peer effects, I compare the 
excess variance across different sizes of peer groups defined by the number of firms in 
the industry. In each year, I rank industry peer groups from the largest to the smallest 
number of firms in the industry, and then the lower third industry groups are defined 
as small industries, while the middle and top third industry groups are regarded as large 
industries.18 Estimation results are illustrated in Table 1.9. Column (1) conditions on 
observable firm-level and industry-level heterogeneity including firm-specific and 
industry-specific characteristics. Column (2) further conditions on peer firm average 
characteristics. The estimates of the square of peer effect parameter 𝛾2 is 1.832 given 
firm- and industry-specific variables which suggesting a peer effect multiplier of 1.354, 
and the related Chi-squared statistics is 7.76 indicating a rejection of no peer effects 
hypothesis at the 99% significance level. When further controlling for peer firms’ 
                                                          
18 If I classify the industry group as small and large by cutting at the median number of firms across 
industry peer group, the results are qualitatively similar.  
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average variables, the estimate changes little.  
To interpret the economic significance of the peer effect multiplier, I estimate the 
relative cash changes due to peer effects in small and large industries, respectively. It 
shows that peer effects lead managers to enlarge or shrink cash savings by 12.8% in 
small industries and 6.18% in large industries.19 To put these results into perspective, 
consider a small industry with an expected cash changes by 2% under the assumption 
of no peer influence, the results suggest that observed cash changes will be between 
1.74% and 2.26%. Since the average cash level of sample firms is 200 million, and the 
average total asset is 2026 million, the peer effect in cash savings (0.26%) could result 
in substantial changes. Overall, the results of the excess variance-based tests for peer 
effects strongly support the hypothesis that peer effects significantly alter cash savings 
in an industry.  
1.7 Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that corporate cash saving decisions are influenced in 
a meaningful way by the peer firms cash policies. Using instrumental variable 
identification approach to estimate the causal peer effect, I show that one standard 
deviation increase (decrease) in instrumented peer firms’ average cash savings leads to 
2.63% increase (decrease) in firm’s cash savings on average. Such peer effect is 
economically meaningful and larger than many previously identified cash saving 
determinants. In addition, I also find that cash saving peer effects are important enough 
to impact total cash savings at the industry level.  
                                                          
19 Graham (2008) provides a rough sense of the magnitude of the implied social multiplier, see Page 
656-657. Such relative change is given by (γ − 1)/√𝑁𝑗.  
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After examining the existence of peer effects in cash saving decisions, I also 
perform several cross-sectional tests to examine whether rivalry-based mechanism and 
(or) information-based mechanism could explain the peer effect in cash saving 
decisions. The sets of tests suggest that cash saving peer effects originate from both 
channels: (1) firms are more sensitive to peers’ cash holding decisions when they face 
greater competitive pressures; (2) less powerful firms (with lower market share), 
smaller firms, young firms, and financially constrained firms respond more actively to 
the peers’ cash policies; (3) peer effects on cash savings is more pronounced in bad 
times. Furthermore, I find that peer effect is asymmetric where cash-rich firms are less 
sensitive to peer firms cash policies than other firms.  
Overall, this paper provides a positive answer that firms’ cash saving decisions are 
remarkably influenced by peer firms’ cash policies, and the peer effect is more 
important than many other determinants of cash savings. There is another related 
question: whether mimicking behavior in cash saving decisions could increase firm 
values. I believe this could provide an interesting avenue for future research.
34 
 
CHAPTER 2 
GETTING FEEDBACK ON YOUR RESEARCH: EVIDENCE 
FROM ANALYSTS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A recent strand of literature examines how agents extract information from stock prices 
when making decisions.20 Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show that firm managers 
incorporate the private information contained in stock prices when they make corporate 
investment decisions. Because stock prices aggregate diverse information, including 
outsider opinions that firm managers might not easily access, stock-price information 
might shift manager beliefs about their own firms’ fundamentals. In particular, Luo 
(2005) shows that firm managers, after observing the market reaction to their 
acquisition decisions, are more likely to abandon deals that the stock market does not 
react favorably to. Managers hence are able to learn from stock-market reactions about 
the quality of their managerial decisions.  
In this paper, we investigate whether another group of important agents—sell-side 
analysts—also learn about the quality of their decisions from the stock market. Sell-
side analysts issue research reports on the firms that they cover and the market then 
reacts to these reports. If the report elicits a large market reaction, this means that the 
analyst changed the market’s priors about the covered firm (Loh and Stulz (2011)). The 
                                                          
20 See Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a review. The idea that market prices are a useful 
source of information goes back to Hayek (1945).  
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analyst might also update her beliefs about the quality of her own research, hence 
influencing her future research effort and impact.21 There are good reasons to expect 
that research effort might depend on past success. First, if the report contains new 
information about the firm, such as private information collected by the analyst or a 
better method/framework of understanding existing public information, such 
information can also be applied to all firms in the analyst’s coverage portfolio. 
Veldkamp (2006) shows that agents have incentives to produce information that is 
usable across a subset of assets rather than for only one asset (see also Kacperczyk, 
Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016)). This mirrors what analysts do since they 
typically specialize in covering firms in the same industry (e.g., see Boni and Womack 
(2006)). Second, besides information, the analyst might update her beliefs about her 
own skill in doing research and hence cause her future research effort to be related to 
past success. In the setting of traders, Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) show 
evidence of learning from past trading experiences and that past success influences 
future activity.  
We define whether a recommendation change is successful by using the influential 
definition from Loh and Stulz (2011)—in which a recommendation change issued on 
a non-firm news day produces a stock-price impact that is visible to investors in the 
stock. We examine how a recently influential analyst learns from past success by 
measuring two dimensions of future effort: the number of recommendation changes 
                                                          
21 Footnote #1 in Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) has an appropriate analogy for our paper’s 
focus. “As an analogy, assume that there exist stock prices on individual researchers, which reflect the 
views of the general profession. If a researcher’s stock price fell upon starting a new project, many such 
researchers would choose to abandon the project.” Our focus is on analysts who produce research on the 
firms that they cover and the stock-price reaction to their research informs analysts about the quality of 
their research and/or their skill in doing research.  
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and the total number of recommendations including initiations and reiterations.  
We find consistent evidence of learning. We show that if an analyst issues at least 
one influential recommendation change in a quarter, she is more likely to issue 
recommendation changes next quarter. The unconditional probability of observing that 
an analyst issues a recommendation change in a quarter is 65.6%. This probability goes 
up by 6.12% if the analyst has influential recommendation changes in the most recent 
quarter. The finding that recent success (influential changes) leads to increased research 
effort is robust to controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, and the analyst’s 
history (beyond the most recent quarter) of issuing influential recommendation changes. 
We also find evidence that recent success leads to more recommendation activity in 
general, where activity includes initiations and reiterations. We therefore conclude that 
recent success does indeed lead to greater future effort.  
Why are recently influential analysts more active? The first plausible explanation 
is a short-term information hypothesis. If analysts find that it is their 
models/frameworks or the private information in the reports that caused the stock-
market reactions, the analyst will quickly use this to generate related reports. As such, 
the feedback effect should dissipate after such a time when the information gets fully 
incorporated into subsequent reports. The second is a learning about skill hypothesis 
where the analyst uses the stock-market reaction to infer her research skill. Having 
received validation of her skill from the strong stock-price reaction, the analyst 
increases effort and confidence and might become better at the job. Here, the feedback 
effect should be more long-lasting and persist beyond the short term, i.e. recent success 
should lead to increased effort beyond the next immediate period. Third and finally, an 
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overconfidence hypothesis could explain the findings. Analysts experiencing recent 
success increase their activity but there is no real quality to this new output.   
In tests to disentangle these hypotheses, we find that the feedback effects of recent 
success on future effort indeed last only for the short term. After four quarters, the 
feedback effects are all significantly lower, which supports the information 
hypothesis.22 To test the overconfidence hypothesis, we examine the future influential 
likelihood of recently influential analysts. We find that recently influential analysts are 
also more likely to be influential in the next period, inconsistent with the 
overconfidence hypothesis.23  
In further tests, we examine other implications of the short-term information 
hypothesis. That research effort can be predicted by past successes most likely implies 
that analysts have capacity constraints. Otherwise an analyst who receives feedback 
from the market that the thesis in her report is correct can immediately write more 
reports on other firms. Such instantaneous report writing would limit our ability to find 
any predictability from the current to the next quarter. Other professional investors have 
been shown to have capacity constraints, e.g. institutional investors (Kempf, Manconi, 
and Spalt (2016)), fund managers (Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016)), and Federal Reserve 
supervisors (Eisenbach, Lucca, and Townsend (2016)). Driskill, Kirk, and Tucker 
(2016) also find that analysts take more time to issue forecast revisions when a lot of 
                                                          
22  To pin down whether this information is private information or better processing of public 
information, we show that the feedback effects are strong in both the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. This 
reveals that the information channel does not merely stem from private access to management, but also 
from the analyst’s better ability to interpret available public information. 
23 The fact that recommendation changes in the next period have larger stock price reactions could 
also be consistent with overreaction if investors overreact to recently influential analysts. But in 
recommendation drift tests, we find no evidence of reversals for previously influential analysts or 
uninfluential analysts and hence conclude that investor overreaction is not responsible for these results. 
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news hit their coverage portfolios (see, e.g., the limited attention story in Hirshleifer, 
Lim, and Teoh (2009)). In Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007), agents who have limited 
attention shift from one simple model to another whenever enough evidence 
accumulates against the incumbent model. We find evidence consistent with capacity 
constraints—that when an analyst covers more firms, the predictability of this quarter’s 
influential recommendations for next quarter’s recommendation activity increases.  
We also conduct our tests at the broker level and find a strong short-term feedback 
effect which dissipates after a few months. This is consistent with the information story. 
Analysts who move the market share the insights with the rest of the brokerage team 
and colleagues learn from each another. Such learning across stocks implies that 
influential recommendation changes can predict the future occurrence of 
recommendation changes for other firms in the same industry. To examine whether 
such spillover effects can lead to profitable trading strategies, we form a portfolio of 
firms without recommendation changes but whose industries had a large number of 
influential upgrades. If these influential upgrades contain common industry 
information that will be incorporated into future analyst reports, buying such firms in 
advance might earn abnormal returns when investors do not fully anticipate such 
predictability. We show that a long-short portfolio formed in this manner earns 
abnormal returns of up 0.6% per month and that the ability of these portfolios to predict 
future upgrades and downgrades likely contributes to these profits. We also provide 
cross-sectional regressions to show our results here are robust to controlling for the 
usual lead-lag effect between large and small firm returns in the same industry.   
Our study is related to the literature on the real effects of financial market prices 
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(e.g., Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012)). Most of such studies examine whether 
managers learn from stock prices when making decisions (e.g., Bakke and Whited 
(2010), Foucault and Frésard (2012), Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2015), Edmans, 
Jayaraman, and Schneemeier (2016), and Zuo (2016)). Besides firm managers, other 
decision makers also learn from stock prices, e.g. customers (Sun (2016)) and suppliers 
(Williams and Xiao (2014)). These studies typically use exogenous changes in stock 
prices caused by extreme mutual fund flows to test whether decision makers respond 
to such non fundamentals-driven price movements. Sulaeman and Wei (2014) show 
that analysts also appear to make recommendations in response to such flow-driven 
mispricing. The focus of our study is on analysts. While most studies explore on how 
agents learn from exogenous changes in stock prices, we examine how analysts learn 
from endogenous stock-price movements caused by their reports. The analyst setting is 
also better than the manager setting for studying individual learning because observable 
analyst output occurs frequently and can be tied to an individual, while observable 
managerial actions are infrequent and usually team-based.  
Our study also relates to the broad literature on how security analysts respond to 
recent news. As prominent intermediaries, analysts’ reports should incorporate recent 
stock market information. Some papers look at specific firm events, such as earnings 
announcements (e.g., Altınkılıç and Hansen (2009)), earnings guidance (e.g., Frankel, 
Kothari, and Weber (2006)), and large stock price movements (e.g., Conrad et al. 
(2006)). Other papers look at how analysts respond to other analysts, i.e. herding 
behavior, examined for example in Welch (2000), Hong and Kubik (2003), and 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010). In addition, because we study the likelihood of a 
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recommendation change for a given unit of time, our paper is related to recent work on 
the recommendation change frequency (e.g., Hobbs, Kovacs, and Sharma (2012), 
Boulland, Ornthanalai, and Womack (2016), and Bernhardt, Wan, and Xiao (2016)). 
We bring a new dimension to this issuance frequency literature by showing that the 
likelihood of issuing a revision is closely linked to whether the analyst’s most recent 
recommendation changes have been influential. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data sources, 
sample, and key variables. Section 3 reports the results of feedback effect on analyst 
research. Section 4 identifies the mechanisms driving the feedback effect of analyst 
recommendation activity, Section 5 reports the results of additional tests, and Section 
6 concludes.  
2.2 Data and sample 
2.2.1  Analyst data 
The analyst stock recommendations are from Thomson Financial’s Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail File, which spans the years 1993 to 
2014. 24  Our sample period starts from 1994 since the recommendation change 
observations in 1993 are sparse (1993 data is used for prior ratings when available). A 
recommendation change is defined as the current rating minus the prior rating by the 
                                                          
24  Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) report that matched records in the I/B/E/S 
recommendations data were altered between downloads from 2000 to 2007. Thomson, in response to 
their paper, fixed the alterations in the recommendation history file as of February 12, 2007. The dataset 
we use is dated December 17, 2015 and hence reflects these corrections. However, there are still some 
large brokers missing from the current I/B/E/S forecasts and recommendations files. To reinstate the 
missing years from these brokers, we use Capital IQ estimates to extract recommendations issued by 
these missing brokers and splice the collected data into our sample. Spliced observations make up about 
0.45% of the observations in the recommendations sample. 
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same analyst. According to the definition in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009), 
a prior rating is assumed to be outstanding if it has not been stopped by the broker (in 
the I/B/E/S Stopped File) or has been confirmed by the analyst in the last twelve months 
(checking the I/B/E/S review date).  
An analyst’s total recommendation activity is computed by aggregating all rating 
activity including rating changes, initiations, and reiterations. Reiterations are 
commonly not recorded by the I/B/E/S recommendation file. So we follow the literature 
(e.g. Loh and Stulz (2017)) to assume that an analyst reiterates an outstanding 
recommendation when she issues 1) a Q1 earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S Detail File, 
or 2) a price target forecast in the I/B/E/S Price Target File. We exclude observations 
from anonymous analysts, recommendation changes where the lagged stock price is 
less than one dollar, and observations with no outstanding prior rating from the same 
analyst. For our main analysis, we also exclude the analyst codes in I/B/E/S which 
mostly likely do not represent individuals. These are analyst codes associated with 
industry names (e.g., Healthcare), obvious team-sounding names (e.g. Research DEPT), 
multiple analyst names, and broker codes associated with only one single analyst.  
Stock returns are from CRSP. To be sure that stock-price reactions associated with 
recommendation changes can be reasonably attributed to analysts, we remove 
recommendation changes that occur on firm-news days following Loh and Stulz (2011). 
Firm-news contaminated days are defined as the three trading days centered around a 
Compustat earnings announcement date or a company earnings guidance date,25 and 
days with multiple analysts issuing recommendations for the firm. We calculate the 
                                                          
25 Guidance dates are from First Call Guidelines until it was discontinued on September 29, 2011, 
and from I/B/E/S Guidance file thereafter. 
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cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of recommendation changes from the 
recommendation date to the following trading day, i.e., a day [0,1] event window,26 
and check whether the two-day CAR is in the same direction and is statistically 
significant at the firm level based on the firm’s prior stock-price volatility.27 Such 
recommendation changes are classified as influential.   
2.2.2  Descriptive statistics  
Our main sample is constructed at the analyst-quarter level (averaging across the 
multiple firms covered by an analyst) where we estimate whether analysts are more 
likely to issue recommendation changes and increase their total recommendation 
activity in the next quarter t+1 conditional on having influential revisions this quarter 
t. The analyst-quarter observations are included in our sample only if the analyst issued 
uncontaminated recommendation changes in quarter t. We then define Rec-change 
dummy which equals one when the analyst-quarter observation is associated with at 
least one recommendation change in quarter t+1, and zero otherwise. When Rec-
change dummy equals zero, it means that the analyst who is present in quarter t only 
issues initiations, re-initiations, reiterations, or does not issue any recommendations at 
all in quarter t+1 even though she is still present in I/B/E/S. An analyst’s total 
                                                          
26 If the recommendation is issued on a non-trading day or after trading hours, day 0 is defined as the 
next trading day. 
27 Specifically, CAR is computed as the cumulative return of the common stock less the cumulative 
return on an equally weighted characteristic-matched size, book-to-market ratio (BM), and momentum 
portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)), and then compare its absolute value with 1.96 × √2 × 𝜎𝜀. We 
multiply by √2  since the CAR is a two-day CAR. 𝜎𝜀 , the Idiosyncratic volatility, is the standard 
deviation of residuals from a daily time-series regression of past three-month (days −69 to −6) firm 
returns against the Fama and French (1993). This measure roughly captures recommendation changes 
that are associated with noticeable abnormal returns that can be attributed to the recommendation 
changes.  
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recommendation activity (#Total activity) is measured as the total number of reports 
written by the analyst in a quarter. Total activity (from t-1 to t+1) is the change in the 
total number of analyst recommendation reports from quarter t-1 to quarter t+1. 
Influential dummy, our key explanatory variable, equals one if the analyst issues at least 
one influential recommendation change in the quarter t, and zero otherwise. Influential 
before is an indicator variable which equals one if analyst issued at least one influential 
recommendation changes in her full history before quarter t, and zero otherwise. Panel 
A of Table 2.1 shows the distribution of recommendation activity at the analyst-quarter 
level, which consists of 79,192 observations where at least one uncontaminated 
recommendation change is issued by an analyst in the current quarter. We see on 
average that 22.3% of analyst-quarters are associated with at least one influential 
recommendation change, and the unconditional next-quarter recommendation change 
probability is 65.6%. This percentage includes all next quarter recommendation 
changes, including those that are issued with firm news. When we examine only next-
quarter changes that are uncontaminated by firm news, the percentage is 53.3%. In the 
next quarter, analysts on average write 14.4 reports, and issue 2.53 recommendation 
changes (of which 1.95 of the changes are uncontaminated). In multivariate regressions, 
we control for analyst and firm average characteristics (averaged within the analyst-
quarter), whose distributions are reported in Panel C of Table 2.1.  
We also construct a sample at the broker-month level (averaging across the multiple 
firms covered by a broker) to estimate whether brokers issue more recommendation 
changes and increase their total recommendation activity in the month m+1, conditional 
on having influential revisions in month m. A more frequent measurement of activity 
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(monthly instead of quarterly) can be used here because at the broker level we are 
aggregating all analyst activity within a broker. When doing this, we reinstate team 
analysts who were removed earlier in the analyst level tests. The broker-month 
observations are included in our sample only if the broker issued at least one 
uncontaminated recommendation change in month m. Influential dummy here equals 
one if the broker has at least one influential recommendation change in month m, and 
zero otherwise. Other variables are also measured in the same way as those defined in 
the analyst-quarter setting. Additionally, we also define the fractions of 
recommendation changes, influential recommendation changes, uncontaminated 
recommendation changes, and total recommendation activity, where the denominator 
is the number of firms covered by the broker. The summary statistics of these variables 
are reported in the Panel B of Table 2.1. The broker-level sample consists of 25,628 
observations. We can see that 40.6% of broker-months are associated with at least one 
influential recommendation change, which is much larger than that at the analyst-
quarter setting, and the next-month recommendation change probability is 87.3%. 
When we limit to next-month revisions that are not contaminated by firm news, the 
percentage is still high, at 81.7%. In the next month, brokers on average have 80.3 
recommendation reports, 8.41 of which are associated with recommendation changes, 
of which 5.59 are uncontaminated recommendation changes.  
2.3 Feedback effect of past success  
2.3.1 Future recommendation change probability  
In this section, we estimate whether analysts are more likely to issue 
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recommendation changes in the upcoming quarter if they have influential 
recommendation changes this quarter, controlling for analyst and firms’ average 
characteristics. We use recommendation changes as one of our measures of 
discretionary analyst effort because analysts are not required to change their ratings 
according to any regular interval, unlike earnings forecasts which need to be issued 
every quarter. Also, in comparison to reiterations, recommendation changes are 
infrequent reports issued by the analyst when the analyst has accumulated enough 
evidence to move her prior on the firm while reiterations might merely repeat the 
information in a prior report. 
We first provide univariate evidence on the relation between influential likelihood 
and the upcoming recommendation change probability, by estimating the probit 
regression of next-quarter Rec-change dummy on a constant and Influential dummy. 
Then we turn to multivariate tests where a battery of analyst and firms’ average 
characteristics are added in. Boulland, Ornthanalai, and Womack (2016) observe that 
experienced analysts become more deliberate and change their recommendations less 
frequently than before. Analysts’ career tenure also relates to their research 
performance. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) and Loh and Stulz (2011) show that 
experienced analysts make more accurate and influential earnings forecast and 
recommendation revisions. Therefore, we control for analyst experience and reputation 
proxied by an indicator variable to identify whether the analyst is ranked as an All-
American team (whether as first-, second-, third-team, or runner-up statuses) in the 
latest October Institutional Investor magazine’s annual poll.28 Analyst experience is the 
                                                          
28 All-American analyst ranking is published in the October issue and an analyst maintains the Star 
status for 12 months beginning the November after the publication of the poll results. 
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number of quarters since the analyst issued the first Q1 earnings forecast or stock 
recommendation on I/B/E/S. We use the earlier of two dates if the analyst issues both 
forecasts and recommendations. Next, because forecast accuracy can be a proxy for 
skill in stock picking (Loh and Mian (2006)), we define Accuracy quintile as the 
average forecast accuracy quintile of the analyst based on the firms covered in the past 
year, where the quintile rank is increasing in forecast accuracy. We further control for 
the analyst’s prior year Leader-Follower Ratio (LFR) constructed following Cooper, 
Day, and Lewis (2001) where they use this ratio to gauge the extent to which a forecast 
event leads other analysts to revise their estimate. A ratio larger than one denotes a 
leader analyst. 29  More importantly, the number of firms that an analyst covers 
(#Firmsperana) in a quarter is added to our multivariate regressions, since analysts are 
more likely to issue more recommendation changes if they cover a larger number of 
firms. We also control for the following firm characteristics: Size is last June’s market 
capitalization, BM is the book-to-market ratio (computed and aligned following Fama 
and French (2006)), Momentum is the buy-and-hold return for the 11-month period 
ending one month before beginning of the recommendation month, and Stock volatility 
is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the prior month. These firm 
characteristics are averaged over all firms that analysts cover in analyst-quarter setting.  
We now report estimates of next-quarter recommendation change probability 
conditional on having influential recommendation changes from probit regressions in 
                                                          
29  To compute this, the gaps between the current recommendation and the previous two 
recommendations from other brokers are computed and summed. The same is done for the next two 
recommendations. The leader-follower ratio is the gap sum of the prior two recommendations divided 
by the gap sum of the next two recommendations. A ratio larger than one shows that other brokers issue 
new ratings quickly in response to the analyst’s current recommendation. 
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Table 2.2. We focus on the marginal effect of the indicator variable—Influential 
dummy. The marginal effects, which measure the change in probability when changing 
the variable by one standard deviation centered around its mean (±
1
2
𝜎), or a 0 to 1 
change for a dummy variable, are reported with z-statistics in parentheses (based on 
standard errors clustered by analyst).  
We first examine the impact of influential recommendation changes on analyst 
effort proxied by the likelihood of the analyst issuing any recommendation change next 
quarter, i.e. including changes issued both on firm news days and on non-firm news 
days. The marginal effect of Influential dummy reveals that the increase in the 
likelihood of issuing recommendation changes next quarter conditional on having 
influential changes this quarter is 6.12%. When we add analyst and firms’ average 
characteristics, as well as calendar quarter fixed effects to control for market-wide 
shocks, the marginal effect remains sizable at 3.71%.30 In column 3, we further include 
an indicator variable—Influential before, to capture the analyst’s propensity to be 
influential in general. Loh and Stulz (2011) show that being influential in the past is 
positively associated with the current likelihood of being influential, and it is related to 
analyst skill that is persistent. Thus, this variable can help us to control for some 
unobserved and persistent analyst characteristics that impact both the influential 
likelihood and the recommendation change probability. From column 4 to column 6, 
we examine analyst effort using only recommendation changes issued on non-firm 
news days. We find that analysts are also more likely to issue uncontaminated 
                                                          
30 Quarter fixed effects are useful because market wide shocks might be important in affecting analyst 
behavior in general. For example, Loh and Stulz (2017) show that analysts produce better output in bad 
times. When we examine our feedback effects in good and bad times, there is some evidence that bad 
times see slightly stronger feedback effects.  
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recommendation changes if they have influential changes in this quarter, regardless of 
whether control variables and calendar quarter fixed effects are added.31  
Looking at the marginal effects of the controls, we see that inexperienced analysts, 
those with a smaller leader-follower ratio, and non-Star analysts are more likely to issue 
recommendation changes. These results are consistent with Boulland, Ornthanalai, and 
Womack (2016) who show that experienced analysts revise their decisions more slowly, 
but are more influential and more likely to lead other analysts. These results imply that 
“success” as measured by Star status and analyst experience leads to lower effort as 
proxied by the number of revisions. While this appears to be in contrast with our main 
results that success leads to greater effort, we believe this can be understood in a simple 
Bayesian framework. Reputable analysts have stronger priors and better information 
and are unlikely to change their priors frequently. Hence it is not surprising that they 
make less frequent rating revisions (Boulland, Ornthanalai, and Womack (2016)). 
However, when a reputable analyst makes a rating change that is influential, she learns 
from the market reaction that her new private signal has high precision. Hence she 
updates her priors on the other firms that she covers and is now more likely to revise 
her existing ratings in her coverage universe. The multivariate analysis shows that 
analysts are more likely to issue recommendation changes if they cover a large number 
of firms, which is an intuitive result. Lastly, the probability to revise recommendations 
is greater when the average firm associated with the analyst-quarter has higher prior 
stock volatility.  
                                                          
31 Although we already have several analyst characteristics as controls, it is possible that some other 
unobserved analyst characteristic influences our results. When we include analyst fixed effects to 
account for these potential unobserved characteristics, we find that our results are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar.   
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2.3.2  Future total recommendation activity 
We use an alternative variable to measure analyst effort—total recommendation 
activity, instead of the recommendation change likelihood. From column 1 to column 
3 of Table 2.3, we use the log of one plus the number of total reports written by an 
analyst next quarter as the dependent variable and estimate pooled OLS regressions 
with standard errors clustered by analyst. We see that the past success-future effort 
feedback effect is still economically and statistically significant, where successful 
analysts issue more reports next quarter than those of unsuccessful analysts who do not 
make any influential recommendation changes this quarter. The inclusion of analyst 
and firms’ average characteristics, as well as analyst past performance does not remove 
the effect of the Influential dummy. In column 4 to column 6, we investigate the time-
series change in analyst effort before and after issuing influential recommendation 
changes, where the dependent variable is the change in the number of total 
recommendation reports written by the analyst from quarter t-1 to t+1.32 We can see 
that analysts significantly write more reports after issuing influential recommendation 
changes. 
Overall, both univariate and multivariate tests show that analysts who receive 
feedback from the stock market that the content of their research reports is correct are 
more likely to issue recommendation changes and write more recommendation reports 
in the next quarter. This can be interpreted as evidence of increased research effort due 
to recent success.  
                                                          
32 The change in number of total activity from quarter t-1 to quarter t+1 is winsorized at 1% and 99% 
percentile, to reduce the impact of extreme values. 
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2.3.3  Robustness tests 
In order to exclude some possible confounding effects, we expand the analyst-
quarter sample to an analyst-quarter-firm sample. For each analyst-quarter combination, 
we include all firms covered by an analyst as long as the analyst has an outstanding 
rating on the firm even if she does not issue a new rating in the quarter.33 This allows 
us to construct a large panel in which an analyst-quarter-firm observation represents an 
analyst who is actively covering the firm that quarter. This large panel allows us to 
control for the following additional effects. 
1) An analyst may revise a rating back to its original level because the prior 
influential recommendation change leads the stock price of that firm to the 
analyst’s target. To account for such revisions, we add a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm receives an influential recommendation change from the 
same analyst this quarter and zero otherwise.  
2) An analyst may respond to other analysts’ influential recommendation changes 
but not their own. We add the percentage of analysts who issue influential 
recommendation changes on the firm this quarter as a control 
3) Firm-specific characteristics—firm size, book-to-market ratio, firm’s stock 
return and total volatility are included as firm-level controls instead of analyst-
level averages across firms.34 Stock volatility is important to control for salient 
events in the current quarter, which might lead to an overall increase in 
                                                          
33 A rating is considered outstanding following the definition in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston 
(2009). 
34 Firm size and book-to-market ratio are defined previously. Total volatility is the average of the 
monthly standard deviation of daily returns that quarter, and stock return is the average monthly return 
in a quarter. 
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recommendation change likelihood next quarter.35 
In unreported results, we find that including above control variables does not 
change our conclusion that analysts are more likely to issue recommendation changes 
next quarter on average across all the firms that they cover conditional on having 
influential recommendation changes this quarter on any firm. 
2.4 Is the feedback effect driven by learning about information or skill?  
In this section, we investigate why analysts devote more effort next quarter on their 
future research when the market reacts strongly to at least one of their current reports. 
An information hypothesis suggests that analysts update their beliefs about the quality 
of their research in terms of the models they used in the reports or the private 
information that they obtained. Such endorsement by the market leads them to increase 
their future research effort and impact. This is supported by the theoretical work of 
Veldkamp (2006) on information markets, which predicts that agents have incentives 
to produce information with implications for a subset of assets. A skill hypothesis 
suggests that it is because analysts update their beliefs about their own skill when the 
market endorses their reports. This motivates them to devote more effort on future 
research.  
2.4.1  Feedback effect: Different horizons 
To investigate whether it is the information hypothesis or (and) the skill hypothesis 
that drives the feedback effect (past success-future effort relation), we test the 
                                                          
35 We do not control for the number of analysts per firm because this variable is highly correlated 
with firm size. In this sample, the correlation between these two variables is more than 0.70. We obtain 
similar results if we replace firm size with the number of analysts per firm.  
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persistence of feedback effect. If the analyst finds out that it is the information/model 
in their most recent report that elicits the large market reaction, she will apply it quickly 
to other firms. Such information is likely to be short-lived as the market soon figures 
out the implications of the new information for other firms. Therefore, the feedback 
effect should dissipate after some time. However, if the skill hypothesis drives the 
feedback effect, that the analyst and the market updates on how good the analyst is, the 
feedback effect should not dissipate as much. 
Table 2.4 reports the marginal effect of having influential recommendation changes 
in this quarter on the quarter t+1 and quarter t+4 recommendation activity, controlling 
for analyst and firms’ average characteristics. The Chi-square statistics and p-values 
reveal whether there is any difference between the Influential dummy coefficients 
associated with these two samples. From column 1 to column 4, we find that the 
marginal effect of Influential dummy is larger for quarter t+1’s recommendation change 
probability than it is for quarter t+4. Importantly, the difference is both economically 
and statistically significant, which indicates that the information contained in the 
current quarter’s influential recommendations does indeed contribute to the increasing 
likelihood of recommendation changes next quarter but this information becomes less 
useful one year later. In column 5 to column 8, we test how the feedback effect varies 
in analyst next-quarter and next-year’s total recommendation activity. Although the 
decrease in the effect of Influential dummy on the number of total recommendation 
activity from quarter t+1 to quarter t+4 is not statistically significant, the magnitude of 
the decline appears economically meaningful. The dependent variable in column 7 
(column 8) is the number of total activity in quarter t+1 (t+4) minus that in quarter t-1. 
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We can see that the feedback effect on the change of total activity disappears four 
quarters later.  
These results generally support the information hypothesis, that the market’s 
validation of the analyst’s information leads the analyst to successfully apply the same 
framework or information quickly next quarter to other related firms. The skill 
hypothesis appears still relevant, since the feedback effects on the recommendation 
change probability and the number of total recommendation activity are mostly still 
statistically significant after four quarters.  
2.4.2 Feedback effect at the broker level 
In this section, we test the feedback effect at the broker level. If analysts share their 
information and learn from each other within brokerage house, the information 
contained in influential reports can be further applied by the analyst or her colleagues. 
At the broker level, it is harder to make a case for the skill hypothesis since brokers, 
especially large ones, are unlikely to need the market’s endorsement of their research 
to learn about how good they are.  
As the unconditional probability of recommendation changes at the broker level is 
very high, our dependent variable here is the fraction of activity, i.e. recommendation 
changes, uncontaminated recommendation changes, and total recommendations 
divided by the number of firms covered by the broker. The explanatory variable is the 
number of influential recommendation changes over the number of firms covered by a 
broker (#InfluRecchg/#Firms). In the multivariate tests, we control for the first lag of 
the dependent variable to capture the persistence in a broker’s recommendation activity. 
We also control for analyst and firm characteristics, which are averaged within each 
54 
broker-month combination. To control for broker size, we include the number of 
analysts per broker (Log #Anaperbroker).  
Table 2.5 reports the estimates of broker future recommendation activity 
conditional on the fraction of influential recommendation changes this month. In the 
regressions, broker fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects are also included. 
From the positive coefficients of #InfluRecchg/#Firms in column 1 to column 3, we 
see that the fraction of influential recommendation changes this month is indeed 
positively associated with the fraction of recommendation changes and activity next 
month. To interpret the economic significance of the coefficients of 0.321, 0.157, and 
1.154 (models 1 to 3), a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of influential 
recommendation changes this month leads to a 10%, 7%, and 5% increase in next-
month fractions of recommendation changes, uncontaminated recommendation 
changes and total recommendation activity, respectively.36 These results indicate that 
brokers are indeed more active next month if they have more influential reports this 
month.  
The results in column 4 to column 9 inform us whether broker-level feedback effect 
is persistent. We find that the feedback effect dissipates and becomes insignificant after 
three months, and disappears completely after twelve months. The feedback effect 
hence appears short-lived. This supports the information hypothesis and is consistent 
with the earlier presented evidence at the analyst level. 
                                                          
36 The economic significance is measured by the coefficient of #InfluRecchg/#Firms multiplied by 
its standard deviation and then divided by the mean of dependent variable (see Table 2.1).  
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2.5 Additional tests: Evidence on capacity constraints 
In this section, we examine the impact of capacity constraints. Our result that 
research effort is predicted by past successes most likely implies that analysts have 
capacity constraints and are unable to write and publish reports simultaneously on all 
the firms that they cover. Otherwise an analyst who receives feedback from the market 
that she wrote a great report can immediately turn around and write more reports on 
other firms instantaneously. This would prevent us from finding any predictability from 
the current quarter to the next quarter. 
However, recent literature shows that agents, even if professional investors, face 
capacity constraints and limited attention, e.g., directors (Fich and Shivdasani (2006), 
and Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel (2014)), fund managers (Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016)), 
Federal Reserve supervisors (Eisenbach, Lucca, and Townsend (2016)), and 
institutional investors (Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2016)). The issue of limited 
attention seems particularly pertinent to sell-side analysts, who play a crucial 
information intermediary role in both analyzing public information and generating 
private information (see Driskill, Kirk, and Tucker (2016) and Harford et al. (2016)). 
Busy agents endowed with a limited amount of process capacity might take shortcuts 
whenever they can. Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) show that agents who have limited 
attention shift from one univariate model to another whenever enough evidence 
accumulates against the incumbent model. Agents who have limited attention are also 
more likely to stick to one model if they receive feedback that the model is effective.  
We use the number of firms that an analyst covers as a proxy for the analyst’s 
capacity constraints. In each quarter, we sort analysts based on how many firms that 
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they cover (using the number of firms on which they have outstanding ratings on). The 
analysts who cover an above-median number of firms are classified as the capacity 
constrained analysts and others are capacity unconstrained. We then compare the 
marginal effects of Influential dummy on the next-quarter recommendation change 
probability and total recommendation activity across capacity constrained and capacity 
unconstrained analysts in Table 2.6, and find that constrained and less constrained 
analysts both learn about the quality of their decisions from the stock market. However, 
constrained analysts display more predictability. 
2.5.1 Are future recommendation changes still influential?  
After showing that analysts update their beliefs about the quality of their research 
and devote more effort in the upcoming quarter conditional on having influential 
recommendation changes, we now test whether their future reports are also more likely 
to be influential. Loh and Stulz (2011) show that being influential in the past is 
significantly related to the current likelihood of being influential. From the above 
results, analysts who find that the market endorses the information/model in their most 
recent report start to apply it quickly to other firms. If the analyst is able to apply the 
valuable information and framework to the next report and this cannot be easily 
replicated by investors reading the first influential report, we expect the future 
recommendation changes from that analyst to also be influential. As we argued, such 
information is likely to be short lived, and thus the effect of the useful information will 
dissipate some time later. However, if the skill hypothesis dominates, the increased 
likelihood of influential reports should not dissipate.  
Table 2.7, Panel A reports the marginal effect of having influential recommendation 
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changes in this quarter on the influential probability in quarter t+1 and quarter t+4, 
controlling for analyst and firm average characteristics. The Chi-square statistics and 
p-values reveal whether there is any difference between the coefficients associated with 
these two samples. We find that the marginal effect of Influential dummy is larger for 
quarter t+1’s recommendation change influential probability than it is for quarter t+4. 
Importantly, the difference is both economically and statistically significant, which 
indicates that the information contained in the current quarter’s influential 
recommendations does indeed contribute to more influential recommendations changes 
next quarter but this information becomes less useful one year later. 
In addition, we estimate the impact of current-month influential recommendation 
changes on the future influential probability at the broker-month setting. Panel B of 
Table 2.7 reports the marginal effect of having influential recommendation changes 
this month on the broker’s influential probability in month m+1, m+3, and m+12, 
controlling for analyst and firm characteristics averaged within the broker-month, as 
well as the number of analysts per broker. Broker fixed effects and calendar-month 
fixed effects are also included in these estimations. We can see that the marginal effect 
of Influential dummy is statistically and economically significant in predicting the next-
month influential probability, while the predictability decreases after three months and 
disappears one year later. The decreasing pattern of broker future influential probability 
is consistent with our evidence at the analyst level. 
Overall, the findings of increasing future influential probability at the analyst and 
broker level further support the information hypothesis—that the market’s validation 
of the analyst’s information leads the analyst or other analysts within the same broker 
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to successfully apply the same framework or information to other related firms in the 
subsequent periods. In addition, the fact that the current influential probability is 
positively related to future influential probability is not consistent with an 
overconfidence hypothesis. An overconfidence explanation of the feedback effect 
would say that analysts revise more frequently after recent success because they 
become overconfident. Overconfidence-motivated recommendation changes should 
not be associated with a higher influential likelihood.  
2.5.2 Feedback effect pre- and post-Reg FD 
We now examine whether the feedback effect is stronger or weaker in the post Reg 
FD period. We define the post Reg FD period as the fourth quarter of 2000 and after. 
Some studies find that channels of analyst’s private access to management dry up after 
Reg FD (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010)). The source of information included 
in an analyst’s influential report can come from either private access to management, 
or the analyst’s better ability to interpret available information. One possible 
mechanism of our information channel is that after an analyst issues an influential 
rating change, she is able to get access to more private channels to management 
afterwards due to the attention that her successful report generated. If the source of the 
analyst’s future influential recommendation changes is due to such private channels of 
information access, these sources should dry up after Reg FD. But if the source of the 
information is the analyst’s better interpretation of already public information, then the 
feedback effect should not dissipate after Reg FD.  
Table 2.8 reports that the feedback effect after Reg FD remains statistically and 
economically significant. The results indicate that the feedback effect is not solely 
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driven by private sources of information between the analyst and firm management. 
Analysts’ better interpretation of already public information is also an important 
ingredient of the information in the successful report that gets transmitted to future 
reports.  
2.6 Additional tests and alternative hypotheses 
2.6.1  Feedback effects for “failures”  
Thus far our results are based on successful analysts and we proxy for success using 
the presence of an influential recommendation change in the current quarter. We find 
that such success indeed changes the next period behavior and effort of analysts. 
Instead of examining the impact of success, some studies examine the impact of failures 
on agents. Coval and Shumway (2005) find that futures traders who experienced losses 
in the morning are more inclined to take above-average afternoon risks. Howell (2017) 
find that entrepreneurs who receive negative feedback in a business venture 
competition are more likely to abandon their ventures in the future. To investigate the 
effects of feedback using failures instead of successes, we define an analyst-quarter as 
a failure if that analyst issues more wrong-direction recommendation changes than 
right-direction recommendation changes, and she does not have any influential 
recommendation changes in a quarter. We examine the effect of failure on the next 
quarter recommendation activity. As the flip side of success, failure is expected to lead 
to less research effort. But it could be that bad analysts now have to work harder to 
make more recommendation changes to increase their chances of turning things around. 
In unreported results, we find that on average bad analysts are less likely to revise their 
60 
recommendations and decrease their total recommendation activity in the next quarter.    
2.6.2  Alternative hypothesis: Investor overreaction to past success  
An alternative explanation for the greater impact of next-quarter recommendation 
changes issued by analysts who make influential revisions is that investors simply 
overreact to these analysts. To investigate this, we compare the next-quarter 
recommendation change performance of analysts who have successful 
recommendations and those who do not. Each of these two samples is further 
subdivided into recommendation upgrades and downgrades. Then, for each subsample, 
we form a daily-rebalanced calendar-time portfolio that buys stocks from trading day 
2 following the revisions to day 21, i.e. a one-month drift. Following the standard 
approach in Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), we compute average daily returns 
where one dollar is placed in each revision and the weight of the revised stock varies 
from day 2 to day 21 according to its cumulative return since entering the portfolio. 
The portfolio’s daily returns are then compounded to monthly returns, and the returns 
in excess of the risk-free rate are regressed on the Carhart (1997; Fama and French (2015) 
five factors. Consequently, the intercept measures the revision drift of each 
recommendation change portfolio.  
In Table 2.9, we find that the intercepts of the regressions are significantly positive 
for upgrades and significantly negative for downgrades, indicating that there is a stock-
price drift to analyst revisions. Of interest is the difference of intercepts between the 
influential portfolio (i.e. buy upgrades and short downgrades of analysts who make at 
least one influential recommendation change in the current quarter) and the non-
influential portfolio (i.e. buy upgrades and short downgrades of analysts who do not 
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make any influential recommendation changes in the current quarter), but we find that 
the difference is statistically insignificant. Similar results are also found for the three-
month and six-month drifts. This is evidence that the post-revision drift of successful 
analysts is both economically and statistically indistinguishable from that of other 
analysts who do not make influential rating changes. Overall, we find no evidence that 
investor overreaction is the cause of the larger stock-price impact of next-quarter 
recommendation changes of previously influential analysts. 
This test also excludes another potential channel—the observed feedback effect 
may be driven by the investors who notice influential recommendation changes, and 
then analysts adjust their behavior to cater to this increased investor attention. Higher 
attention to the recently successful analyst should then lead to a smaller drift in the 
analyst’s next-quarter recommendation change portfolio compared to that of 
unsuccessful analysts but we do not find such evidence.  
2.6.3  A trading strategy that benefits from the feedback effect 
Our main evidence is that influential recommendation changes can predict the 
future issuance of recommendation changes by the analyst and also by the broker. Such 
spillover effects can lead to a profitable trading strategy but only under certain 
conditions. First, the sign of the influential recommendation changes should be able to 
predict the direction of future recommendation changes. If the information in 
influential recommendation changes is applicable for a subset of stocks as our 
information hypothesis suggests, it seems reasonable that this information can be 
applied in a directionally similar manner to other covered firms. Second, for such a 
trading strategy to be work, investors have to respond insufficiently to such 
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predictability. If investors can figure out the implications of the influential 
recommendation changes for the value of all other firms covered by the same analyst 
and broker, they would react in anticipation of the feedback effect predicting that more 
similar-content reports will be issued.  
Each month, we long a portfolio of firms without recommendation changes but 
whose industries (Fama-French 30 groups) on average had influential upgrades. We 
hold the stocks for three months to mirror the quarterly horizon we use for most of our 
earlier tests. We also short a similar portfolio of firms without recommendation changes 
but whose industries on average had influential downgrades. To differentiate industries 
based on the strength of their influential upgrades or downgrades, we compute the 
difference between the number of influential upgrades and influential downgrades 
(DiffUpDown_Influ). Because large industries are more likely to have extreme values 
of DiffUpDown_Influ, we control for industry size by dividing industries first into two 
groups based on the number of firms in the industry, and then sorting industries into 
five quintiles based on DiffUpDown_Influ within each group.37  
Firms in the industries that are sorted into each quintile are weighted using one plus 
the firm’s prior-month return. Compared to equal-weighting firms, these weights 
mitigate microstructure biases such as the bid-ask bounce (see Asparouhova, 
Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2013)). Panel A of Table 2.10 reports the average 
monthly raw returns, alphas, and summary statistics for each portfolio. One can see 
immediately that quintile 5, which contains firms in industries that have the most 
                                                          
37 An alternative way is to sort industries based on the number of influential upgrades divided by the 
total number of influential recommendation changes. While we do get similar results, this approach 
causes smaller industries to dominate the extreme portfolios. 
63 
influential upgrades has the highest abnormal returns. This means that in industries that 
have the most influential upgrades, firms without recommendation changes can earn 
positive abnormal returns in the subsequent three months. In contrast, quintile 1, which 
contains firms in industries with the most influential downgrades is associated with 
negative alphas, although they are not statistically significant.38 Finally, we see that the 
hedged portfolio that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 1 earns a statistically 
significant Fama-French three-factor (five-factor) alpha of 0.59% (0.60%) per month.   
The results reveal that the information in influential recommendation changes in an 
industry contains a common (rather than competitive) component that is predictably 
incorporated into other firms over the next few months. We have shown in our earlier 
tables that influential recommendation changes lead to a higher likelihood of 
recommendation changes in the future months. Column 8 of Table 2.10 reports the 
average number of upgrades and downgrades as well as the ratio of upgrades over 
downgrades for each quintile in the months where stocks are held. In column 8 of Panel 
A, we see that the quintile portfolio 1 (5) has the lowest (highest) ratio of average 
number of upgrades to the average number of downgrades, and the difference of this 
ratio between quintile portfolios 5 and 1 is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, the findings in Panel A indicate that the ability of these portfolios to predict 
future upgrades and downgrades likely contributes to the abnormal alphas that we 
observe. These future upgrades and downgrades are predicted by the feedback effect in 
which the successful analysts or analysts from successful brokers predictably increase 
                                                          
38 The weaker results with downgrades is consistent with the information in influential downgrades 
being a mix of common and competitive information so that it does not lead unambiguously to other 
firms in the same industry being downgraded later. A downgrade with competitive information might 
mean that other firms will likely get upgraded instead.  
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their likelihood of issuing recommendation changes. This evidence of within-industry 
predictability might be related to the lead-lag effect within industries since firms 
without recommendations might be smaller than firms with influential 
recommendation changes. Hou (2007) shows that within an industry, the returns of 
large firms can predict the returns of small firms due to the slow diffusion of common 
industry information. In our portfolios, firms without recommendations are indeed 
smaller than firms that experience influential recommendation changes. To investigate 
the role of the lead-lag effect, we partition our sample into large firms (those with 
market capitalization above the 80th NYSE size percentile (highest quintile), and 
reported in Panel B) and small firms (all other firms, reported in Panel C). We can see 
that abnormal returns are still positive and statistically significant even for large firms. 
We see also that the predictability of future upgrades and downgrades is actually 
stronger in large firms. These findings indicate that our results are not fully driven by 
the lead-lag effect.39  
We also estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions each 
quarter with an explicit control for the lead-lag effect. The dependent variable is the 
quarterly return for firms without recommendation changes in the prior month whose 
industries had influential recommendation changes. The independent variables are 
observed in the month-end before the start of the quarter. We proxy for the lead-lag 
effect using the value-weighted prior-month return of firms in the same industry that 
                                                          
39 We also check whether the predictability in returns in simply due to past recommendation changes 
or due to only influential recommendations as we argue. When we form portfolios according to the 
uncontaminated but non-influential recommendation changes rather than only influential 
recommendation changes, we find that there is no predictability in the returns of firms without 
recommendations. This implies that our abnormal returns are driven by the spillover effect from 
influential recommendation changes, and not simply a general spillover effect from all recommendation 
changes.  
65 
are in the largest size quintile based on the NYSE breakpoints determined using the 
CRSP sample. We also control for firm size, book-to-market, lagged return, short-term 
and long-term momentum, return volatility, turnover, institutional ownership, and 
industry size. Table 2.11 reports time-series averages of the coefficients and the 
associated time-series t-statistics (in parentheses). The quarterly returns used as the 
dependent variable are non-overlapping to ensure the t-statistics will not be 
overstated.40 Our variable of interest is UpInfluQuintile, which is the quintile rank 
indicating the favorableness of influential recommendation changes (favorableness is 
determined by the number of influential upgrades minus the number of influential 
downgrades). 41  Across four specifications in Table 2.11, the coefficient of 
UpInfluQuintile is positive, showing that the spillover effects of influential 
recommendation changes in the industry onto other firms. These coefficient estimates 
are robust to the control for the lead-lag effect.  
The evidence of predictability in returns is also consistent with investors 
underreacting to the implications of the feedback effect. They do not incorporate the 
predictability in analysts’ influential recommendation changes on the likelihood of 
observing more same-signed recommendation changes in the same industry in 
subsequent periods.  
2.7 Conclusion  
Recent literature examines how decision makers extract information from stock 
                                                          
40 We use quarterly regressions here to mirror the quarterly horizon we use in most of our tests. We 
obtain similar results if we use a monthly cross-sectional regression instead. 
41 The results are qualitatively similar if we use the difference between the number of influential 
upgrades and influential downgrades (DiffUpDown_Influ) instead.  
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prices in making decisions. As prominent information intermediaries, sell-side analysts 
issue research reports on the covered firms, and some of these reports are associated 
with extremely large abnormal returns. We show strong evidence that analysts learn 
from the significant market reactions elicited by their influential recommendation 
changes and update beliefs about the quality of their research. Specifically, conditional 
on having influential revisions in this quarter, analysts devote more efforts in the 
upcoming quarter, for example, they are more likely to revise recommendations and 
increase their total recommendation activities.  
We find that these results are mostly consistent with an information hypothesis. In 
essence, analysts who move the market treat this as positive feedback about the content 
or approach in their influential report. They then quickly apply this to the reports that 
they write in the next quarter and this leads to more active and influential 
recommendation activities. One year later, however, such effects reduce since the 
information is more fully incorporated into the analyst’s coverage universe after a 
series of reports. The information hypothesis is also supported by the existence of 
feedback effect at the broker level. The evidence in this paper is also consistent with 
analysts facing capacity constraints, just like other professional investors. Getting 
positive feedback leads them to immediately implement their ideas on other firms so 
that the predictability we find is indeed stronger for busier analysts. 
We also examine whether a trading strategy that seeks to benefit from such 
feedback effects can earn abnormal returns. If a firm that did not experience any 
recommendation change is in an industry with many influential recommendation 
changes in one direction, it is likely that this firm will soon experience a same-direction 
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recommendation change if analysts’ past success leads them to revise their ratings 
subsequently on other similar firms. We find indeed that such a trading strategy can 
earn abnormal returns of up to 0.6% per month. This is evidence that investors do not 
fully incorporate such analyst feedback effects to other firms when they observe 
influential recommendation changes in an industry. 
Overall, this study sheds new light on how an important group of decision makers, 
analysts, whose research influences stock price, learn from stock-price reactions when 
producing future research reports.
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CHAPTER 3 
IS THE CEO SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE 
DECISIONS? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Most academic literature focuses on the role of chief executive officers (CEOs) in firm 
decision-makings, the strand of studies typically examines how the CEO compensation, 
experience, behaviors and personalities affect firm policies and performance. In reality, 
however, the publicly listed companies are run by a team of top managers, where 
individuals with different beliefs and opinions collectively decide what the corporation 
should do.  Therefore, only focusing on the CEO cannot provide a whole picture of 
how managerial team influences corporate decisions. This paper aims to fill this void 
by examining how other senior managers cooperate with CEOs in determining firm 
investment, financing and payout policies, as well as their impacts on firm value.  
Recent studies have begun to lay stress on the importance of other senior managers, 
especially for chief financial officers (CFOs). They find that CFO equity incentives 
play a stronger role than those of the CEOs in earnings management, debt maturity 
choices, and stock price crash risk (see Jiang, Petroni, and Yanyan Wang (2010), Chava 
and Purnanandam (2010), and Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011)). The findings in Ben-David, 
Graham, and Harvey (2013) also imply that CFO actively contribute to firm investment 
and financing decisions. Different from these papers, we want to go a step further by 
looking at the role of whole top manager team in firm decisions and performance, 
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instead of focusing on only one person or just comparing the relative influence of CEOs 
and CFOs on different firm policies. 
We test our story by focusing on the impact of one of managerial personalities—
over-optimism on firm policies. Over-optimism is defined as an excessive belief that 
future events will be positive, and is figured out by the prior literature as a strong and 
robust psychological trait across many samples of subjects, especially among top 
executives. Therefore, drawing on the findings of prior research that overoptimistic 
CEOs are more likely to make aggressive firm decisions,42 we can examine whether 
overoptimistic (non-optimistic) non-CEO managers would reinforce (mitigate) the 
influence of overoptimistic CEOs on firm policies.  
Following the methodology of Campbell et al. (2011), we construct a modified 
version of Malmendier and Tate (2005) stock options-based over-optimism measure. 
The measure captures the propensity of a manager to voluntarily hold vested in-the-
money stock options. Although it is optimal for risk-averse, undiversified, and utility 
maximized executives to exercise their granted options early if it is sufficiently in the 
money, the overoptimistic managers believe that the stock prices of their companies 
will increase and postpone option exercise to earn more capital gains.  
To test whether and how non-CEO managers cooperate with CEOs in firm 
decision-makings, we estimate and compare the investment, financing and payout 
policies across four groups of firms, where the CEO and non-CEO manager team are 
both overoptimistic (Group1_both), or only one of them is overoptimistic 
(Group2_CEO and Group3_NonCEO), or neither of them is overoptimistic 
                                                          
42 For example, see Malmendier and Tate (2005), Malmendier and Tate (2008), Malmendier, Tate, 
and Yan (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda (2015), etc.  
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(Group4_Neither). We define a non-CEO manager team as over-optimism if at least 
half of the non-CEO top managers are overoptimistic.43 We find that, on average, firms 
whose CEOs and non-CEO manager team are both overoptimistic or neither of them is 
overoptimistic account for a substantial part of our sample, about 76%, which suggests 
that CEOs and other c-suite executives perform similarly in holding/exercising stock 
options. It might be because they receive same information, or they mimic each other 
in holding/exercising firm options, or CEOs prefer to hire non-CEO managers with 
similar personalities. Nevertheless, there are still 24% firm-years where CEOs and 
other c-suite executives perform differently in holding/exercising their own firms’ 
stock options.  
We have several important findings. Firstly, we examine the investment choices of 
four groups of firms. Our results indicate that, firms with both overoptimistic CEOs 
and overoptimistic non-CEO manager teams invest 14.9% more than Group 4 firms do, 
where none of senior managers are overoptimistic. However, the capital expenditure in 
the Group 2 firms with only overoptimistic CEOs is very close to that of Group 4 firms. 
The pattern is similar for investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity, asset growth as well as 
property plant and equipment (PP&E) growth, where other non-optimistic managers 
mitigate the effect of overoptimistic CEOs on increasing investment-to-cash-flow 
sensitivity and asset growth. These results indicate that prior findings of the positive 
relation between overoptimistic CEOs and firm investment are driven by the firms 
whose overall senior managers are overoptimistic, but cannot be attributed to 
                                                          
43  We require that each firm-year should have available total compensation (item TDC1 in 
Execucomp) for top five managers. Except for the CEO, we call other four top managers as non-CEO 
managers.  
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overoptimistic CEOs alone.  
Next, we examine the managerial over-optimism on financing decisions. 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) and Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) find 
that overoptimistic managers issue more debt than their industry peers, because they 
overestimate firm’s future and ability to meet its liabilities. However, we find that such 
financing decisions only exist in those firms whose CEOs and non-CEO manager team 
are both overoptimistic. Another issue is that of payout decisions. We find that although 
the overoptimistic CEOs are reluctant to pay dividends, there is a significant increase 
in payout (or equivalently, mitigate the decreasing payout) in firms where other top 
managers are not overoptimistic.  
We conduct a number of robustness tests to increase the credibility of our results 
and interpretation. A possible alternative explanation for the managers’ late option 
exercise behavior could be that managers in firms with strong past stock performance 
retain their option holdings and also engage in investment, issue more debt, and retain 
money for future projects to alleviate the underinvestment problem. Therefore, we 
control for firm buy-and-hold returns over the past fiscal years in our main regressions. 
In addition, we also control for manager tenure and compensation incentives which 
may impact manager options holding/exercise behaviors as well as corporate policies. 
We find that our results are robust to these factors. 
Another confounding issue is that the effect of whole senior manager team may 
reflect corporate governance factors. Goel and Thakor (2008) emphasize the 
importance of the interaction between manager overconfidence and the corporate 
governance, including internal organizational governance and board governance. Both 
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concepts of corporate governance not only influence top manager team’s constitution, 
they also affect the firm investment, financing, and payout policies. In addition to 
internal and board governance, we also consider the influence of CEO power. Powerful 
CEOs not only influence firm decisions (e.g., see Malmendier and Tate (2005), 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)), they may also foist their beliefs on other top 
managers, which could drive our results looking like aggressive decisions are made by 
whole overoptimistic manager team. Interestingly, including corporate governance 
measures and proxies of CEO power as additional controls does not change our 
coefficients of interest in a meaningful way.  
It is also possible that firms who have opportunities or plan to implement the 
aggressive policies and hence appoint overoptimistic managers. To gain insight about 
whether our findings are driven by a causal effect of overoptimistic manager team on 
firm policies or solely by matching, we restrict our sample to a subset of firm-years for 
which matching is less likely to happen. We re-estimate the foregoing regressions after 
eliminating the firm-years in which the CEOs stay in the firms less than 3 years, or the 
average tenure of non-CEO managers is less than 3 years. We find that our results on 
the association between overoptimistic manager team and firm policies do not come 
mainly from the endogenous selection of overoptimistic managers by those firms. 
 Finally, we examine whether overoptimistic non-CEO managers are helpful in 
increasing firm value. Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overoptimistic CEOs 
overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. However, 
several papers suggest the possibility of an overoptimistic manager increasing firm 
performance (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Compte and Postlewaite (2004), Van 
73 
den Steen (2004), Hackbarth (2008), and Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011)). In recent 
years, some empirical work exists to support the beneficial aspects of overoptimistic 
managers (e.g., Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), Hilary 
et al. (2016), and Phua, Tham, and Wei (2017)). Following the estimation method in 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), we find that only firms with both overoptimistic 
CEOs and non-CEO manager team are able to transform the growth opportunities into 
firm value, while overoptimistic CEO alone cannot achieve such success. This result is 
consistent with that in Hilary et al. (2016), they show that over-optimism is a related 
but different bias from overconfident. Over-optimism mainly refers to an excessive 
belief that future state will be positive, while overconfident individuals place too much 
weight on the accuracy of private information and an excessive belief in their own skills. 
Over-optimism generates higher managerial effort, and importantly, this additional 
effort improves firm profitability and market value.  
Recent work shows that overconfident CEOs have a significant impact on various 
corporate decisions, including investment (e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2005)), mergers 
and acquisitions (e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2008), Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal 
(2013)), financing decisions (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Huang, Tan, and Faff 
(2016)), innovations (e.g. Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 
(2012)), stakeholder commitments (Phua, Tham, and Wei (2017)), and accounting 
practices (Ahmed and Duellman (2013), Schrand and Zechman (2012), Hribar and 
Yang (2010)). Our paper differs from these studies in focusing on the roles of non-CEO 
top managers in corporate decision-makings, specifically, we aim to test whether 
overoptimistic (non-optimistic) non-CEO managers would reinforce (mitigate) the 
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aggressive decisions of overoptimistic CEOs.   
Several studies explore the roles of other managers as well as directors in firm 
outcomes. In addition to the papers that explore the impacts of CFOs on firm policies 
as we mentioned above, Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda (2015) show that 
board independence improves decision makings by overoptimistic CEOs by using the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our paper, however, does not focus on 
one manager or directors’ monitoring role, we attach the importance to how the whole 
non-CEO senior manager team helps CEO in firm investment, financing and payout 
decisions.   
Our study also relates to a broader literature that examines the impact of managerial 
styles on firm decisions. The pioneering paper by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) shows 
that individual manager matters for corporate decisions, in addition to firm-, industry-, 
and market-level characteristics. Many subsequent studies have looked at the corporate 
decisions made by the heterogeneous decision makers in terms of gender, age, 
education, and experience, etc. Our paper contributes to the literature by looking at the 
relationship between corporate decisions and the aggregation of top managers’ over-
optimism. There is very few paper talking about the aggregation effect of managers 
within the company, except for Garlappi, Giammarino, and Lazrak (2017), who model 
the dynamic corporate investment where decisions are made collectively by a group of 
agents holding heterogeneous beliefs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables of 
interest. In section 3, we talk about the econometric specifications of our tests. The 
main empirical findings are provided in section 4. We consider alternative explanations 
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and robustness check for our findings in section 5. Section 6 explores whether non-
CEO managers have abilities to transfer the growing opportunities into firm value. 
Section 7 concludes.  
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
We use Compustat’s Execucomp data to construct the over-optimism measure from 
1993 to 2015. To be included in the sample, a firm must report the non-missing and 
non-negative total compensation (as reported in Execucomp item TDC1) for CEO and 
other four highest paid managers (excluding CEO) during the year.44 We also restrict 
our sample to firm-years in which the CEO was in office for the entire year. All 
accounting data are from Compustat and stock returns are from CRSP. The financial 
firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000 to 6999) and utility firms 
(SIC codes 4900 to 4999) are excluded from our sample.  
3.2.1 Measure of manager over-optimism 
Manager over-optimism cannot be observed directly. Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
and Malmendier and Tate (2008) develop several measures of CEO optimism based on 
the CEO net stock purchases, options holding and exercising decisions, and the media’s 
descriptions. Unlike CEO, it is difficult to collect enough information on the media’s 
perception of other four top managers’ personal characteristics. Considering that our 
sample contains more than 28,000 top managers, it is infeasible to hand collect each 
manager’s portrayal from the media reports. On the other hand, matching top five 
                                                          
44 For some firm-years, more than five executives are listed in Execucomp. In such cases, we use 
only the five executives with the highest compensation. 
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managers in Execucomp with their stock transaction data in Thomson Reuters Insider 
Filing will lose many observations. Therefore, we base our over-optimism measure on 
a manager’s stock options holding/exercise decisions in Execucomp.  
Options-based over-optimism measure is built on the assumption that it is optimal 
for risk-averse, undiversified, and utility maximized executives to exercise their 
granted options early if it is sufficiently in the money (Hall and Murphy (2002)). Top 
managers are granted large quantities of stock and options, but the transactions of these 
grants are restricted, which prohibits top managers from perfectly hedging against the 
risk and leaves them highly exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies. Over-
optimism, however, may lead top managers to overestimate the future success of their 
companies. These overoptimistic managers believe that the stock prices of their 
companies will increase and postpone option exercise to earn more capital gains. 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), we define a top manager as overoptimistic if 
she holds her own company’s stock options that are more than 67% in the money. The 
choice of 67% in Malmendier and Tate (2005) comes from calibrating Hall and Murphy 
(2002) model using a detailed dataset on executive stock option holding and exercise 
decisions. Since we do not have the detailed options grant data, we take 67% 
moneyness cutoff as a given for the full sample of executives.45 We classify a top 
manager as overoptimistic from the first time she fails to exercise more than 67% in-
the-money options and if she subsequently exhibits the same behavior at least one time 
during the remaining sample period. This classification is consistent with our target 
that we are interested in exploring top managers who “habitually” exercise options late, 
                                                          
45 Our results are robust if we use 100% moneyness cutoff. 
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rather than “transitory” over-optimism effect.  
As we do not have detailed data on options holdings and exercise for each option 
grant, we follow Campbell et al. (2011) in calculating the average moneyness of the 
manager’s option portfolio for each year. Specifically, the average moneyness of the 
options is estimated as the per-option realizable value divided by the average exercise 
price. For each manager-year, we calculate the average realizable value per option as 
the total realizable value of the exercisable options divided by the number of 
exercisable options held by the manager. We then subtract the per-option realizable 
value from the stock price as the fiscal year end to obtain an estimate of the average 
exercise price of the options.46 As we want to identify managers who chose to hold 
options that could have been exercised, we include only vested options held by the top 
managers. Using this measure with the Execucomp sample allows us to compute 
optimism for each top-five manager and enables us to include more firms in our sample. 
The optimism measure in Campbell et al. (2011) can achieve similar classification and 
empirical results shown in Malmendier and Tate (2005) in which the optimism measure 
is built on the proprietary stock options holding and exercising data. In addition, 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) show that the optimism measure based on the year-
by-year aggregate data on manager vested option holdings available in Execucomp 
works well after controlling for past stock return performance.47  
                                                          
46 By using this algorithm, we cannot classify managers who have all of their options out of the 
money or have no options at all. In addition, we cannot classify managers who have no options for every 
year they are in the sample. In the analyses, we exclude the unclassified managers. 
47 We control for firm past stock return performance in all empirical regressions. 
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3.2.2 Classification of firms based on the manager over-optimism 
According to the above approach in constructing the over-optimism measure, we 
can identify each top-five manager in our sample as overoptimistic or not. In order to 
explore whether and how other non-CEO managers as a team cooperate with CEO in 
deciding investment, financing and payout policies, we aggregate the extent of over-
optimism among other four senior managers and define that a non-CEO manager team 
as a whole is overoptimistic if at least two of the four non-CEO top managers are 
classified as overoptimistic, and it is non-optimistic if only one or none of the them is 
overoptimistic. As thus, we have two indicators, one is used to measure whether CEO 
is overoptimistic or not, another one aims to identify whether a firm has an 
overoptimistic non-CEO manager team during the year.  
Left panel of Table 3.1 describes the fraction of firms with overoptimistic CEOs 
and that of firms with overoptimistic non-CEO manager team. Since a manager who is 
identified as overoptimistic in any year remains so throughout the sample period, this 
may mechanically induce an increase in the fraction of overoptimistic managers as time 
goes on. However, after the year 1997, the increasing pattern is not very obvious 
(except for the period 2003-2005). The pattern in the first half of the sample period is 
similar to that in Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012). From the column (4) and column 
(6), we can see that the average frequencies of firms with overoptimistic CEOs (62.97%) 
is larger than the frequencies of firms with overoptimistic non-CEO manager team 
(50.39%). 
To estimate how the firm policies vary across firms with different combinations of 
CEO and non-CEO manager team who have the same or opposite extent of optimism, 
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we classify firms into four categories: Group1_both includes firms who have an 
overoptimistic CEO as well as an overoptimistic non-CEO executive team. 
Group2_CEO includes firms whose CEOs are overoptimistic, but whose non-CEO 
manager team are not overoptimistic. Group3_NonCEO, just the other way around, 
includes firms who have overoptimistic non-CEO manager team but their CEOs are 
not overoptimistic. In Group4_neither, neither CEOs nor non-CEO manager team is 
overoptimistic.  
In the right panel of Table 3.1, we can see that, on average, Group 1 and Group 4 
firms account for a substantial part, 75.84%, of our sample period. It shows that CEOs 
and other c-suite executives perform similarly in holding/exercising stock options, 
which might be because they have same information, or they mimic each other in 
holding/exercising firm options, or CEOs prefer to hire people with similar 
personalities. Nevertheless, there are still 24.16% firm-years in which CEOs and other 
c-suite executives perform differently in holding/exercising their own firms’ stock 
options.  
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics  
We use the firm-year panel to estimate the roles of top managers in determining 
firm investment (i.e. capital expenditure, investment-to-cash flow sensitivity and asset 
growth), financing (i.e. internal or external financing, debt or equity financing), and 
payout policies (i.e. dividend and total payout activity), as well as their influences on 
firm value. In the empirical estimations for different firm policies, we include different 
controls that are examined to be effective for investment, financing, and payout policies 
by the extant literature, respectively.  
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Table 3.2 provides the averages of dependent and independent variables for four 
groups of firms, respectively. We find that the aggressive behaviors, like large 
investment, high speed of asset growth, more debt issuance, and less payout concentrate 
in the firms where both CEO and non-CEO manager team are both overoptimistic, 
while overoptimistic CEOs alone (Group2_CEO) are not able to make that aggressive 
decisions. Interestingly, the smallest difference of firm investment, financing and 
payout decisions is found between Group 2 and Group 4 firms, which means that other 
non-optimistic c-suite managers restrain the aggressive behaviors of overoptimistic 
CEOs. From the last column, we can see that the difference of these decisions between 
Group 1 and Group 2 firms are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
With respect to the controls, the overoptimistic top five managers in Group 1 
manage firms with larger size, higher Tobin’s Q, lower leverage, greater performance 
as measured by profitability, ROA, and annual stock returns. In addition, managers in 
Group 1 firms tend to have longer tenure and higher delta values. The average 
percentage of the total compensation to the top five executives that goes to the CEO 
(CEO pay slice, CPS) is largest for Group 2 firms where CEO is relatively more 
important (see Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)).  
3.3 Econometric specifications 
To test the roles that non-CEO managers play in corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions, we use two regression specifications. Firstly, we include three 
dummy variables—Group1_both, Group2_CEO, and Group3_nonCEO into the 
regressions of firm policies.  
           𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (8) 
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Where Y represents investment, financing or payout policies, X includes the relevant 
determinants of Y, as well as the measures of corporate governance, manager stock 
ownership and compensation incentives. The intercept 𝛼 represents the average value 
of the dependent variables in the forth-group firms (Group4_neither).  
Another more intuitive specification is to directly include two dummy variables, 
I(Opt_CEO) and I(Opt_nonCEO), which indicate whether the CEO or non-CEO 
manager team is overoptimistic or not, respectively. However, as shown in Table 3.1, 
there are about 76% firm-year combinations in which CEO and other c-suite managers 
have similar behavior in holding/exercising their own firms’ stock options, it means 
I(Opt_CEO) and I(Opt_nonCEO) are highly correlated. In our sample, the correlation 
of these two variables is about 0.54. Therefore, we firstly regress the I(Opt_nonCEO) 
on I(Opt_CEO) as illustrated in Equation (2), and keep the residual as the proxy of the 
“pure” optimism level of non-CEO manager team that cannot be explained by the CEO 
optimism nor by other common factors, i.e. same insider information, board 
characteristics, and corporate governance effect etc., which drive CEO and other 
managers perform similarly. Then, we include the residual from the above regression 
as well as the indicator variable I(Opt_CEO) in the regressions of firm policies in 
Equation (3). The specification is as follows, 
                              𝐼(Opt_nonCEO)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼(Opt_CEO)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (9) 
              𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1I(Opt_CEO)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝜀?̂?𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                      (10) 
When examining the firm-year panel of observations based on the above two 
specifications, we control for industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors that 
are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. Industries are defined based on 
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Fama-French 48-industry groupings. All outcome variables are forwarded by one 
period and continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile. We do 
not include firm fixed effects here, since the variables of interests is sticky. For example, 
only firms that are classified in each group at least once during the sample period can 
be included in the firm-fixed-effect estimations in Equation (1), which will reduce large 
number of observations and induces sample selection problem.  
3.4 Main results 
3.4.1 Investment and manager over-optimism 
We begin by examining whether and how non-CEO manager team impacts 
corporate investment decisions. In particular, we test whether large increase in firm’s 
investment, sensitivity of investment to cash flows, and asset growth comes from the 
firms as long as their CEOs are overoptimistic (as previous literature shows), or only 
comes from those companies whose CEOs and non-CEO manager teams are both 
overoptimistic. If the latter is the case, it implies that firms other senior managers also 
play an important role in investment decisions.  
3.4.1.1 Capital expenditure 
The regression results are provided in Table 3.3. From the column (1) to column 
(3), we estimate the regressions of capital expenditure by including the indicator 
variables of different groups of firms. The regression results support our conjecture: 
the coefficient on indicator variable Group1_both is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, while, the indicator Group2_CEO becomes insignificance, 
and the magnitude of its coefficient is much smaller than that of Group1_both. 
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Economically, 0.945%, the coefficient estimate of Group1_both, represents 14.9% 
increase in capital expenditures from its mean and an increase of 0.15 standard 
deviations. The 0.178%, the coefficient estimate of Group2_CEO, only represents 2.8% 
increase in capital expenditures from its mean and an increase of 0.03 standard 
deviations. The p-value at the bottom of the table shows that the difference between 
the coefficients of Group1_both and Group2_CEO are statistically significant. These 
results indicate that the aggressive investment decisions of overoptimistic CEOs can be 
moderated by other c-suite managers who are not overoptimistic, which leads Group 2 
firms much closer to the benchmark firms (Group 4 firms with neither overoptimistic 
CEOs nor overoptimistic non-CEO manager team) in their industries. Previous studies 
just examine the relation between overoptimistic CEOs and firm investment (see 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), Banerjee, Humphery-
Jenner, and Nanda (2015)), they ignore the effect of other c-suite managers. Virtually, 
their findings are mostly driven by the firms whose overall senior manager team is 
overoptimistic. Our findings remind people that do not always attribute the aggressive 
expansion to CEOs, other c-suite managers are also boosters.  
In the column (2), we additionally control for manager tenure and their 
compensation incentives, including delta and vega. Since the correlation of these 
variables between CEO and other top managers are high, we only include those 
variables of CEOs. Delta is defined as the dollar change in a manager’s stock and option 
portfolio for a 1% change in stock price, and measures the manager’s incentives to 
increase stock price. Vega is the dollar change in a manager’s option holdings for a 1% 
change in stock return volatility, and measures the risk-taking incentives generated by 
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the manager’s option holdings.48 It appears that younger managers, the managers with 
higher delta and lower vega will invest more. But these control variables do not 
influence our conclusion that firms make more investment is due to their whole top 
manager team is overoptimistic. 
In the column (3), we further control for firm past performance. As stock options 
are often granted at the money, the moneyness of options is influenced by firm stock 
returns subsequent to the grant date. Thus, the option-based measure of manager over-
optimism may also proxy for the relation between past performance and investment 
rather than manager personal characteristics. Thus, the Group1_both may represent 
those firms who perform well and earn a lot in stock market, which lead them to invest 
more in capital expenditures. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) find that the optimism 
measure based on the aggregate vested option holdings in Execucomp performs well 
after controlling for past stock performance. Therefore, in column (3), we further 
control for firm buy-and-hold returns over the past fiscal years by following Hirshleifer, 
Low, and Teoh (2012). Firstly, to determine the number of years of stock returns we 
should control for, we run regressions of natural logarithm of one plus moneyness on 
several lags of annual stock returns, including the annual stock return leading up to the 
fiscal year-end for which moneyness is being measured. We also include the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization as an additional control variable. Similar to 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), we find that moneyness is significantly associated 
with contemporaneous annualized stock returns and up to 6 years of lagged stock 
returns. Then, we compute the cumulative stock return over the lesser of the CEO’s 
                                                          
48 We use the approximation method detailed in Core and Guay (2002) to calculate delta and vega of 
the stock and option portfolios. 
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tenure or 7 years, the cumulative return stops just before the start of the fiscal year 
when the dependent variable is measured. We use this cumulative past stock return as 
a control variable, and find that the results continue to hold, where firms with both 
overoptimistic CEO and non-CEO manager team have the largest capital expenditures 
than other groups of firms. 
In column (4) and column (5), we use the econometric specification in Equation (2) 
- (3) to test whether overoptimistic non-CEO manager team also plays an important 
role in corporate investment decisions, after controlling for CEO over-optimism. The 
results in column (4) show that we can replicate results in the prior studies on the 
relation of overoptimistic CEO and corporate investment decisions, in which 
investment is positively related to the indicator variable of overoptimistic CEO. 
Furthermore, we find that the overoptimistic non-CEO manager team also positively 
and significantly associate with the investment decisions. 
Overall, the empirical evidence in Table 3.3 reveals that non-CEO senior managers 
also play a crucial role in firm investment decisions. Without the overoptimistic 
colleagues, overoptimistic CEO alone cannot significantly influence firm investment 
decisions.  
3.4.1.2 Sensitivity of investment to cash flows 
We next examine how overoptimistic non-CEO manager team influences a firm’s 
investment sensitivity to cash flows. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that 
overconfident CEOs spend more of their cash flows on capital expenditures. We want 
to test whether such effect is driven by overoptimistic CEO alone or it needs other c-
suite managers also to be optimistic. We examine the investment-cash-flow sensitivity 
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model that is widely studied in the literature (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 
(2004); Malmendier and Tate (2005); Foucault and Fresard (2014)). The capital 
expenditure and cash flow in year t+1 are all normalized by total assets at the beginning 
of the year. Other control variables are in year t.  
The results are presented in Table 3.4. We find that only Group 1 firms with both 
overoptimistic CEO and overoptimistic non-CEO manager team spend more of their 
cash flows. The results are also economically significant. Compared to the benchmark, 
firms in Group 1 will spend more than 30% of their cash flows to investment. However, 
the firms in Group 2 do not increase their spending of cash flow to capital expenditures, 
their investment-cash-flow sensitivity is very close to that of firms in Group 4 with 
neither overoptimistic CEO nor overoptimistic non-CEO manager team. The difference 
of the first two interactions are statistically significant at the 5% level from the p-value 
at the bottom of the table. In addition, the inclusion of manager incentive and past stock 
performance does not weaken our results. When we replace the group indicators with 
the manager over-optimism indicators in column (5), we find that overoptimistic non-
CEO manager team plays an important role in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  
3.4.1.3 Asset growth and manager over-optimism 
Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda (2015) show that overconfident CEOs, 
with their overly positive views on firm prospects, seek greater asset growth, whether 
measured by total asset growth or property, plant, and equipment growth. In this paper, 
we test whether the effect of overoptimistic CEO on asset growth can be moderated by 
other non-overoptimistic senior managers. The PP&E growth represents the log 
increase in property, plant, and equipment from year t to year t+1, and similarly for 
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total asset growth. The regression results are reported in Table 3.5. We find that all 
three groups, compared to the benchmark Group 4 firms who have neither 
overoptimistic CEO nor overoptimistic non-CEO manager team, are positively 
associated with the PP&E growth and total asset growth. For example, the managers in 
Group 1 firms tend to grow the PP&E more than 90% of its mean and 0.278 of its 
standard deviations. The estimated PP&E growth in Group 2 firms represents 18.3% of 
its mean and 0.06 of its standard deviations. From the p-value at the bottom of the table, 
we find that the coefficient of indicator variable Group2_CEO is significantly smaller 
than that of Group1_both at the 1% level, suggesting that non-CEO executive team 
also plays an important role in asset growth. Specifically, if the non-CEO senior 
managers are also optimistic, they will accelerate the aggressive decisions of 
overoptimistic CEOs. However, if the non-CEO colleagues are not overoptimistic, they 
would restrain the CEOs’ aggressive actions.  
When we further control for manager tenure and incentives, as well as the past stock 
performance in column (2) and column (3), the Group 2 firms do not associate with 
faster asset growth than benchmark group any more. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
Group3_nonCEO indicator is always significant, and its magnitude is larger than that 
of Group2_CEO. The empirical evidence of the managerial over-optimism on total 
asset growth illustrated in column (4) and column (8) are similar to that of PP&E 
growth. Overall, the results in Table 3.5 emphasize the important role of other c-suite 
managers in firm expansion decisions.  
3.4.2 Financing choice and manager over-optimism: Debt vs. equity 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) show that, conditional on having to access 
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public securities markets, overconfident managers choose debt over equity, since 
equity prices are more sensitive to differences in opinions about future cash flows. In 
addition, debt can allow current shareholders to remain the residual claimant on the 
firm’s future cash flows. From the overall financing aspect, Hackbarth (2009) and Ben-
David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) also find that overoptimistic manager chooses a 
higher level of debt because she is confident on firm’s future and ability to meet its 
liabilities. In this section, we test whether overoptimistic CEO alone can significantly 
affect the corporate financing decisions.  
The regression results are presented in Table 3.6. We find that Group 1 firms 
(Group1_both) prefer debt to equity across three specifications from column (1) to 
column (3). The coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% and 5% level and range 
from 0.00912 to 0.0133, representing a 33.3% to 48.5% increase in net debt issuance 
from its mean and an increase of 0.08 to 0.12 standard deviations. However, the Group 
2 firms with only overoptimistic CEO display no preference on debt issuance, when 
controlling for manager characteristics and firm past performance. In addition, the 
results in column (5) indicate that non-CEO executive team is more important than 
CEOs in determining external financing choices. This result is not surprising as 
literature documents that CFOs play an equally or even more important role than that 
of CEOs in financing decision-makings.  
3.4.3 Dividend payout and manager over-optimism 
Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2013) show that an overconfident CEO views external 
financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by 
lowering the current dividend payout. We examine whether this reduction in dividends 
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associated with overoptimistic CEO alone or it needs non-CEO manager team also to 
be overoptimistic. We use the same econometric specifications as those in the above 
sections, in which we estimate the effect of non-CEO manager team on firm payout 
decisions. The results are illustrated in Table 3.7. We find that the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate on Group2_CEO is the half of that on Group1_both, the difference 
of these two coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of 
economically significance, the coefficient estimates of Group1_both range from -0.529 
to -0.664 across three specifications in column (1) to column (3), representing a 50.7% 
to 63.6% decrease in dividend payment from its mean and a decrease of 0.359 to 0.45 
standard deviations.  
The results here are consistent with the findings documented in Deshmukh, Goel, 
and Howe (2013) that overoptimistic CEOs prefer to reduce dividend payment. 
Furthermore, we also find that if an overoptimistic CEO is accompanied by an 
overoptimistic non-CEO manager team, she is more likely to retain the money for the 
future investment and reduce the dividend to shareholders. However, if other c-suite 
managers are not overoptimistic, they would moderate the effect of overoptimistic CEO 
on the dividend reductions. The results are quite robust to the additional controls for 
manager characteristics and firm past performance. The column (4) further verifies that 
non-CEO managers also play an important role in determining the dividend payment. 
From column (5) to column (8), we can see that the results are similar when we replace 
the dividend payment with total payout—the sum of dividend and repurchase, then 
scaled by the market capitalization.  
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3.5 Robustness tests 
Two main concerns about the interpretation of our results are omitted variables that 
simultaneously inspiring whole manager team to hold deeply in-the-money options and 
inducing firm to implement aggressive decisions, and the accuracy of option-based 
over-optimism measure. In this section, we conduct a number of robustness check to 
increase the credibility of our results and interpretation. 
3.5.1 Corporate governance effect 
We classify firms into four categories according to the CEO and other non-CEO 
managers’ over-optimism, the category indicators may represent other effects rather 
than the manager over-optimism effect. For example, it may merely reflect corporate 
governance factors. Goel and Thakor (2008) emphasize the importance of the 
interaction between manager overconfidence and the corporate governance. There are 
two concepts of corporate governance, one is the “internal organizational governance” 
that refers to the internal promotion process by which managers move up through the 
corporate hierarchy, and the other is the “board governance” representing the board’s 
decision to promote or fire a manager. Both concepts of corporate governance not only 
influence the optimism level of manager team, they also affect the firm investment, 
financing, and payout policies. To tease out these possible confounding effects, we 
further control for governance characteristics in our main regressions. Our measures of 
corporate governance are the board size and board independence.49 Following Harford, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), board size is generally measured as the number of 
                                                          
49 Using E-index as corporate governance measure gives similar results. 
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directors on the board divided by the log of total assets, and board independence is 
computed as the ratio of independent directors to total directors.  
The results are illustrated in Table 3.8, where corporate governance measures are 
included in the various regressions of firm policies. We can see that our results are still 
robust that firm policies are decided by a whole top manager team, overoptimistic CEO 
alone cannot make such aggressive decisions. Although the difference of capital 
expenditure is not statistically significant between Group 1 firms and Group 2 firms, it 
is still economically significant. In the regressions, we also control for the other 
determinants of outcome variables, including firm and manager characteristics, 
compensation incentives, as well as the past firm performance.   
3.5.2 The effect of CEO power 
Prior studies show that powerful CEOs can influence the firm policies. For example, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that CEOs who have accumulated additional titles 
(e.g. the chairman of the board) display higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) suggest that dominant CEOs, as proxied by a high 
CEO pay slice (CPS) can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and 
behavior of firms. On the other hand, powerful CEOs might foist their beliefs on other 
top managers. If powerful CEOs postpone exercising their stock options, they may 
force other senior managers to do so, or other senior managers learn from the late 
exercising behavior of powerful CEOs. Thus, it is possible that our results—only firms 
with optimistic whole manager team make aggressive decisions are driven by the effect 
of powerful CEOs.  
In order to mitigate such concern, we further control for the CEO power, as proxied 
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by the CEO pay slice (CPS) defined in Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)—the 
fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the 
CEO, and an indicator variable which equals one if CEO is the chairman of the board, 
and zero otherwise.50 We re-estimate the foregoing regressions by including these two 
variables, and present the results in Table 3.9. We can see that the additional controls 
of CEO power do not influence our results that non-overoptimistic managers can 
attenuate the aggressive effect of overoptimistic CEOs on firm policies. In the 
regressions, we also control for firm and manager characteristics, as well as the past 
firm performance.  
3.5.3 Matching between manager over-optimism and firm decisions 
Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) find that growing firms tend to have more 
optimistic CEOs. It is possible that firms who have opportunities or plan to implement 
the aggressive policies and hence appoint overoptimistic managers. To gain insight 
about whether our findings are driven by a causal effect of overoptimistic manager 
team on firm policies or solely by matching, we restrict our sample to a subset of firm-
years for which matching is likely to be less important. We measure manager over-
optimism as a persistent trait. However, firm growth opportunities vary over time as its 
strategic resources and competitive environment shift (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 
(2012)), which suggesting that matching effects between manager over-optimism and 
time-varying firm decisions are likely to be strongest when the managers are first 
appointed. Therefore, we re-estimate the foregoing regression after eliminating the 
                                                          
50 We use data in ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services, formally RiskMetrics) database to construct 
the indicator variable that whether CEO is the chairman of the board.  
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firm-years in which the CEOs stay in the firms less than 3 years, and where the average 
tenure of non-CEO top managers is less than 3 years.   
Table 3.10 summarizes the coefficients of the variables of our interest. The related 
control variables are included in but not reported in the table, as well as industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. In column (2), we report the coefficients of group 
indicators that interact with the cash flow, although we do not differentiate it with pure 
group indicators reported in other columns. Except that the investment to cash flow 
sensitivity is not significantly larger or lower in any group of firms, the Group1_both 
continues to be statistically and economically significant in other tests. These findings 
suggest that the relations between overoptimistic manager team and firm policies do 
not come mainly from the endogenous selection of overoptimistic managers by those 
firms.  
3.5.4 Private information 
Managers who fail to exercise their own firms’ stock option may have positive 
private information about future stock prices that make holding options attractive. Such 
favorable information may also explain firms’ subsequent behaviors on active 
financing, retaining money, and doing investment. Since Group 1 firms have both 
overoptimistic CEO and non-CEO manager team, it displays a strongest signal of 
private information, as whole managers refrain from exercising deeply in-the-money 
options. It seems that the previous results are driven by private information. In fact, 
private information should be short-lived and it is unlikely that the same manager 
repeatedly receives positive information. However, our over-optimism measure is 
persistent which targets manager habitual tendency to postpone exercising options. In 
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addition, Carpenter and Remmers (2001) document that there is no evidence that 
managers exercise options based on their private inside information. Furthermore, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that the manager failed to exercise in-the-money 
options in the past can predict the similar behavior in the future, but is not associated 
with the current or future stock price performance. They also find that the CEOs cannot 
beat the market by holding options beyond the threshold. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
the inside information drives our results.  
3.5.5 Risk tolerance 
Another possible alternative explanation for our findings is that managers who fail 
to exercise deeply in-the-money option are due to their high risk tolerant rather than 
over-optimism. Such high-risk tolerance can lead to more aggressive behaviors that we 
find from our above results. Even if this is true, it would not overturn our key insight, 
that non-CEO manager team who has opposite managerial traits from CEO can mitigate 
the impact of CEO traits on firm policies. It still suggests the important role of non-
CEO managers and the cooperation among senior managers.  
3.6 Overoptimistic managers and firm value 
The evidence provided so far is all neutral, where we can see overoptimistic non-
CEO managers reinforce the effect coming from the overoptimistic CEOs, while if 
other non-CEO managers are not overoptimistic, they can mitigate the effect produced 
by overoptimistic CEOs in the firms. In this section, we examine whether 
overoptimistic non-CEO managers are helpful in firm performance. Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) show that overoptimistic CEOs overpay for target companies and 
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undertake value-destroying mergers. However, some studies support the beneficial 
aspects of overoptimistic managers, because overoptimistic managers are more creative 
and make more efforts to achieve their goals. For example, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 
(2012) document that CEO over-optimism allows firm to translate growth opportunities 
into realized firm value, by using industry price to earnings (PE) ratio as an exogenous 
proxy for firm growth opportunities to address the endogenous issue under the 
interpretation of the regression of firm value on manager over-optimism. We follow 
their method and examine the variations in firm value across different groups of firms, 
and see whether the increasing firm value is due to overoptimistic CEOs alone or it 
needs that other c-suite managers are also optimistic. Firstly, we calculate the monthly 
industry PE ratio as the logarithmic transformation of the ratio of the industry’s total 
market capitalization to the industry’s total earnings. Then, we subtract the 60-month 
moving average of the PE ratio. Finally, we average the difference over the fiscal year 
to form the exogenous proxy of firm growth opportunities. The firm value is proxied 
by Tobin’s Q, and the independent variables are the same as those in Hirshleifer, Low, 
and Teoh (2012). Using our sample, we can replicate their results by looking at the 
regression results in column (1) and column (3) in Table 3.11, where the industry PE 
ratio positively and significantly associates with Tobin’s Q, and the coefficient of the 
interaction between industry PE ratio and the CEO over-optimistic measure in column 
(3) is also positive and statistically significant. In column (2), we interact the measure 
of growth opportunities-industry PE ratio with group indicators. Interestingly, we find 
that only group 1 firms are able to transform the growth opportunities into firm value, 
where both CEOs and non-CEO manager team are overoptimistic. The results in 
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column (4) also suggest that non-CEO managers play a crucial in transforming growth 
opportunities into firm value. Therefore, the increasing firm value cannot only attribute 
to the optimistic CEOs, it is the result of cooperation of whole manager team. This 
result is consistent with the Hilary et al. (2016), they show that over-optimism is a 
related but different bias from overconfident, it generates higher managerial effort, and 
importantly, this additional effort improves firm profitability and market value.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper aims to explore the role played by the non-CEO top managers in firm 
investment, financing and payout policies, as well as their impacts on firm value. 
Drawing on the findings of prior research that overoptimistic CEOs are more likely to 
make aggressive firm decisions, we examine whether overoptimistic (non-optimistic) 
non-CEO managers would reinforce (mitigate) the effect of overoptimistic CEOs on 
firm policies. Over-optimism is defined as individual holding an excessive belief that 
future events will be positive, and is figured out by the prior literature as a strong and 
robust psychological trait across many samples of subjects, especially among top 
executives.  
Using a large sample of top five managers from Execucomp database, we find that 
only the firms with both overoptimistic CEOs and overoptimistic non-CEO manager 
teams would make more investment, use more debt financing when accessing to the 
public security market, and are less likely to pay dividends. However, the investment 
and financing decisions in firms with only overoptimistic CEOs are close to those of 
firms with neither overoptimistic CEOs nor overoptimistic non-CEO manager teams. 
These results indicate that prior findings of the aggressive decisions made by 
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overoptimistic CEOs are virtually driven by the firms whose overall senior managers 
are overoptimistic, but cannot be attributed to overoptimistic CEOs alone. We also find 
that only the firms with both overoptimistic CEOs and overoptimistic non-CEO 
manager teams are able to transform the growth opportunities into firm value, 
overoptimistic CEOs alone cannot achieve such success. This result supports the bright 
side of over-optimism, because it can boost manager creativity and generate higher 
managerial effort, which consequently improve firm value.  
Our research is the first to explicitly show that non-CEO managers also play a 
significant role in firm investment, financing, and payout decisions. But the 
implications of this study are limited by the validity of our measures of group over-
optimism. In addition, although we try to mitigate the concerns of endogeneity, this 
issue remains exist in our study. These limitations can be avenues for future research.
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A    Tables for Chapter 1 
 
Figure 1.1: Trend of cash ratio from 1980 to 2014 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2014 with positive 
total assets and sales for firms incorporated in the United States and publicly traded on the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 4900-
4999) and government entities (SIC code greater than or equal to 9000) are excluded from the 
sample. Cash ratio is cash and short-term investment scaled by total assets. The aggregate cash 
ratio is the sum of cash divided by the sum of assets for all sample firms.  
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2014 with positive total assets 
and sales for firms incorporated in the United States and publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 is the change in cash ratio. 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡  is the natural logarithm of total assets and 
adjusted by 2014 CPI. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡   is the ratio of income before extraordinary over total assets. 𝑀𝐵𝑡  
market value divided by the book value of assets. Market value of assets is book value of asset mines 
book value of equity and plus market value of equity. Book value of equity is equal to stockholder equity 
plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. 
Market equity is the fiscal year-end equity price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the ratio of net equity issuance over total assets. Net equity issuance is defined as the 
sale of common and preferred stocks net of cash dividend and purchase of common and preferred stocks. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 is the ratio of net debt issuance over total assets. Net debt issuance is defined as long-term 
debt issuance net of long-term debt reduction. 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the ratio of net investment over total assets. 
Net investment is the sum of capital expenditures plus acquisitions net of sales of property. Peer firms’ 
average characteristics denote variables constructed as the average of all firms within an industry-year 
combination, excluding the ith observation. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 
4900-4999) and government entities (SIC code greater than or equal to 9000) are excluded from the 
sample. Industries are defined by three-digit SIC code.  
  Mean Median SD P1 P99 
Firm-specific characteristics      
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 -0.004 -0.001 0.093 -0.379 0.316 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡  5.508 5.398 2.077 1.170 10.611 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡  -0.034 0.0320 0.237 -1.426 0.244 
𝑀𝐵𝑡  1.889 1.393 1.513 0.578 10.358 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 -0.023 -0.003 0.046 -0.279 0 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 0.009 0 0.091 -0.289 0.403 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡  0.076 0.050 0.084 -0.059 0.445 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 0.152 0.129 0.090 0.037 0.492 
 
     
Peer firms’ average characteristics 
     
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  -0.008 -0.007 0.024 -0.08 0.054 
𝑃_𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 5.420 5.292 1.0675 3.343 8.370 
𝑃_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 -0.059 -0.027 0.124 -0.649 0.112 
𝑃_𝑀𝐵𝑡 2 1.801 0.786 0.886 5.047 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡  -0.024 -0.019 0.017 -0.111 0 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡  0.010 0.009 0.029 -0.082 0.127 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 0.077 0.068 0.038 0.007 0.244 
 
     
 
0.020 0.017 0.016 -0.013 0.078 
 
     
Industry Characteristics 
     
#Firms per industry-year 23.89 14 36.202   
#Industries 202     
 
     
#Obs. 94085     
#Firms 9419     
 𝑃_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 (IV)  
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Table 1.2: Instrument variable validity 
The table reports partial correlations between the instrument and firm-specific fundamentals. The sample 
includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2014 with positive total assets and sales for 
firms incorporated in the United States and publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. 
Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and government entities (SIC code 
greater than or equal to 9000) are excluded from the sample. The dependent variable is the average of 
peer firm relative idiosyncratic stock volatility in the last year. Peer firm average factors are peer firm 
averages of the same variables listed under firm-specific factors in the table: firm size, cash flow, market-
to-book ratio, net equity issuance, net debt issuance, and net investment. Peer firm averages are 
constructed as the average of all firms within an industry-year combination, excluding the ith observation. 
Industries are defined by three-digit SIC code. All the variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
Column (1) includes firm-specific and peer firms’ average characteristics, and column (2) further 
controls for industry characteristics: industry concentration and industry cash flow volatility. All test 
statistics are computed using standard errors that are robust to within-firm correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
   
 (1) (2) 
Firm-specific characteristics   
 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.82) (-0.86) 
   
 -0.000035 -0.0000327 
 (-0.72) (-0.67) 
   
 0.000637** 0.000633** 
 (2.23) (2.22) 
   
 -0.00159 -0.00151 
 (-1.26) (-1.20) 
   
 0.00000835 0.0000186 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
   
 0.000328 0.000321 
 (0.44) (0.43) 
   
Peer firms’ average characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm i’s IdioVol Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics No Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.229 0.230 
#Obs. 94085 94085 
P_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 
𝑀𝐵𝑡 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑡
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 
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Table 1.3: 2SLS estimation of linear-in-means model 
This table presents 2SLS estimated coefficients scaled by the corresponding variable’s standard 
deviation, where the instrument is the lagged average of peer firms relative idiosyncratic stock volatility, 
relative idiosyncratic stock volatility is the difference between firm’s idiosyncratic stock volatility and 
industry median idiosyncratic stock volatility. The endogenous variable is the peer firms average cash 
savings. The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2014 with positive total 
assets and sales for firms incorporated in the United States and publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and government 
entities (SIC code greater than or equal to 9000) are excluded from the sample. Peer firms’ average 
characteristics denote variables constructed as the average of all firms within an industry-year 
combination, excluding the ith observation. Industries are defined by three-digit SIC code. All the 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. All test statistics are computed using standard errors that 
are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. K-P rk Wald F statistics significance implying less 
than 15% or 10% size distortion is denoted by ** and ***, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 0.026
** 0.0264* 0.0264* 0.027** 0.032*** 0.027*** 
 (2.23) (2.24) (2.23) (2.24) (2.66) (2.61) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1     -0.024
*** -0.024*** 
     (-50.76) (-50.90) 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 0.007
*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (4.86) (4.86) (4.90) (4.90) (4.37) (4.36) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 0.034
*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (12.91) (12.91) (12.91) (12.91) (14.50) (14.54) 
𝑀𝐵𝑡 0.012
*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (11.01) (11.00) (10.99) (10.99) (10.98) (11.10) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 0.022
*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (23.61) (23.60) (23.60) (23.59) (20.93) (21.06) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 0.017
*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (21.14) (21.14) (21.13) (21.13) (18.94) (19.00) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 -0.053
*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (-56.31) (-56.31) (-56.31) (-56.31) (-55.28) (-55.38) 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 0.006
*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (8.57) (8.56) (8.61) (8.60) (11.32) (11.11) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1      0.005
*** 
      (3.07) 
𝑃_𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
* -0.003* -0.004* -0.003* 
 (-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.84) (-1.72) 
𝑃_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 -0.013
* -0.013* -0.013* -0.014* -0.016** -0.015** 
 (-1.75) (-1.77) (-1.84) (-1.86) (-2.09) (-2.08) 
𝑃_𝑀𝐵𝑡 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.64) (-0.65) (-0.54) (-0.55) (-1.12) (-0.87) 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
* -0.002 
 (-1.35) (-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.36) (-1.94) (-1.60) 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 -0.001
** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (-2.02) (-2.03) (-1.98) (-1.99) (-2.64) (-2.10) 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 0.013
*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 (2.82) (2.83) (2.81) (2.82) (3.22) (3.27) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡−1  0.000  0.000   
  (0.86)  (0.79)   
𝐼𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1   -0.002
* -0.002*   
   (-1.86) (-1.83)   
 
      
1st-stage Instrument 
P_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 
0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 
(9.36) (9.36) (9.36) (9.36) (9.36) (10.64) 
       
K-P rk Wald F statistics 87.659*** 87.651*** 87.58*** 87.566*** 87.619*** 113.302*** 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 94085 94085 94085 94085 94085 94085 
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Table 1.4: Robustness tests 
This table presents 2SLS estimated coefficients scaled by the corresponding variable’s standard 
deviation, where the instrument is the lagged average of peer firm relative idiosyncratic risk, and the 
endogenous variable is the peer firm average cash savings. Column (1) employ TNIC peer groups, 
column (2) restricts the sample into US domestic firms, column (3) focuses on the period from 2004 to 
2014 where no cash trend exists, and column (4) uses pseudo peers to implement placebo tests. Financial 
firms (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and government entities (SIC code greater 
than or equal to 9000) are excluded from the sample. Peer firms’ average characteristics denote variables 
constructed as the average of all firms within an industry-year combination, excluding the ith 
observations. All the variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% level. All test statistics are computed using 
standard errors that are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. K-P rk Wald F statistics 
significance implying less than 15% or 10% size distortion is denoted by ** and ***, respectively. 
 TNIC peers Domestic firms 2004 - 2014 Pseudo peers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  0.032
** 0.022* 0.021* 0.008 
 (2.07) (1.93) (1.80) (0.30) 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡  0.008
** 0.0098*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
 (2.38) (4.45) (2.88) (5.14) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡  0.022
*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.035*** 
 (5.46) (12.30) (3.70) (12.72) 
𝑀𝐵𝑡  0.011
*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (5.47) (7.60) (6.62) (12.19) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 0.020
*** 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.022*** 
 (16.83) (13.26) (20.10) (23.88) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 0.024
*** 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.017*** 
 (18.14) (11.07) (18.05) (20.94) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡  -0.062
*** -0.052*** -0.062*** -0.053*** 
 (-43.47) (-37.77) (-43.51) (-56.16) 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 0.006
*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
 (3.76) (7.37) (2.76) (9.41) 
𝑃_𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.87) (-1.17) (-1.39) (-0.51) 
𝑃_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-1.42) (-1.10) (-1.04) (-0.37) 
𝑃_𝑀𝐵𝑡 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 
 (-1.52) (0.30) (-1.43) (-0.37) 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡  -0.006
* -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
 (-1.94) (-0.76) (-1.63) (-0.74) 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡  -0.005
*** -0.001 -0.004** -0.000 
 (-2.58) (-1.44) (-2.12) (-0.12) 
𝑃_𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 0.024
*** 0.012** 0.016** 0.002 
 (3.05) (2.43) (2.37) (0.28) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡−1 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (1.35) (0.65) (-0.19) (1.05) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.003
** 
 (-0.15) (-0.16) (-1.45) (-2.25) 
      
1st-stage Instrument 
𝑃_𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 
0.049***     
(6.48) 
0.055***    
(9.23) 
0.080***    
(8.81) 
0.013***    
(3.45) 
 
    
K-P rk Wald F statistics 43.337*** 85.235*** 81.669*** 11.913** 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 44878 47081 24613 94058 
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Table 1.5: Rivalry-based mechanism 
This table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients for the peer firm average cash savings interacted with the 
indicator variables identifying industry concentration, the intensity of cash flow volatility, and the extent 
of product market threats. The dependent variable is the change in cash ratio. The coefficient estimates 
are scaled by the corresponding variable standard deviation. The endogenous variables are the peer firms 
average cash savings interacted with indicator variables, and the instrument variables are the one-period-
lagged peer frim average relative idiosyncratic risk interacted with the same indicator variables. The 
indicator variable 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤 is equal to one if firms are ranked into the bottom tercile and zero if the firms are 
at the top tercile based on the competition proxies listed in the top row. Just the reverse, 𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ is equal 
to one if firms are ranked into the top tercile and zero for bottom tercile. The K-P rk Wald F statistics 
are reported at the bottom of the table. Industries are defined by 3-digit SIC code. All test statistics are 
computed using standard errors that are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. K-P rk 
Wald F statistics significance implying less than 15% or 10% size distortion is denoted by ** and ***, 
respectively.  
 
  
Compustat 
HHI  
TNIC 
HHI   EPCM         
Cash flow 
volatility  
Product 
market 
fluidity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤  0.019
** 0.029*** 0.033** 0.010 0.021** 
 (2.51) (2.63) (2.29) (1.37) (1.97) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  0.016 0.012 0.029
*** 0.017* 0.030*** 
 (1.39) (0.97) (2.79) (1.83) (2.94) 
𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.11) (-1.37) (0.11) (0.82) (0.48) 
      
K-P rk Wald F statistics 11.165*** 19.191*** 20.414*** 20.724*** 16.979*** 
Firm-specific characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Peers average characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 72394 31815  61785 56495 29423 
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Table 1.6: Information-based mechanism 
This table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients for the peer firm average cash savings interacted with 
indicator variables identifying the lower and upper third of the within-industry-year distribution of 
market share, gross margin, market cap, book size, market-to-book ratio, and firm age in Panel A, as 
well as whether the firm has a bond rating, whether the firm paid a dividend, whether the firm has lines 
of credit, the Whited-Wu (2006) Index and HP Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) in Panel B. The 
dependent variable is the change in cash ratio. The coefficient estimates are scaled by the corresponding 
variable standard deviation. The endogenous variables are the peer firms average cash savings interacted 
with indicator variables, and the instrument variables are the one-period-lagged peer frim average 
relative idiosyncratic risk interacted with the same indicator variables. The K-P rk Wald F statistics are 
reported at the bottom of the table. Industries are defined by 3-digit SIC code. All test statistics are 
computed using standard errors that are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. K-P rk 
Wald F statistics significance implying less than 15% or 10% size distortion is denoted by ** and ***, 
respectively.  
 
 Panel A  
Market 
share 
Gross 
margin 
Market 
Cap 
Book 
size 
Market-
to-book Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤  0.029
** 0.028** 0.198* 0.026** -0.016 0.029** 
 (2.11) (1.99) (1.66) (2.07) (-1.39) (2.40) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  0.015
** 0.028*** 0.011 0.013* 0.034** 0.013 
 (2.09) (2.84) (1.56) (1.69) (1.98) (1.32) 
𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 0.002 0.002 -0.021
*** -0.022*** 0.022** -0.005 
 (0.24) (0.28) (-3.19) (-3.19) (2.53) (-1.18) 
       
K-P rk Wald F statistics 25.672*** 25.316*** 25.854*** 36.915*** 19.026*** 23.573*** 
Firm-specific characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Peers average characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 61986 60762 61990 62018 61941 62378 
 Panel B 
Bond 
rating 
(G2 = Y) 
Dividend 
payment 
(G2 = Y) 
Lines of 
credit 
(G2 = Y) 
HP Index       
(G2 = Low) 
WW Index 
(G2 = Low) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷1 0.029
*** 0.018** 0.022** 0.032*** 0.020** 
 (2.70) (2.17) (2.49) (2.76) (2.44) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷2 0.005 0.014 0.011 0.016
* 0.016* 
 (0.95) (1.44) (1.43) (1.91) (1.74) 
𝐷2 0.026
*** -0.005 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.010* 
 (5.84) (-1.03) (7.01) (3.72) (1.77) 
      
K-P rk Wald F statistics 31.947*** 11.045*** 28.386*** 24.657** 17.11*** 
Firm-specific characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Peers average characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 94085 94085 61990 62209 60713 
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Table 1.7: Information-based mechanism – Bad times vs. Normal times 
This table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients for the peer firm average cash savings interacted with 
indicator variables identifying the “bad times” in economics. Column (1) is based on the NBER-defined 
recessions; column (2) consider separately the Subprime mortgage crisis from December 2007 to June 
2009; The column (3) set the indicator variable Crisis following the Loh and Sultz (2016) definition: 
September-November 1987 (1987 crisis), August-December 1998 (LTCM crisis), and July 2007-March 
2009 (Credit crisis). The dependent variable is the change in cash ratio. The coefficient estimates are 
scaled by the corresponding variable standard deviation. The endogenous variables are the peer firm 
average cash savings interacted with indicator variables, and the instrument variables are the one-period-
lagged peer frim average relative idiosyncratic risk interacted with the same indicator variables. The K-
P rk Wald F statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. Industries are defined by 3-digit SIC code. 
All test statistics are computed using standard errors that are robust to within-firm correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. K-P rk Wald F statistics significance implying less than 15% or 10% size distortion is 
denoted by ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
NBER Recess 
Dec 2007 – 
     Jun 2009 
Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                      * Bad time dummy 0.038** 0.023* 0.017*** 
 (2.06) (1.71) (3.52) 
    
                     * Other period dummy 0.016** 0.019** 0.016* 
 (2.18) (2.27) (1.78) 
    
Bad time dummy 0.002 -0.029 0.018* 
 (0.71) (-1.00) (1.67) 
    
K-P rk Wald F statistics 7.247*** 51.605*** 46.095*** 
Firm-specific characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Peers average characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 94085 94085 94085 
P_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ−𝑖𝑗𝑡
P_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ−𝑖𝑗𝑡 
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Table 1.8: Whether cash-rich firms are less sensitive to peer effect? 
This table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients for the peer firms average cash savings interacted with 
indicator variables identifying cash-rich firms. The dependent variable is the change in cash ratio. The 
coefficient estimates are scaled by the corresponding variable standard deviation. All models are 
estimated by 2SLS method where the endogenous variables are the peer firm average cash savings 
interacted with indicator variables, and the instrument variables are the one-period-lagged peer frim 
average relative idiosyncratic risk interacted with the same indicator variables. The K-P rk Wald F 
statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. Industries are defined by 3-digit SIC code. The indicator 
variable in Column (1) identifying the lower and upper third of the within-industry-year distribution of 
last period cash holding levels. The indicator variables in Column (2) and Column (3) follows the 
Harford (1999), where cash-rich firm-years are years in which a firm’s cash holdings are more than 1.5 
standard deviations and 2 standard deviations above the predicted cash holdings, respectively. All test 
statistics are computed using standard errors that are robust to within-firm correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. K-P rk Wald F statistics significance implying less than 15% or 10% size distortion is 
denoted by ** and ***, respectively.  
 
 
 Lagged cash Cash rich 1.5X          Cash rich 2X 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤  0.016
* 0.026** 0.024** 
 (1.70) (2.10) (2.44) 
𝑃_∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ  0.015 0.019
** 0.016** 
 (1.05) (2.18) (2.29) 
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ -0.099
*** -0.071*** -0.062*** 
 (-16.71) (-10.66) (-8.33) 
    
K-P rk Wald F statistics 22.133*** 32.895*** 40.250*** 
Firm-specific characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Peers average characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 61406 75272 75272 
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Table 1.9: Total economic impact of peer effect on industry cash savings 
This table displays estimates from the excess variance-based tests pioneered by Graham (2008). The 
sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2014 with positive total assets and 
sales for firms incorporated in the United States and publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. 
Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and government entities (SIC code 
greater than or equal to 9000) are excluded from the sample. When the estimate of the peer effect 
multiplier γ2, is significantly different from 1, then peer effects of corporate cash saving decisions exist. 
Column (1) presents results for the changes of cash holdings, which conditions for firm-level 
characteristics such as cash flow to assets ratio, market-to-book ratio, firm real size, net equity issue, net 
debt issue, and net investment (Almeida, Campbell and Weisbach (2004), and Palazzo (2012)). Column 
(2) conditions for all firm-specific and peer firm average characteristics. The industry-specific factors 
are controlled in both models. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Estimate of γ2 1.832 1.809 
   
Implied Peer Effect Multiplier 1.354 1.345 
   
Chi-Squared Test (H0: There’s no peer influence) (7.76)*** (7.70)*** 
   
Implied effect of Multiplier (Small industry) 12.8% 12.5% 
   
Implied effect of Multiplier (Large industry) 6.2% 6.0% 
   
Firm-specific characteristics Yes Yes 
   
Industry-specific characteristics Yes Yes 
   
Peer firms’ average characteristics No Yes 
   
# Industry-year combinations 4445 4445 
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Appendix B    Tables for Chapter 2 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics of recommendation activity, analyst, and firm average 
characteristics. The recommendation sample is from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. Observations 
from anonymous analysts, recommendation changes where the lagged stock price is less than one dollar, 
observations with no outstanding prior rating from the same analyst, and team analysts are excluded. A 
recommendation change is defined as an analyst’s current rating minus her prior outstanding rating 
(initiations, re-initiations, and reiterations are excluded). An uncontaminated recommendation change is 
one that does not occur on firm-news days following Loh and Stulz (2011). Firm-news contaminated 
days are defined as the three trading days centered around a Compustat earnings announcement date or 
a company earnings guidance date, and days with multiple analysts issuing recommendations for the 
firm. An analyst’s total recommendation activity is computed by aggregating all rating activity including 
changes, initiations, and reiterations. We add to explicit reiterations in I/B/E/S by assuming that an 
analyst reiterates an outstanding rating when she issues a Q1 earnings forecast or a price target forecast. 
The rec-change probability and the number of total recommendation activity are based on the analyst-
quarter sample which consists of only observations where the analyst makes at least one uncontaminated 
rec-change in the quarter. Influential dummy equals one if the analyst issued at least one influential 
recommendation change in the quarter t, and zero otherwise. Influential changes are those whose two-
day CARs are in the same direction as the recommendation changes and is 1.96 times larger than 
expected based on the prior three-month idiosyncratic volatility of the stock, where CAR is the average 
day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return, whose benchmark return is the return from a characteristic-
matched DGTW portfolio (Loh and Stulz (2011)). Rec-change dummy equals one if an analyst in quarter 
t with uncontaminated recommendation changes issues at least one recommendation change in quarter 
t+1, and zero otherwise. Total activity (from t-1 to t+1) is the difference of the number of total 
recommendation activity between quarter t+1 and quarter t-1. Influential before is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the analyst has been influential at least once before quarter t, and zero otherwise. 
For Panel B, to aggregate recommendation activity to the broker level, we reinstate team analysts. At the 
broker-month setting, #InfluRecchg/#Firms is the fraction of influential recommendation changes over 
the number of firms covered by a broker in month m+1. Similarly, %TotalRec, %Recchg, 
and %CleanRecchg are the fractions of total recommendation activity, recommendation changes, and 
uncontaminated recommendation changes, where the denominator is the number of firms covered by a 
broker in month m+1. Other variables at the broker-month level are defined in the same way as those at 
the analyst-quarter level. Influential dummy equals one if the broker has at least one influential 
recommendation change in month m, and zero otherwise. Rec-change dummy equals one if a broker in 
month m with uncontaminated recommendation changes issues at least one recommendation change in 
month m+1. Experience measures the number of quarters since the analyst issued the first earnings 
forecast or stock recommendation on I/B/E/S. Accuracy quintile is the average forecast accuracy quintile 
of the analyst based on the firms covered in the past year (5=most accurate). LFR is the analyst's prior-
year leader-follower ratio (computed from recommendations). Star analyst equals one if the analysts are 
ranked as an All-American team in the latest October Institutional Investor magazine’s annual poll. 
#Firmsperana is the number of firms that an analyst covers in a quarter. Firm characteristics are averaged 
across the firms that analysts cover in a quarter. Size is last June’s market cap, BM is the book-to-market 
ratio, Momentum is the buy-and-hold return for the 11-month period ending one month before beginning 
of the recommendation month, and Stock volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 
prior month (one month prior to the recommendation month).  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (Cont’d) 
 
 Mean Stdev P25 Median P75 #Obs. 
Panel A: Analyst recommendation activity (analyst-quarter setting) 
Influential dummy 0.223 0.416 0 0 0 79192 
Rec-change dummy (t+1) 0.656 0.475 0 1 1 79192 
Clean rec-change dummy (t+1) 0.533 0.499 0 1 1 79192 
#Total activity (t+1) 14.4 11.6 6 12 20 79192 
#Rec-change (t+1) 2.53 2.16 1 2 3 79192 
#Clean rec-change (t+1) 1.95 1.71 1 1 2 79192 
Total activity (from t-1 to t+1) 0.090 8.04 -4 0 4 78371 
Influential before 0.608 0.488 0 1 1 79192 
       
Panel B: Broker recommendation activity (broker-month setting) 
Influential dummy 0.406 0.491 0 0 1 25628 
#InfluRecchg / #Firms 0.005 0.015 0 0 0.005 25628 
Rec-change dummy (m+1) 0.873 0.333 1 1 1 25628 
Clean rec-change dummy (m+1) 0.817 0.387 1 1 1 25628 
#Total activity (m+1) 80.3 109 15 40 98 25628 
#Rec-change (m+1) 8.41 11.5 2 5 11 25628 
#Clean rec-change (m+1) 5.59 8.5 1 3 7 25628 
%TotalRec (m+1) 0.338 0.224 0.194 0.303 0.448 25628 
%Recchg (m+1) 0.046 0.093 0.017 0.033 0.056 25628 
%CleanRecchg (m+1) 0.031 0.079 0.009 0.020 0.036 25628 
       
Panel C: Analyst and firm average characteristics (analyst-quarter setting) 
Experience (#qtrs) 26.9 20.9 10.3 22.2 38.8 79192 
Accuracy quintile 2.99 0.436 2.77 3 3.22 71904 
LFR 2.43 3.1 1.08 1.66 2.67 73213 
Star analyst 0.126 0.331 0 0 0 79192 
#Firmsperana 12.7 7.37 8 12 16 79192 
Size ($m)_avg 8,573 22,173 713 2,201 7,168 79192 
BM_avg 0.546 1.18 0.268 0.436 0.677 79192 
Momentum_avg 0.166 0.61 -0.132 0.0952 0.339 79192 
Total volatility_avg 0.029 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.035 79192 
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Table 2.2: Future rec-change probability conditional on having influential rec-
changes 
The probits estimate the marginal effect of having influential recommendation changes this quarter on 
the probability of issuing recommendation changes next quarter, controlling for analyst and firms’ 
average characteristics. The sample here is based on analyst-quarter observations which have 
uncontaminated recommendation changes in a quarter t. The sample of recommendation changes are 
from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. In parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by analysts, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Calendar quarter fixed effects are included when indicated. See Table 2.1 for definitions of variables. 
 
 
 Rec-change dummy (t+1) Uncontaminated Rec-change dummy 
(t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Influential dummy 0.061*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.050*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 
 (14.40) (8.76) (8.36) (10.74) (6.58) (6.20) 
Influential before   0.053***   0.050*** 
   (9.95)   (8.54) 
Log experience  -0.010*** -0.021***  -0.020*** -0.030*** 
  (-3.29) (-6.15)  (-5.46) (-7.59) 
Accuracy quintile  0.011** 0.010**  0.002 0.001 
  (2.31) (2.06)  (0.40) (0.17) 
LFR  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002** -0.002** 
  (-0.85) (-0.98)  (-2.42) (-2.54) 
Star analyst  -0.039*** -0.041***  -0.029*** -0.031*** 
  (-5.15) (-5.52)  (-3.53) (-3.82) 
Log BM_avg  0.005* 0.005*  0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (1.86) (1.85)  (7.98) (8.01) 
Log size_avg  -0.000 -0.000  0.001 0.002 
  (-0.17) (-0.02)  (0.88) (1.02) 
Stock volatility_avg  0.590*** 0.600***  0.215 0.226 
  (4.38) (4.48)  (1.48) (1.56) 
Momentum_avg  0.011*** 0.011***  0.012*** 0.012*** 
  (3.47) (3.53)  (3.39) (3.45) 
Log #Firmsperana  0.196*** 0.186***  0.209*** 0.200*** 
  (40.04) (37.79)  (36.32) (34.56) 
       
Predicted Prob. 0.656 0.695 0.696 0.533 0.557 0.557 
Quarter F.E. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0023 0.0553 0.0569 0.0012 0.0498 0.0510 
#Obs. 79192 66393 66393 79192 66393 66393 
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Table 2.3: Future total recommendation activity conditional on having influential 
rec-changes 
The pooled OLS regressions estimate the effect of having influential recommendation changes this 
quarter on the number of total recommendation activity from the same analyst next quarter, and the 
change in the number of total activity from quarter t-1 to t+1, controlling for analyst and firms’ average 
characteristics. The sample here is based on analyst-quarter observations which have uncontaminated 
recommendation changes in a quarter t, using Loh and Stulz (2011)’s definition of firm news 
contamination. The sample of recommendation changes are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analysts, where *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Calendar quarter fixed effects are included 
when indicated. See Table 2.1 for definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
 Log #Total activity (t+1) Total activity (from t-1 to t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Influential dummy 0.258*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.195*** 0.243*** 0.259*** 
 (28.54) (9.56) (9.30) (2.88) (3.27) (3.48) 
Influential before   0.062***   -0.450*** 
   (6.25)   (-6.47) 
Log experience  -0.047*** -0.059***  -0.537*** -0.449*** 
  (-7.55) (-8.95)  (-14.97) (-11.84) 
Accuracy quintile  0.109*** 0.107***  -0.094 -0.083 
  (11.25) (11.15)  (-1.51) (-1.33) 
LFR  -0.001 -0.001  -0.003 -0.003 
  (-1.14) (-1.24)  (-0.41) (-0.33) 
Star analyst  0.110*** 0.107***  0.104 0.123 
  (7.61) (7.44)  (1.18) (1.40) 
Log BM_avg  0.071*** 0.071***  -0.044 -0.043 
  (9.54) (9.56)  (-0.96) (-0.92) 
Log size_avg  0.053*** 0.053***  0.008 0.004 
  (15.08) (15.27)  (0.40) (0.20) 
Stock volatility_avg  2.074*** 2.084***  -18.240*** -18.310*** 
  (5.57) (5.60)  (-6.65) (-6.67) 
Momentum_avg  0.031*** 0.031***  0.453*** 0.452*** 
  (4.45) (4.47)  (7.07) (7.06) 
Log #Firmsperana  0.761*** 0.749***  -0.630*** -0.545*** 
  (80.51) (77.54)  (-11.52) (-9.56) 
Intercept 2.351*** -0.323*** -0.300*** 0.046* 3.755*** 3.585*** 
 (257.00) (-5.18) (-4.84) (1.75) (9.78) (9.32) 
       
Quarter F.E. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.014 0.331 0.332 0.000 0.074 0.074 
#Obs. 79192 67525 67525 78371 67253 67253 
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Table 2.4: Future recommendation activity conditional on having influential rec-
changes: Different horizons 
This table illustrates the effect of having influential rec-changes this quarter on the quarter t+1 and the 
quarter t+4 rec-change probability, uncontaminated rec-change probability, the level and the change of 
total recommendation activity, controlling for analyst and firms’ average characteristics. The dependent 
variable in column 7 (column 8) is the difference in the number of total recommendation activity between 
quarter t+1 (t+4) and quarter t-1. The sample of recommendations are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 
1994-2014. The estimations here are based on analyst-quarter observations which have uncontaminated 
recommendation changes in a quarter t, using Loh and Stulz (2011)’s definition of firm news 
contamination. The Chi-square statistics and p-value are used to examine whether the effects of the 
current-quarter influential recommendation changes are different in quarter t+1 and quarter t+4 samples. 
In parentheses are z-statistics (column 1-column 4 and t-statistics (column 5-column 8) based on standard 
errors clustered by analysts, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. Calendar quarter fixed effects are included. The R-sq. in column 1 to column 4 are pseudo 
R-squares based on the probit estimations, and the R-sq. in column 5 to column 8 are adjusted R-squares 
based on the pooled OLS regressions. See Table 2.1 for definitions of variables.  
 
Rec-change dummy 
Uncontaminated 
Rec-change dummy Log #Total activity Total activity 
 t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4 t+1 t+4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Influential dummy 0.035*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.259*** 0.151 
 (8.36) (4.298) (6.20) (3.062) (9.30) (5.05) (3.48) (1.54) 
Influential before 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.082*** -0.450*** -0.451*** 
 (9.95) (7.890) (8.54) (7.684) (6.25) (5.43) (-6.47) (-3.83) 
Log experience -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.059*** -0.089*** -0.449*** -0.789*** 
 (-6.15) (-5.782) (-7.59) (-7.297) (-8.95) (-9.07) (-11.84) (-11.14) 
Accuracy quintile 0.010** 0.019*** 0.001 0.012** 0.107*** 0.122*** -0.083 -0.133 
 (2.06) (3.343) (0.17) (1.969) (11.15) (9.00) (-1.33) (-1.26) 
LFR -0.001 0.000 -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.004 
 (-0.98) (0.397) (-2.54) (-1.270) (-1.24) (-0.27) (-0.33) (0.30) 
Star analyst -0.041*** -0.014 -0.031*** -0.007 0.107*** 0.172*** 0.123 0.621*** 
 (-5.52) (-1.574) (-3.82) (-0.767) (7.44) (8.36) (1.40) (3.90) 
Log BM_avg 0.005* 0.004 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.071*** 0.068*** -0.043 -0.151** 
 (1.85) (1.159) (8.01) (6.308) (9.56) (6.49) (-0.92) (-1.97) 
Log size_avg -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.004 -0.143*** 
 (-0.02) (-0.764) (1.02) (1.591) (15.27) (8.47) (0.20) (-4.07) 
Stock volatility_avg 0.600*** -0.090 0.226 -0.136 2.084*** -1.178** -18.31*** -51.60*** 
 (4.48) (-0.587) (1.56) (-0.854) (5.60) (-2.11) (-6.67) (-11.50) 
Momentum_avg 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.075*** 0.452*** 0.778*** 
 (3.53) (4.264) (3.45) (3.657) (4.47) (6.49) (7.06) (7.39) 
Log #Firmsperana 0.186*** 0.153*** 0.200*** 0.162*** 0.749*** 0.630*** -0.545*** -2.419*** 
 (37.79) (25.96) (34.56) (24.78) (77.54) (43.90) (-9.56) (-22.95) 
Intercept     -0.300*** -0.262*** 3.585*** 4.621*** 
     (-4.84) (-2.61) (9.32) (5.77) 
         
Comparing the marginal effects of Influential dummy in (t+1) and (t+4) samples 
Chi-square statistics 9.40*** 5.70** 1.72 2.44 
[p-value] [0.0022] [0.0170] [0.1893] [0.1183] 
         
Predicted Prob. 0.696 0.622 0.557 0.497 - - - - 
Quarter F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0569 0.0334 0.0510 0.0346 0.332 0.164 0.074 0.085 
#Obs. 66393 62065 66393 62065 67525 64878 67253 64625 
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Table 2.5: Future recommendation activity conditional on having influential rec-
changes: Broker level analyses 
This table illustrates the effect of having influential recommendation changes this month on the fractions 
of recommendation changes (%Recchg), uncontaminated recommendation changes (%Clean Recchg), 
and total recommendation activity (%TotalRec) over the number of firms covered in the month m+1, 
m+3, and m+12 at the broker level, controlling for analyst and firm average characteristics of the broker, 
as well as the number of analysts per broker in that month. The sample here is based on broker-month 
observations which have uncontaminated recommendation changes in a month m. The sample of 
recommendation changes is from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1994-2014 and analyst codes associated with 
teams are included. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by broker, where *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Calendar month fixed effects 
and broker fixed effects are included. See Table 2.1 for definitions of variables. 
 Month m+1 Month m+3 Month m+12 
 
%Recchg 
%Clean 
Recchg 
%Total 
Rec 
%Recchg 
%Clean 
Recchg 
%Total 
Rec 
%Recchg 
%Clean 
Recchg 
%Total 
Rec 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
#InfluRecchg/#Firms 0.321*** 0.157** 1.154** 0.234 0.173 0.433 0.0063 0.076 -0.115 
 (3.14) (2.00) (2.29) (1.16) (0.91) (0.95) (0.14) (0.94) (-0.72) 
Dependent var (m) 0.454*** 0.468*** 0.156*** 0.393*** 0.365*** 0.325*** 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.204*** 
 (3.41) (3.42) (3.59) (4.09) (3.99) (12.16) (6.48) (6.89) (13.10) 
Log Experience_avg 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.65) (0.67) (-0.66) (0.36) (0.26) (-1.10) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-1.62) 
Accuracy Quintile_avg -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.54) (-0.77) (0.90) (-0.82) (-1.04) (0.61) (-0.58) (-1.04) (0.04) 
LFR_avg -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.17) (-1.54) (-0.72) (-0.47) (-0.64) (-1.58) (-0.45) (-0.72) (-0.46) 
Star Analyst_avg 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.005 0.020 0.011* 0.009* 0.016 
 (1.25) (1.35) (0.44) (1.04) (1.25) (0.66) (1.80) (1.67) (0.44) 
Log BM_avg -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.0001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.003 
 (-3.02) (-2.95) (-0.02) (-1.10) (-0.14) (-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.04) (-1.20) 
Log Size_avg -0.002* -0.001* 0.002 -0.001* -0.001* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
 (-1.73) (-1.66) (1.54) (-1.91) (-1.82) (0.59) (-1.42) (-1.71) (-0.72) 
Stock Volatility_avg 0.035 0.025 0.107 0.024 0.037 0.041 0.040 0.047 0.029 
 (0.84) (0.62) (0.76) (0.39) (0.62) (0.32) (1.13) (1.52) (0.23) 
Momentum_avg 0.001 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006* 
 (1.04) (1.21) (1.76) (0.71) (1.05) (0.53) (0.87) (0.85) (1.87) 
Log #Anaperbroker 0.005* 0.005* 0.023** 0.005* 0.003 0.029*** 0.000 -0.001 0.017* 
 (1.73) (1.80) (2.40) (1.83) (1.40) (3.75) (0.11) (-0.54) (1.71) 
Intercept 0.041*** 0.029** 0.168*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.080** 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.185*** 
 (3.36) (2.23) (3.90) (3.20) (2.72) (2.16) (4.51) (4.90) (4.61) 
          
Month F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Broker F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.525 0.505 0.479 0.478 0.442 0.518 0.366 0.341 0.494 
#Obs. 25628 25628 25628 25467 25467 25467 24475 24475 24475 
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Table 2.6: Future recommendation activity conditional on having influential rec-
changes: Evidence from capacity constrained vs. unconstrained analysts 
This table illustrates the effect of having influential recommendation changes this quarter on the 
probability of issuing recommendation changes and the number of total recommendation activity next 
quarter for capacity constrained (C) and unconstrained (U) analysts, respectively, controlling for analyst 
and firms’ average characteristics. The estimations here are based on analyst-quarter observations which 
have uncontaminated recommendation changes in a quarter t, using Loh and Stulz (2011)’s definition of 
firm news contamination. The capacity constrained (unconstrained) analysts are those whose number of 
covered firms is above (below) the median. The sample of recommendation changes are from I/B/E/S 
Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. The Chi-square statistics and p-value are used to examine whether the effects 
of the current-quarter influential recommendation changes are different for the capacity constrained and 
unconstrained subsamples. In parentheses are z-statistics (column 1-column 4) and t-statistics (column 
5 and column 6) based on standard errors clustered by analysts, where *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Calendar quarter fixed effects are included. The R-sq. in 
column 1 to column 4 are pseudo R-squares based on the probit estimations, and the R-sq. in column 5 
and column 6 are adjusted R-squares based on the pooled OLS regressions. See Table 2.1 for definitions 
of variables. 
 Rec-change dummy 
(t+1) 
Uncontaminated Rec-
change dummy (t+1) 
Log #Total activity 
(t+1) 
 C U C U C U 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Influential dummy 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.020*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 
 (7.660) (4.081) (5.641) (2.926) (7.132) (5.922) 
Influential before 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.063*** 0.042*** 0.066*** 0.055*** 
 (8.086) (6.249) (6.904) (5.584) (4.036) (4.929) 
Log experience -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.023** -0.082*** 
 (-3.335) (-5.226) (-5.114) (-5.704) (-2.098) (-11.71) 
Accuracy quintile 0.009 0.010* -0.001 0.002 0.195*** 0.061*** 
 (1.193) (1.679) (-0.098) (0.391) (9.920) (6.225) 
LFR -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.003*** 0.001 
 (-0.297) (-0.992) (-1.444) (-2.069) (-2.634) (0.718) 
Star analyst -0.036*** -0.053*** -0.028*** -0.040*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 
 (-4.175) (-4.477) (-2.869) (-3.304) (5.937) (4.402) 
Log BM_avg 0.004 0.007* 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.102*** 0.056*** 
 (0.908) (1.904) (5.617) (6.053) (8.132) (6.704) 
Log size_avg 0.003 -0.002 0.004* -0.000 0.060*** 0.049*** 
 (1.269) (-1.059) (1.705) (-0.168) (10.45) (13.08) 
Stock volatility_avg 0.636*** 0.556*** 0.227 0.212 3.314*** 1.044** 
 (3.210) (3.048) (1.038) (1.123) (5.361) (2.402) 
Momentum_avg 0.006 0.015*** 0.007 0.015*** 0.026** 0.033*** 
 (1.117) (3.585) (1.203) (3.391) (2.025) (3.985) 
Log #Firmsperana 0.146*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.186*** 0.668*** 0.753*** 
 (11.41) (28.02) (13.21) (23.27) (22.93) (68.85) 
Intercept     -0.252* 0.186** 
     (-1.832) (2.383) 
Comparing the marginal effects of Influential dummy for constrained vs. unconstrained analysts 
Chi-square statistics 5.88** 2.71* 0.38 
[p-value] [0.0153] [0.0998] [0.5391] 
       
Predicted Prob. 0.769 0.612 0.642 0.470 - - 
Quarter F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0266 0.0452 0.0274 0.0374 0.167 0.266 
#Obs. 33418 32975 33418 32975 34012 33513 
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Table 2.7: Future influential probability conditional on having influential rec-
changes 
The probits in Panel A estimate the marginal effect of having influential recommendation changes this 
quarter on the quarter t+1 and the quarter t+4 recommendation change influential probability, controlling 
for analyst and firm average characteristics. The sample of recommendation changes is from I/B/E/S 
Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. The estimation in Panel A is based on analyst-quarter observations which 
have uncontaminated recommendation changes in a quarter t, using Loh and Stulz (2011)’s definition of 
firm news contamination. The Chi-square statistics and p-value are used to examine whether the effects 
of the current-quarter influential recommendation changes are different for quarter t+1 and quarter t+4 
recommendation change influential probability. The probits in Panel B estimate the marginal effect of 
having influential recommendation changes this month on the month m+1, m+3, and m+12 
recommendation change influential probability, controlling for analysts and firm average characteristics 
of the broker in that month. Influential dummy in the Panel B regressions equals one if the broker has at 
least one influential recommendation change in a month, and zero otherwise. The estimation in Panel B 
is based on broker-month observations which have uncontaminated recommendation changes in a month 
m, using Loh and Stulz (2011)’s definition of firm news contamination. Calendar quarter fixed effects 
are included in the regressions in Panel A, and broker fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects are 
included in the regressions in Panel B. In parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by analysts, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 
2.1 for definitions of variables.  
Panel A: Analyst-quarter setting 
 Influential 
dummy (t+1) 
Influential 
dummy (t+4) 
Influential 
dummy (t+1) 
Influential 
dummy (t+4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Influential dummy 0.057*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.018*** 
 (15.03) (11.25) (8.934) (5.197) 
Influential before   0.041*** 0.038*** 
   (11.60) (10.22) 
Log experience   -0.012*** -0.015*** 
   (-4.791) (-5.894) 
Accuracy quintile   0.015*** 0.011*** 
   (4.387) (3.066) 
LFR   -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.642) (-0.837) 
Star analyst   0.008* 0.016*** 
   (1.687) (3.007) 
Log BM_avg   0.005** 0.006*** 
   (2.316) (2.632) 
Log size_avg   -0.007*** -0.004*** 
   (-6.341) (-3.402) 
Stock volatility_avg   -0.404*** -0.128 
   (-3.956) (-1.221) 
Momentum_avg   0.005** 0.001 
   (2.039) (0.405) 
Log #Firmsperana   0.088*** 0.075*** 
   (23.00) (18.68) 
Comparing the marginal effects of Influential dummy in (t+1) and (t+4) samples 
Chi-square statistics 12.07*** 8.37*** 
[p-value] [0.0005] [0.0038] 
     
Predicted Prob. 0.128 0.116 0.127 0.119 
Quarter F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0060 0.0034 0.0484 0.0407 
#Obs. 79192 75600 66393 62065 
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Table 2.7: Future influential probability conditional on having influential rec-
changes (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Broker-month setting 
 Influential 
dummy (m+1) 
Influential dummy 
(m+3) 
Influential 
dummy (m+12) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Influential dummy 0.031*** 0.017** 0.001 
 (4.63) (2.54) (0.18) 
Log Experience_avg 0.017** 0.015** 0.011 
 (2.37) (1.99) (1.39) 
Accuracy Quintile_avg 0.000 0.001 0.015 
 (0.00) (0.09) (1.46) 
LFR_avg 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.10) (-0.48) (0.59) 
Star Analyst_avg 0.092* 0.123*** 0.145*** 
 (1.95) (2.84) (2.89) 
Log BM_avg 0.000 0.004 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.71) (0.27) 
Log Size_avg 0.004 0.000 0.001 
 (1.25) (0.14) (0.38) 
Stock Volatility_avg -0.449 -0.262 -0.263 
 (-1.55) (-0.86) (-0.85) 
Momentum_avg 0.009 0.011 -0.008 
 (1.23) (1.64) (-1.06) 
Log #Anaperbroker 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.175*** 
 (13.71) (14.41) (11.76) 
    
Predicted Prob. 0.361 0.366 0.373 
Month F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Broker F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo. R2 0.282 0.277 0.277 
#Obs. 24283 23814 22131 
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Table 2.8: Feedback effect pre- and post-Reg FD 
This table illustrates the effects of having influential rec-changes this quarter on the (uncontaminated) 
rec-change probability and the number of total activity in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. The analyst 
and firms’ average characteristics are controlled for in each estimation. The sample of recommendations 
are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. Post-Reg FD period starts from 2000q4 to 2014q4, and 
pre-Reg FD period starts from 1994q1 to 2000q3. The estimations here are based on analyst-quarter 
observations which have uncontaminated recommendation changes in a quarter t, using Loh and Stulz 
(2011)’s definition of firm news contamination. The Chi-square statistics and p-value are used to 
examine whether the effects of the current-quarter influential recommendation changes are different in 
the post and pre-Reg FD samples. In parentheses are z-statistics (column 1-column 4) and t-statistics 
(column 5 and 6) based on standard errors clustered by analysts, where *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Calendar quarter fixed effects are included. The R-sq. in 
column 1 to column 4 are pseudo R-squares based on the probit estimations, and the R-sq. in column 5 
and column 6 are adjusted R-squares based on the pooled OLS regressions. See Table 2.1 for definitions 
of variables. 
 Rec-change dummy 
(t+1) 
Uncontaminated Rec-
change dummy (t+1) 
Log #Total activity 
(t+1) 
 Pre  
Reg FD 
Post  
Reg FD 
Pre  
Reg FD 
Post  
Reg FD 
Pre  
Reg FD 
Post  
Reg FD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Influential dummy 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.080*** 0.051*** 
 (5.097) (6.677) (2.898) (5.501) (6.015) (7.083) 
Influential before 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.070*** 0.056*** 
 (8.217) (6.361) (5.936) (6.600) (4.142) (4.850) 
Log experience -0.012** -0.024*** -0.013** -0.038*** 0.004 -0.086*** 
 (-2.404) (-5.546) (-2.204) (-7.639) (0.316) (-11.04) 
Accuracy quintile 0.016** 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.145*** 0.082*** 
 (2.276) (0.689) (0.184) (0.0417) (8.786) (7.322) 
LFR -0.001 -0.000 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.089) (-0.572) (-2.938) (-1.338) (-0.413) (-1.189) 
Star analyst -0.017 -0.054*** -0.042*** -0.025** 0.068*** 0.129*** 
 (-1.527) (-5.598) (-3.616) (-2.444) (2.679) (8.219) 
Log BM_avg 0.163*** 0.197*** 0.184*** 0.208*** 0.628*** 0.808*** 
 (22.22) (34.47) (22.03) (30.71) (33.82) (75.49) 
Log size_avg -0.008 0.011*** 0.010* 0.031*** 0.090*** 0.071*** 
 (-1.539) (3.282) (1.812) (8.483) (6.679) (8.290) 
Stock volatility_avg 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.062*** 0.052*** 
 (1.471) (-1.118) (0.268) (0.945) (10.17) (12.83) 
Momentum_avg 0.670*** 0.556*** 0.212 0.171 4.391*** 0.972** 
 (2.828) (3.395) (0.841) (0.988) (6.336) (2.240) 
Log #Firmsperana 0.007* 0.013*** 0.009* 0.013*** 0.006 0.044*** 
 (1.649) (2.762) (1.897) (2.585) (0.675) (3.944) 
Intercept     -0.673*** -0.139* 
     (-6.404) (-1.895) 
Comparing the marginal effects of Influential dummy in the post and pre-Reg FD samples 
Chi-square statistics 0.98 0.06 3.84* 
[p-value] [0.3217] [0.8031] [0.0501] 
       
Predicted Prob. 0.717 0.686 0.605 0.536 - - 
Quarter F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0509 0.0595 0.0533 0.0470 0.261 0.338 
#Obs. 20559 45834 20559 45834 20632 46893 
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Table 2.9: Stock recommendation drift for previously influential vs. uninfluential 
analysts 
All recommendation changes in the next quarter (t+1) are placed into four portfolios based on whether 
the analyst issues at least one influential recommendation change in the current quarter (Influential 
dummy) and the direction of each revision. Each portfolio is a daily-rebalanced calendar-time portfolio 
that buys stocks from trading day 2 following the revision to day 21, i.e. a one-month drift. The daily 
average returns of each portfolio are computed following the standard approach in Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman (2007), in which one dollar is placed in each revision and the weight of the revised stock varies 
from day 2 to day 21 according to its cumulative return since entering the portfolio. The portfolio’s daily 
returns are then compounded to monthly returns. The portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate is 
then regressed against the Fama and French (2015) five factors and the coefficients reported. Sample 
data are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File and CRSP 1994-2014. In parentheses are t-statistics, where *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively based on a null hypothesis of zero 
for the coefficient (null hypothesis of one for the MKTRF coefficient of upgrade and downgrade 
portfolios). 
  
Intercept 
(%) MKTRF SMB HML RMW CMA Adj. R2 
Avg 
#Firms 
perday 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) 
          
Influential 
dummy=1 
Upgrades (t+1) 0.467*** 1.198*** 0.430*** 0.210*** 0.124 0.126 0.811 57.8 
 (2.67) (4.24) (7.18) (2.68) (1.52) (1.17)   
         
Downgrades (t+1) -0.686*** 1.100** 0.396*** 0.311*** 0.038 -0.253** 0.802 58.4 
 (-3.89) (2.12) (6.58) (3.95) (0.46) (-2.33)   
         
Difference (1) 1.154*** 0.098 0.034 -0.101 0.087 0.379*** 0.017 104.5 
  (5.01) (1.61) (0.43) (-0.98) (0.81) (2.68)   
          
Influential 
dummy=0 
Upgrades (t+1) 0.565*** 1.111*** 0.442*** 0.216*** 0.094* -0.127* 0.895 217.4 
 (4.67) (3.45) (10.71) (4.00) (1.67) (-1.71)   
         
Downgrades (t+1) -0.651*** 1.106*** 0.463*** 0.137** -0.020 -0.143* 0.902 233.0 
 (-5.37) (3.28) (11.18) (2.53) (-0.35) (-1.91)   
         
Difference (0) 1.217*** 0.005 -0.021 0.079 0.114* 0.015 0.057 406.9 
  (9.45) (0.15) (-0.48) (1.38) (1.89) (0.19)   
          
 [Difference (1) – 
Difference (0)] 
-0.063 
(-0.26) 
0.093 
(1.47) 
0.055 
(0.67) 
-0.180* 
(-1.69) 
-0.027 
(-0.24) 
0.364** 
(2.49) 
0.020 473.8 
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Table 2.10: Alphas of firms without rec-changes sorted on the favorableness of 
recent influential rec-changes in their industry 
In each month, we divide industries into two groups based on the number of firms in the industry (this 
controls for industry size), and then sort industries into five quintiles based on the favorableness of the 
influential recommendation changes in their industry. Favorableness is proxied by the difference 
between the number of influential upgrades and influential downgrades in the industry. We then hold 
stocks of firms without recommendation changes in these quintiles for three months. The average 
calendar-time monthly return of firms in each quintile is computed using one plus the firm’s prior-month 
return as the weight, following Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2013). The average portfolio 
monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate (Rprf) is reported in the column 1. Rprf is regressed against 
the Fama and French (1993) three factors or the Fama and French (2015) five factors and the respective 
alphas are reported in column 2 and column 3. The average number of firms (industries) per month of 
each portfolio is reported in column 4 (column 5). Column 6 to column 8 reports the average number of 
upgrades and downgrades and the ratio of upgrades over downgrades for the period where stocks are 
held (average here uses the same weights as the weights used in the returns computations). 
Recommendation data is from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1994-2014. In parentheses are t-statistics, where 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively based on a null hypothesis of 
zero for the coefficient being tested.   
 
Panel A: Full sample of firms without recommendation changes in sorting month 
Portfolio 
Avg 
Rprf 
FF-3 
Alpha 
FF-5 
Alpha 
Avg 
#Firms 
permth 
Avg 
#Ind 
permth 
Avg 
#Up 
permth 
Avg 
#Down 
permth 
Avg  
#Up/#Down 
permth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 0.874** -0.182 -0.121 958 7.465 0.099 0.125 0.864 
 (2.34) (-1.20) (-0.79)      
2 1.045*** -0.035 0.001 1165 12.343 0.105 0.127 0.884 
 (2.77) (-0.27) (0.000)      
3 0.883** -0.202* -0.130 1111 11.354 0.107 0.131 0.880 
 (2.35) (-0.10) (-1.03)      
4 0.981*** -0.081 0.006 1029 11.413 0.108 0.130 0.892 
 (2.63) (-0.77) (0.006)      
5 1.452*** 0.412*** 0.481*** 1027 7.937 0.106 0.124 0.921 
 (3.95) (3.47) (4.13)      
5-1 0.578*** 0.594** 0.602*** - - 0.007*** -0.002 0.058*** 
  (2.87) (3.06) (3.11)     (5.34) (-0.99) (3.27) 
 
Panel B: Subsample of large firms without recommendation changes in sorting month 
Portfolio 
Avg 
Rprf 
FF-3 
Alpha 
FF-5 
Alpha 
Avg 
#Firms 
permth 
Avg 
#Ind 
permth 
Avg 
#Up 
permth 
Avg 
#Down 
permth 
Avg  
#Up/#Down 
permth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 0.974*** -0.056 -0.028 522 7.465 0.147 0.180 0.903 
 (2.68) (-0.38) (-0.18)      
2 0.974*** -0.070 -0.069 656 12.343 0.152 0.178 0.924 
 (2.72) (-0.55) (-0.52)      
3 0.860** -0.199* -0.169 635 11.331 0.155 0.183 0.920 
 (2.41) (-1.73) (-1.42)      
4 0.947*** -0.071 -0.067 583 11.402 0.156 0.182 0.931 
 (2.74) (-0.67) (-0.63)      
5 1.368*** 0.372*** 0.342*** 563 7.937 0.155 0.176 0.963 
 (4.01) (3.27) (3.01)      
5-1 0.394** 0.428** 0.370** - - 0.008*** -0.004 0.06*** 
  (2.07) (2.32) (2.02)     (3.87) (-1.49) (3.27) 
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Panel C: Subsample of small firms without recommendation changes in sorting month 
Portfolio 
Avg 
Rprf 
FF-3 
Alpha 
FF-5 
Alpha 
Avg 
#Firms 
permth 
Avg 
#Ind 
permth 
Avg 
#Up 
permth 
Avg 
#Down 
permth 
Avg  
#Up/#Down 
permth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 0.786* -0.297 -0.200 438 7.429 0.043 0.061 0.866 
 (1.94) (-1.52) (-0.99)      
2 1.172*** 0.052 0.142 510 12.114 0.045 0.062 0.804 
 (2.77) (0.30) (0.79)      
3 0.958** -0.156 -0.029 478 11.236 0.044 0.062 0.784 
 (2.27) (-0.87) (-0.15)      
4 1.032** -0.086 0.095 447 11.276 0.047 0.064 0.824 
 (2.41) (-0.54) (0.59)      
5 1.582*** 0.475*** 0.659*** 467 7.890 0.048 0.061 0.894 
 (3.72) (2.73) (3.77)      
5-1 0.796*** 0.772*** 0.860*** - - 0.005*** 0.000 0.027 
  (3.47) (3.46) (3.80)     (4.34) (0.22) (0.37) 
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Table 2.11: Quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms without rec-changes 
on the favorableness of recent influential rec-changes in their industry  
This table reports the time-series average of coefficients from quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of 
returns of firms without recommendation changes on the favorableness of recent influential rec-changes 
in their industry from 1994:Q2 to 2015:Q1. Firms are defined as having no recommendation changes 
using the most recent prior month of each calendar quarter in industries (Fama-French 30 industry groups) 
which had influential recommendation changes. Firms with stock prices less than $1 at the end of the 
prior month are excluded. UpInfluQuintile is the difference between the number of influential upgrades 
and influential downgrades in the industry, measured in the month prior to the calendar quarter. 
LagLargeFirmRet is the value-weighted prior-month return of same-industry firms that are in the largest 
size quintile (based on the NYSE breakpoints in the CRSP sample).  Size is the log of prior-month market 
capitalization. Log(BM) is the log of book-to-market ratio (computed and aligned following Fama and 
French (2006)). LagRet is the prior-month return. Ret_lag3mths is the buy-and-hold return for the 3-
month period ending one month before the beginning of the calendar quarter. Ret_lag4to12mths is the 
buy-and-hold return for the 9-month period ending four months prior to the calendar quarter. Volatility 
is standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12 months ending in the prior month. Turnover is 
average monthly turnover over the 12 months ending in the prior month. IOownership is the institutional 
ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding in the prior quarter. IndustrySize is the log of the number 
of firms in Fama-French 30 industry groups. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively, with associated time-series t-statistics in parentheses. 
 Quarterly Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UpInfluQuintile 0.004** 0.004* 0.004** 0.003** 
 (1.99) (1.87) (2.32) (2.20) 
LagLargeFirmRet  0.282***  0.230*** 
  (3.17)  (3.50) 
Size   -0.003** -0.003** 
   (-2.36) (-2.23) 
Log(BM)   0.003 0.003 
   (1.27) (1.49) 
LagRet   -0.042** -0.047** 
   (-2.17) (-2.56) 
Ret_lag3mths   0.027*** 0.026*** 
   (3.02) (2.94) 
Ret_lag4to12mths   0.005 0.004 
   (0.65) (0.60) 
Volatility   -0.052 -0.055 
   (-1.19) (-1.25) 
Turnover   -0.025 -0.025 
   (-1.41) (-1.49) 
IOownership   0.010 0.009 
   (1.40) (1.15) 
IndustrySize   0.004* 0.004* 
   (1.70) (1.78) 
Intercept 0.024 0.021 0.043 0.039 
 (1.57) (1.50) (1.64) (1.51) 
     
Avg. #Firms/Mth 2185.822 2181.25 2132.25 2127.83 
Avg. R2 0.008 0.016 0.075 0.079 
Startdate 1994Q2 1994Q2 1994Q2 1994Q2 
Enddate 2015Q1 2015Q1 2015Q1 2015Q1 
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Appendix C    Tables for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1: Frequency of overoptimistic executives 
This table gives the yearly breakdown of the number of total firms, the number of firms with 
overoptimistic CEOs, and the number of firms with overoptimistic non-CEO manager team in our 
sample. The table also gives the distribution of firms with different combinations of CEO and non-CEO 
manager team who have the same or opposite characteristics of optimism. The sample of firms is from 
Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item TDC1) of CEOs and other 
four highest ranked executives. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999) are 
deleted. An executive is measured as overoptimistic for all years from the first time when CEO holds 
options that are more than 67% in the money, and at least two times during their sample tenure. A firm 
who is regarded as the one with overoptimistic non-CEO manager team (Opt_NonCEO) should have at 
least two of other four highest ranked executives (half) measured as over-optimism. Group1_both 
includes firms who have both overoptimistic CEOs and overoptimistic non-CEO executives, 
Group2_CEO includes firms with only overoptimistic CEOs, Group3_NonCEO includes firms with only 
overoptimistic non-CEO executive teams, and Group4_Neither includes firms with neither 
overoptimistic CEOs nor overoptimistic non-CEO manager team. For brevity, overoptimistic executives 
are labeled as “Opt” in the table. 
 
Year #Firms 
Group1 
Both (%) 
Group2 
CEO (%) 
Group3 
NonCEO (%) 
Group4 
Neither (%) 
          
1993 464 131 28.23 44 9.48 30 6.47 259 55.82 
1994 612 200 32.68 61 9.97 34 5.56 317 51.80 
1995 642 249 38.79 72 11.21 43 6.70 278 43.30 
1996 662 300 45.32 71 10.73 42 6.34 249 37.61 
1997 719 366 50.90 74 10.29 39 5.42 240 33.38 
1998 747 398 53.28 88 11.78 46 6.16 215 28.78 
1999 760 384 50.53 111 14.61 46 6.05 219 28.82 
2000 765 377 49.28 128 16.73 46 6.01 214 27.97 
2001 762 363 47.64 150 19.69 32 4.20 217 28.48 
2002 841 343 40.78 192 22.83 41 4.88 265 31.51 
2003 865 385 44.51 189 21.85 45 5.20 246 28.44 
2004 861 419 48.66 197 22.88 50 5.81 195 22.65 
2005 793 388 48.93 173 21.82 51 6.43 181 22.82 
2006 767 360 46.94 176 22.95 39 5.08 192 25.03 
2007 825 357 43.27 192 23.27 42 5.09 234 28.36 
2008 813 339 41.70 202 24.85 36 4.43 236 29.03 
2009 810 305 37.65 200 24.69 48 5.93 257 31.73 
2010 770 319 41.43 175 22.73 53 6.88 223 28.96 
2011 731 313 42.82 160 21.89 55 7.52 203 27.77 
2012 661 294 44.48 146 22.09 40 6.05 181 27.38 
2013 595 313 52.61 99 16.64 38 6.39 145 24.37 
2014 543 274 50.46 103 18.97 27 4.97 139 25.60 
2015 503 226 44.93 104 20.68 28 5.57 145 28.83 
          
Avg.   44.60  18.38  5.79  31.24 
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Table 3.2: Average characteristics across different groups 
This table gives the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The sample consists of all 
nonfinancial and nonutility firms in Execucomp from 1993 to 2015, and firms are required to have 
available compensation data for one CEO and other four highest ranked executives. The table illustrates 
the summary statistics for Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, and Group 4 firms, respectively. The p-value in 
the last column indicates whether the difference between Group 1 and Group 2 is significant or not. The 
meaning of each group is illustrated in Table 3.1. Opt_CEO equals one if an executive is measured as 
overoptimistic for all years from the first time when CEO holds options that are more than 67% in the 
money with at least two times during their sample tenure, and zero otherwise. Opt_NonCEO equals one 
if two of other four highest ranked executives are measured as overoptimism. Invest is the firm capital 
expenditures normalized by total asset at the beginning of the year. PP&E growth is the natural logarithm 
of the PP&E divided by the PP&E in the prior year. Asset growth is the natural logarithm of the total 
asset divided by the total asset at the beginning of the year. Net debt issuance is the ratio of net debt 
issuance over total assets. Net debt issuance is defined as long-term debt issuance net of long-term debt 
reduction. Dividend ratio is the firm’s dividend payment over market capitalization. Total payout is the 
ratio firm’s dividend payment plus share repurchases over market capitalization. Tobin’s Q is constructed 
as the market value divided by the book value of assets. Market value of assets is book value of asset 
mines book value of equity and plus market value of equity. Book value of equity is equal to stockholder 
equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred 
stock. Market equity is the fiscal year-end equity price multiplied by the number of common shares 
outstanding. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. Firm size is natural logarithm of total asset. Leverage is the debt 
in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by the total asset. Tangibility is defined as net property, 
plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Profitability is the operating income before depreciation 
normalized by the total assets at the beginning of year. IntanAssets is the firm’s intangible assets scaled 
by its total assets. Log (PPE/Emp) is the natural logarithm of the net property, plant, and equipment per 
employee. Annual ret is cumulative stock return over year t. Industry PE is average monthly industry PE 
over the fiscal year. The monthly industry PE is calculated as the natural logarithm of the industry’s total 
market capitalization to total earnings less a 60-month moving average. Stock vol is the annualized 
standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal 
period. CEO Pay Slice (CPS) is the percentage of the total compensation to the top five executives that 
goes to the CEO. CEO stkown is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO. CEO tenure is the 
number of years the CEO has held that position. CEO delta is the dollar change in CEO stock and option 
portfolio for 1% change in stock price. CEO vega is the dollar change in CEO option holdings for a 1% 
change in stock return volatility. Chair/President CEO equals to one for all CEO-years if the CEO is 
also president and chairman of the board.
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Table 3.2: Average characteristics across different groups (Cont’d) 
 
 
Group1 
Both 
Group2 
CEO 
Group3 
NonCEO 
Group4 
Neither 
P-value 
(G1-G2≠0) 
Dependent variables (t+1) 
Invest 0.073 0.050 0.065 0.057 0.000 
PP&E growth 0.12 0.032 0.078 0.016 0.000 
Asset growth 0.131 0.053 0.087 0.0356 0.000 
NetDebt 0.036 0.020 0.030 0.018 0.000 
DivPayout (%) 0.71 1.09 1.04 1.52 0.000 
Total payout (%) 2.92 3.60 3.45 3.78 0.000 
Control variables (t) 
Cash flow 0.122 0.081 0.103 0.076 0.000 
Log (TA) 7.34 7.62 7.19 7.47 0.000 
Log (Sale) 7.27 7.48 7.14 7.40 0.004 
Log (Sale) 0.135 0.057 0.1 0.041 0.000 
Tobin’s Q 2.47 1.84 2.08 1.60 0.000 
Leverage 0.208 0.223 0.221 0.252 0.042 
Tangibility 0.281 0.259 0.287 0.311 0.016 
Tangibility -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.708 
Profitability 0.160 0.124 0.150 0.121 0.000 
Profitability -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.008 
SGA/Sale 0.254 0.273 0.250 0.236 0.013 
IntanAssets 0.178 0.194 0.176 0.171 0.059 
#Business segments 2.33 2.74 2.46 2.71 0.000 
Log (PPE/Emp) 3.93 3.94 3.92 4.07 0.930 
Annual ret 0.277 0.116 0.218 0.099 0.000 
Stock vol 0.443 0.451 0.441 0.406 0.317 
Manager characteristics (t) 
CEO Stkown 0.021 0.015 0.024 0.012 0.000 
Non-CEO avgStkown 0.011 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.000 
CEO Tenure 9.6 8.91 7.67 6.17 0.039 
Non-CEO avgTenure 4.01 3.37 3.51 2.86 0.000 
CEO Delta 921 678 439 314 0.000 
Non-CEO avgDelta 175 99.7 122 74.6 0.000 
CEO Vega 153 207 125 128 0.000 
Non-CEO avgVega 42.9 48.1 35.6 33.2 0.075 
CPS 0.391 0.400 0.380 0.384 0.025 
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Table 3.3: Executive over-optimism and capital expenditure 
The table presents the results from regressions of firm capital expenditure on CEO and non-CEO 
manager team over-optimism. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and nonutility firms from 
Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item TDC1) of CEOs and other 
four highest ranked executives. The number of observations varies with the data availability for each 
variable. An executive is measured as overoptimistic for all years from the first time when CEO holds 
options that are more than 67% in the money, and at least two times during their sample tenure. A firm 
who is regarded as the one with overoptimistic non-CEO manager team should have at least two of other 
four highest ranked executives (half) are measured as over-optimism. Variable definitions are provided 
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama-
French 48-industry groupings. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firms, 
where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: CAPX/Total assets at the year (t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Group1_both 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.006***   
 (4.87) (3.33) (2.74)   
Group2_CEO 0.002 0.001 0.001   
 (1.06) (0.34) (0.36)   
Group3_NonCEO 0.0045* 0.0032 0.0029   
 (1.71) (1.20) (1.09)   
I (Opt_CEO)    0.003* 0.004** 
    (1.87) (2.17) 
Opt_NonCEO (residual)     0.004*** 
(2.91)      
Cash flow 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 
 (14.32) (13.57) (13.37) (13.49) (13.37) 
Log (TA) -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-6.68) (-6.23) (-5.93) (-6.03) (-5.93) 
MB 0.004*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (4.41) (2.24) (1.22) (1.33) (1.23) 
CEO stkown 0.035* -0.049* -0.032 -0.037 -0.033 
 (1.68) (-1.77) (-1.15) (-1.29) (-1.17) 
CEO tenure  -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
  (-1.79) (-2.44) (-2.48) (-2.44) 
CEO delta  0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  (4.49) (3.55) (3.83) (3.55) 
CEO vega  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-4.05) (-3.39) (-3.72) (-3.40) 
Cumulated return   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (4.42) (4.75) (4.47) 
Intercept 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
 (17.22) (16.16) (16.60) (16.67) (16.76) 
      
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.404 0.414 0.417 0.416 0.417 
#Obs. 15001 14167 14167 14167 14167 
      
P-value (G1-G2≠0) 0.000 0.000 0.004 - - 
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Table 3.4: Executive over-optimism and sensitivity of investment to cash flows 
The table presents the estimation results of how the CEO and non-CEO manager team over-optimism 
impacts the firm investment to cash flow sensitivity. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and 
nonutility firms from Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item 
TDC1) of CEOs and other four highest ranked executives. The number of observations varies with the 
data availability of each variable. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. All regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama and French 48-industry groupings. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CAPX/Total assets at the year (t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Group1_both * Cash flow 0.030* 0.033* 0.031*   
 (1.69) (1.77) (1.65)   
Group2_CEO * Cash flow -0.007 -0.004 -0.003   
 (-0.45) (-0.23) (-0.21)   
Group3_NonCEO * Cash flow 0.016 0.020 0.019   
 (0.58) (0.70) (0.69)   
Group1_both 0.007*** 0.004 0.003   
 (3.04) (1.55) (1.12)   
Group2_CEO 0.002 0.001 0.001   
 (1.41) (0.55) (0.53)   
Group3_NonCEO 0.003 0.002 0.001   
 (1.10) (0.59) (0.47)   
I (Opt_CEO) * Cash flow    0.018 0.019 
    (1.21) (1.25) 
I (Opt_CEO)    0.002 0.002 
    (0.85) (1.02) 
Opt_NonCEO (residual) * Cash flow     0.030** 
(1.97)      
Opt_NonCEO (residual)     0.002 
     (0.86) 
Cash flow 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 
 (8.86) (8.20) (8.16) (9.14) (8.99) 
Log (TA) -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-6.58) (-6.26) (-5.96) (-6.03) (-5.96) 
MB 0.0037*** 0.002** 0.0011 0.0014 0.001 
 (4.09) (2.00) (1.04) (1.28) (1.03) 
CEO stkown 0.0351* -0.051* -0.034 -0.0365 -0.035 
 (1.67) (-1.83) (-1.21) (-1.29) (-1.24) 
CEO tenure  -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
  (-1.78) (-2.42) (-2.45) (-2.43) 
CEO delta  0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  (4.55) (3.62) (3.83) (3.63) 
CEO vega  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-3.97) (-3.32) (-3.68) (-3.34) 
Cumulated return   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (4.35) (4.71) (4.41) 
Intercept 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
 (17.69) (16.57) (16.97) (16.88) (16.98) 
      
Year  Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.404 0.414 0.417 0.416 0.417 
#Obs. 15001 14167 14167 14167 14167 
P-value (G1-G2≠0) 0.027 0.032 0.047 - - 
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Table 3.5: Executive over-optimism and asset growth 
The table presents the results from regressions of firm tangible asset and total asset growth on the CEO 
and non-CEO manager team over-optimism. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and nonutility firms 
from Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data of CEOs and other four 
highest ranked executives. The number of observations varies with the data availability. Variable 
definitions are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, 
defined based on Fama and French 48-industry groupings. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 PP&E growth: Log(PP&E(t+1)/PP&E(t)) Total asset growth: Log(AT(t+1)/AT(t)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Group1_both 0.062*** 0.036*** 0.029***  0.057*** 0.030*** 0.027***  
 (12.10) (6.40) (5.25)  (12.51) (6.03) (5.30)  
Group2_CEO 0.013** -0.000 0.001  0.015*** 0.002 0.003  
 (2.25) (-0.05) (0.12)  (3.09) (0.43) (0.55)  
Group3 
NonCEO 
0.032*** 
(3.68) 
0.023*** 
(2.63) 
0.020** 
(2.34) 
 0.028*** 
(3.68) 
0.020*** 
(2.71) 
0.019** 
(2.53) 
 
         
I (Opt_CEO)    0.018***    0.017*** 
    (3.68)    (3.93) 
Opt_NonCEO  
(residual) 
   0.026*** 
(5.49) 
   0.022*** 
(5.42)       
         
Log (Sale) -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.011*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (-6.03) (-11.62) (-10.40) (-10.40) (-7.48) (-14.54) (-13.78) (-13.78) 
SGA/SALE -0.019 -0.047** -0.042* -0.042* -0.011 -0.038* -0.036* -0.036* 
 (-0.81) (-1.99) (-1.78) (-1.79) (-0.54) (-1.85) (-1.73) (-1.73) 
Leverage -0.090*** -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.083*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (-6.51) (-4.00) (-3.71) (-3.71) (-6.73) (-3.90) (-3.73) (-3.73) 
RD/Sale 0.081* -0.002 -0.010 -0.011 0.058 -0.024 -0.029 -0.029 
 (1.69) (-0.04) (-0.22) (-0.23) (1.31) (-0.56) (-0.65) (-0.66) 
EBIT/AT 0.505*** 0.372*** 0.338*** 0.337*** 0.478*** 0.329*** 0.310*** 0.309*** 
 (15.86) (10.60) (9.63) (9.62) (16.36) (10.40) (9.75) (9.75) 
Intangibility 0.053*** 0.036** 0.034** 0.034** 0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 (3.56) (2.32) (2.20) (2.20) (0.67) (-0.71) (-0.81) (-0.81) 
Invest 0.534*** 0.445*** 0.398*** 0.398*** 0.386*** 0.296*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 
 (11.29) (9.93) (9.07) (9.08) (8.74) (7.19) (6.66) (6.67) 
CEO stkown  -0.636*** -0.483*** -0.485***  -0.669*** -0.584*** -0.586*** 
  (-7.49) (-5.88) (-5.90)  (-8.56) (-7.59) (-7.60) 
CEO tenure  -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.017***  -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
  (-4.61) (-5.83) (-5.83)  (-6.32) (-7.11) (-7.12) 
CEO delta  0.044*** 0.034*** 0.034***  0.048*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
  (12.31) (9.78) (9.81)  (14.98) (13.21) (13.24) 
CEO vega  -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.008***  -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  (-4.82) (-3.23) (-3.25)  (-4.99) (-3.96) (-3.98) 
CumulatedRet   0.011*** 0.011***   0.006*** 0.006*** 
   (9.53) (9.58)   (6.21) (6.24) 
Intercept 0.083*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 
 (4.56) (5.20) (5.42) (5.60) (6.83) (7.78) (7.95) (8.14) 
         
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.150 0.165 0.175 0.175 0.152 0.179 0.182 0.182 
#Obs. 13144 12150 12150 12150 13156 12162 12162 12162 
         
P-value 
(G1-G2≠0) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
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Table 3.6: Executive over-optimism and net debt issuance 
The table presents the results from regressions of firm net debt issuance on the CEO and non-CEO 
manager team over-optimism. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and nonutility firms from 
Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item TDC1) of CEOs and other 
four highest ranked executives. The number of observations varies with the data availability in 
Compustat. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. All regressions include year and 
industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama and French 48-industry groupings. In parentheses are t-
statistics based on standard errors clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Net Debt Issuance (t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Group1_both 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.009***   
 (6.21) (4.03) (3.57)   
Group2_CEO 0.004* 0.002 0.002   
 (1.76) (0.61) (0.62)   
Group3_NonCEO 0.009** 0.006 0.006   
 (2.02) (1.50) (1.42)   
I (Opt_CEO)    0.005** 0.006*** 
    (2.38) (2.78) 
Opt_NonCEO (residual)     0.007*** 
(3.23)      
Tangibility 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
 (5.30) (5.04) (5.03) (5.06) (5.03) 
Profitability -0.035 -0.022 -0.018 -0.020 -0.018 
 (-1.34) (-0.84) (-0.70) (-0.79) (-0.70) 
MB 0.006*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (3.23) (2.45) (2.21) (2.21) (2.21) 
Log (Sale) 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (6.08) (5.16) (4.68) (4.90) (4.68) 
Leverage -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (-3.42) (-4.19) (-3.97) (-4.01) (-3.97) 
CEO stkown  -0.084*** -0.072** -0.076** -0.072** 
  (-2.62) (-2.25) (-2.41) (-2.26) 
CEO tenure  -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
  (-1.81) (-2.16) (-2.28) (-2.16) 
CEO delta  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (3.88) (3.08) (3.63) (3.10) 
CEO vega  -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 
  (-1.81) (-1.32) (-1.89) (-1.33) 
Cumulated return   0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 
   (2.18) (2.59) (2.20) 
Intercept 0.019*** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013** 0.014** 
 (4.21) (2.02) (2.28) (2.31) (2.44) 
      
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
#Obs. 14601 13579 13579 13579 13579 
      
P-value (G1-G2≠0) 0.000 0.001 0.002 - - 
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Table 3.7: Executives over-optimism and dividend payout 
The table presents the results from regressions of firm payout policies on the CEO and non-CEO manager 
team over-optimism. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and nonutility firms from Execucomp for 
the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data of CEOs and other four highest ranked 
executives. The dependent variable is the firm’s total dividend payment (or total payout amount) scaled 
by its market capitalization in year t+1. The number of observations varies with the data availability in 
Compustat. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. All regressions include year and 
industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama and French 48-industry groupings. In parentheses are t-
statistics based on standard errors clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Dividend/MarketCap 
(t+1) 
Dependent variable: Total payout/MarketCap 
(t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Group1_both -0.664*** -0.547*** -0.529***  -1.097*** -0.974*** -0.897***  
 (-12.45) (-10.05) (-9.76)  (-8.97) (-7.39) (-6.82)  
Group2_CEO -0.346*** -0.284*** -0.285***  -0.448*** -0.501*** -0.504***  
 (-5.65) (-4.52) (-4.54)  (-3.33) (-3.69) (-3.73)  
Group3 
NonCEO 
-0.373*** 
(-4.93) 
-0.307*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.302*** 
(-3.95) 
 -0.425** 
(-2.26) 
-0.355* 
(-1.87) 
-0.334* 
(-1.77) 
 
         
I (Opt_CEO)    -0.413***    -0.733*** 
    (-8.67)    (-6.61) 
         
Opt_NonCEO 
(residual) 
   -0.260*** 
(-6.06) 
   -0.377*** 
(-3.43) 
         
MB -0.034** 0.015 0.030* 0.030* -0.176*** -0.205*** -0.141*** -0.142*** 
 (-2.45) (0.88) (1.74) (1.76) (-4.58) (-4.73) (-3.18) (-3.18) 
Cash flow 1.336*** 1.498*** 1.532*** 1.530*** 6.382*** 6.342*** 6.485*** 6.487*** 
 (7.05) (7.83) (8.02) (8.02) (12.92) (12.74) (13.17) (13.17) 
Log (Sale) 0.245*** 0.298*** 0.294*** 0.294*** 0.514*** 0.350*** 0.333*** 0.332*** 
 (15.57) (14.33) (14.10) (14.11) (15.61) (7.62) (7.23) (7.21) 
Tangibility 0.201 0.162 0.153 0.153 -1.564*** -1.485*** -1.522*** -1.522*** 
 (1.40) (1.10) (1.04) (1.04) (-4.82) (-4.54) (-4.67) (-4.67) 
Leverage -0.297** -0.298** -0.309** -0.309** -1.392*** -1.404*** -1.449*** -1.449*** 
 (-2.20) (-2.13) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-4.56) (-4.53) (-4.71) (-4.71) 
CEO stkown -0.427 2.347*** 2.071*** 2.058*** -1.533 2.379 1.221 1.234 
 (-0.85) (3.22) (2.81) (2.80) (-1.09) (1.30) (0.67) (0.67) 
CEO tenure 0.063*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.057 0.037 0.084 0.084 
 (2.82) (4.42) (4.82) (4.82) (0.93) (0.58) (1.33) (1.33) 
CEO delta  -0.193*** -0.175*** -0.175***  -0.157** -0.083 -0.083 
  (-5.34) (-4.73) (-4.73)  (-2.09) (-1.07) (-1.08) 
CEO vega  0.086*** 0.077*** 0.077***  0.443*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 
  (3.27) (2.89) (2.87)  (8.54) (7.77) (7.78) 
CumulativeRet   -0.028*** -0.028***   -0.117*** -0.118*** 
   (-4.20) (-4.15)   (-6.21) (-6.22) 
Intercept -0.130 -0.109 -0.143 -0.188 -0.015 0.428 0.287 0.240 
 (-0.94) (-0.79) (-1.03) (-1.38) (-0.04) (1.27) (0.84) (0.71) 
         
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.258 0.271 0.272 0.272 0.160 0.167 0.170 0.170 
#Obs.  14952 14124 14124 14124 14976 14147 14147 14147 
         
P-value  
(G1-G2≠0) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.003 - 
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Table 3.8: Robustness test: Further controlling for corporate governance effect 
The table presents the results from regressions of firm investment, financing and payout policy on the 
CEO and non-CEO manager team over-optimism, when additionally controlling for the proxies of 
corporate governance: board size and independent board ratio (Board Indpt). Other control variables, 
including determinants of outcome variables, manager tenure, compensation incentives, and firm past 
performance, are also included but not reported in the table. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and 
nonutility firms from Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item 
TDC1) of CEOs and other four highest ranked executives. In column (2), we report the coefficients of 
Group1_both, Group2_CEO, and Group3_NonCEO interacted with cash flows. The number of 
observations varies with the data availability. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.2. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama-French 48-industry groupings. 
In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPX 
CAPX-
CF 
PP&E 
growth 
Total 
asset 
growth 
Net debt 
issuance 
Total 
dividend 
Total 
payout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Group1_both 0.004 0.049** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.010*** -0.548*** -0.896*** 
 (1.43) (1.97) (4.74) (5.12) (3.50) (-8.39) (-5.78) 
Group2_CEO 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.005 -0.323*** -0.574*** 
 (0.32) (0.15) (1.06) (1.55) (1.60) (-4.29) (-3.59) 
Group3_NonCEO 0.001 0.057 0.008 0.009 0.005 -0.414*** -0.304 
 (0.29) (1.52) (0.89) (1.15) (1.06) (-4.56) (-1.31) 
Board size -0.002 -0.003 -0.016* -0.006 0.004 0.577*** 0.451** 
 (-0.68) (-0.70) (-1.73) (-0.68) (1.02) (5.57) (2.04) 
Board Indpt -0.000 -0.000 -0.016 0.009 0.018** 0.446*** 1.001*** 
 (-0.05) (-0.03) (-0.97) (0.62) (2.29) (2.73) (2.58) 
Intercept 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 0.011 -1.647*** -0.464 
 (10.35) (10.40) (3.08) (3.43) (1.04) (-6.36) (-0.76) 
        
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.432 0.433 0.142 0.149 0.040 0.283 0.173 
#Obs. 9601 9601 8498 8504 9205 9584 9600 
        
P-value (G1-G2≠0) 0.140 0.030 0.001 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.029 
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Table 3.9: Robustness test: Further controlling for the CEO power 
The table presents the results from regressions of firm investment, financing and payout policy on the 
CEO and non-CEO manager team over-optimism, when additionally controlling for CEO power: CEO 
pay slice (CPS) and an indicator variable which equals one if CEO is the chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise. Other control variables, including determinants of outcome variables, manager tenure, 
compensation incentives, and firm past performance, are also included but not reported in the table. The 
sample consists of all nonfinancial and nonutility firms from Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with 
available compensation data (item TDC1) of CEOs and other four highest ranked executives. In column 
(2), we report the coefficients of Group1_both, Group2_CEO, and Group3_NonCEO interacted with 
cash flows. The number of observations varies with the data availability. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 3.1 and 3.2. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on 
Fama-French 48-industry groupings. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by 
firms, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPX 
CAPX-
CF 
PP&E 
growth 
Total 
asset 
growth 
Net debt 
issuance 
Total 
dividend 
Total 
payout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Group1_both 0.005** 0.042* 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.009*** -0.550*** -0.887*** 
 (1.99) (1.79) (4.86) (4.96) (3.30) (-8.33) (-5.65) 
Group2_CEO 0.001 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.003 -0.292*** -0.543*** 
 (0.68) (0.57) (0.85) (0.83) (1.16) (-3.89) (-3.38) 
Group3_NonCEO 0.001 0.035 0.015 0.011 0.002 -0.361*** -0.360 
 (0.40) (0.99) (1.59) (1.29) (0.42) (-4.10) (-1.57) 
CPS -0.010 -0.009 0.028 0.028 0.026** 0.419** 0.243 
 (-1.56) (-1.47) (1.24) (1.42) (2.42) (2.26) (0.47) 
I (CEO_chairman) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.086* 0.150 
 (-1.23) (-1.24) (-0.45) (0.26) (0.17) (1.79) (1.18) 
Intercept 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.040* 0.071*** 0.025*** -0.655*** 0.419 
 (13.38) (13.77) (1.82) (3.51) (2.96) (-3.57) (0.95) 
        
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.440 0.441 0.150 0.153 0.040 0.267 0.174 
#Obs. 10104 10104 8899 8911 9696 10079 10097 
        
P-value  
(G1-G2≠0) 
0.071 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.024 
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Table 3.10: Robustness test: Restricting to a subsample where managers stay in 
firms at least 3 years 
The table presents the results from subsample regressions of firm investment, financing and payout 
policy on the CEO and non-CEO manager team over-optimism, where CEOs should stay at firm at least 
3 years, and the average tenure of other non-CEO managers should be at least three years. Other control 
variables, including determinants of outcome variables, manager tenure, compensation incentives, and 
firm past performance, are also included but not reported in the table. The sample consists of nonfinancial 
and nonutility firms from Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item 
TDC1) of CEOs and other four highest ranked executives. The number of observations varies with the 
data availability. In column (2), we report the coefficients of Group1_Both, Group2_CEO, and 
Group3_NonCEO interacted with cash flows. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.2. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on Fama-French 48-industry groupings. 
In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
CAPX 
CAPX-
CF 
PP&E 
growth 
Total 
asset 
growth 
Net debt 
issuance Dividend 
Total 
payout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Group1_both 0.006** 0.038 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.007** -0.655*** -1.145*** 
 (2.13) (1.30) (2.70) (3.27) (2.19) (-8.68) (-6.42) 
Group2_CEO 0.002 0.003 -0.008 0.003 0.001 -0.371*** -0.631*** 
 (0.66) (0.12) (-1.10) (0.45) (0.36) (-4.33) (-3.33) 
Group3_NonCEO 0.005 0.032 0.015 0.009 0.009 -0.441*** -0.416 
 (1.21) (0.74) (1.24) (0.87) (1.36) (-3.93) (-1.49) 
Intercept 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.128*** 0.150*** 0.040*** - 0.254 1.242** 
 (11.99) (12.30) (4.46) (5.54) (3.32) (-1.28) (2.21) 
        
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.438 0.439 0.155 0.149 0.034 0.259 0.164 
#Obs. 8101 8101 7102 7108 7758 8059 8072 
        
P-value (G1-G2≠0) 0.039 0.118 0.000 0.002 0.044 0.000 0.002 
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Table 3.11: Executive over-optimism and firm value 
This table presents the results from regressions of Tobin’s Q on an instrument for firm growth 
opportunities and on CEO and non-CEO manager team over-optimism. Industry PE is the proxy for 
growth opportunities is calculated as the average monthly industry PE over the fiscal year. The monthly 
industry PE is calculated as the log transformation of the industry’s total market capitalization to total 
earnings less a 60-month moving average. The sample consists of all nonfinancial and nonutility firms 
from Execucomp for the 1993-2015 period, with available compensation data (item TDC1) of CEOs and 
other four highest ranked executives. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by firms, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q (t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industry PE 0.143*** 0.0308 0.0267 0.0188 
 (5.99) (1.10) (0.99) (0.70) 
Group1_both * Industry PE  0.214***   
  (4.39)   
Group2_CEO * Industry PE  0.0462   
  (1.11)   
Group3_NonCEO * Industry PE  -0.0270 
(-0.34) 
  
    
Group1_both  0.448***   
  (11.53)   
Group2_CEO  0.086**   
  (2.11)   
Group3_NonCEO  0.203***   
  (3.67)   
I (Opt_CEO) * Industry PE   0.178*** 0.175*** 
   (4.46) (4.41) 
Opt_NonCEO (residual)* Industry PE    0.105** 
(2.37)     
I (Opt_CEO)   0.299*** 0.317*** 
   (8.92) (9.45) 
Opt_NonCEO (residual)    0.314*** 
    (9.22) 
Log (Sale) -0.089*** -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.082*** 
 (-6.35) (-6.02) (-6.44) (-6.01) 
Log (PPE/Emp) -0.021 -0.025 -0.024 -0.025 
 (-0.99) (-1.19) (-1.15) (-1.17) 
Stock return 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 
 (5.41) (5.15) (5.30) (5.14) 
Stock return * Industry PE -0.021** -0.020** -0.021** -0.019** 
 (-2.13) (-2.14) (-2.18) (-2.09) 
ROA 4.155*** 3.740*** 3.962*** 3.740*** 
 (11.51) (10.49) (11.03) (10.47) 
# Business segments -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.052*** 
 (-5.18) (-4.66) (-4.89) (-4.66) 
Intercept 1.977*** 1.870*** 1.916*** 1.899*** 
 (14.57) (13.88) (14.29) (14.14) 
     
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.317 0.341 0.330 0.341 
#Obs. 12451 12451 12451 12451 
